American vultures over Belarus
The republic itself prefers to call the foreign policy of Belarus the beautiful words “multi-vector” and “balanced.” In reality, there is a less beautiful, but more suitable word for it - limitrophe.
For almost three decades now, the Republic has been maneuvering the geopolitical poles of power, playing on the contradictions between them and regional crises. In this she is not original. Many post-Soviet states are pursuing or have pursued such a policy. There is just one problem - it cannot be carried out endlessly. There is always a great chance of not fitting into the next turn of global politics or simply playing too hard, overestimating your capabilities. There are plenty of examples of this. The most famous are the former President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who now lives in Minsk, or his Ukrainian colleague and fellow sufferer Viktor Yanukovych, who lives in Rostov-on-Don.
Lukashenko is now increasingly being compared to the latter. And Belarus in 2020, respectively, with Ukraine in 2013. Is this comparison justified? Yes and no.
No - because the political situation in Belarus is very different from what it was then in Ukraine. And Belarusian pro-government experts never tire of talking about this.
Firstly, there is no such split in Belarus. There is no own Galicia and no Donbass. Yes, Grodno gravitates a little more towards Poland, Vitebsk towards Russia, but these are not critical differences, there is no hostility between the regions, and the most oppositional and pro-Western is Minsk.
Yanukovych largely let the situation take its course, flirted with the most radical nationalist forces, and allowed Maidan technologies to be tested at numerous protests, which sometimes did not stop for years.
Lukashenko, although he patronizes the isolation of Belarus from the all-Russian space and the implantation of a new, largely artificial identity of Belarusians, he himself tightly controls the process, not allowing it to take radical forms that are dangerous for his power.
If there are nationalist militant groups similar to the Ukrainian ones in the republic, then information about their existence is present only at the level of rumors. Lukashenko has much better control of the situation in the country, and the chances of a Maidan-type coup in the coming months are low.
Yes - because in Belarus a large, well-structured and paid Western lobby has developed, including not only almost the entire opposition, but also numerous NGOs, supposedly of a cultural and educational nature, a significant part of the local elites, also absorbing Western grants, part of the highest nomenklatura and expert communities. And just like Yanukovych, Lukashenko and Makei clearly overestimated their strength and significance in the geopolitical arena, getting involved in a large-scale game of global actors.
Perhaps, after Pompeo’s visit, the Belarusian leadership became even more playful. Relations between Russia and the West are now much worse than they were in 2013. In addition, under Trump, the United States has become the world's largest oil producer, and is now engaged in a fierce struggle with Russia for oil markets, primarily the European one. The stakes are very high. And at this moment, Lukashenko, who was nominally considered an ally of Russia, agrees to the Americans taking over his oil market, and at unfavorable prices for himself.
If the Russians could still treat a tanker from small Norway with leniency, then after American oil goes to Belarusian refineries, the point of no return may be passed.
Another common feature between Yanukovych’s multi-vector Ukraine and Lukashenko’s multi-vector Belarus is that their multi-vector nature is only possible when Russia does not oppose it.
Both the Ukrainian and Belarusian economies are critically dependent on the Russian one. The post-Maidan economic collapse and the collapse of industry in Ukraine convincingly proved this. In the case of Belarus, this dependence is even greater. The republic's economy is virtually unviable apart from the Russian market. It is export-oriented and a significant part of this export goes to Russia. It is not possible to reorient it in any way in the near future.
Even the export of petroleum products to Europe is profitable due to cheap Russian oil. In some industries, the Russian market share in Belarusian exports is more than 80 percent. Including agriculture.
Pompeo, having promised to provide 100 percent of Belarus’ oil needs, of course, did not promise to equally compensate Belarusian losses with purchases of potatoes, milk and tractors. And the republic will apparently begin to lose the Russian market. Large retail chains will begin to refuse Belarusian products, and import substitution will begin in other areas. For the Russian economy, this will only become a driver of growth, and for the Belarusian economy it will mean an inevitable collapse, in comparison with which the Ukrainian problems of 2014 will seem like flowers.
It is in the conditions of this economic collapse that a social explosion with unpredictable consequences is possible.
Over the past year and a half, high-ranking Americans have often flown to Minsk. They are like vultures - they circle, descending ever closer and wait until they can start eating. They are not interested in the Belarusian economy, nor the standard of living of Belarusians, nor peace in the country, nor, especially, the fate of Lukashenko. Their goal, without hesitation, was voiced back in 2018 by the former assistant of the same Pompeo, Wess Mitchell - “a bastion against Russian imperialism.” At the same time, you can make money on the construction of the bastion.
In Minsk, Pompeo has already been promised to simplify access for American business to Belarus. What kind of business this can be - we have a good idea of Hunter Biden and Paul Pelosi Jr. using the Ukrainian example.
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