Glitter, poverty and potential danger of joint Azerbaijani-Turkish exercises
On July 28, joint military exercises with Turkey began in Azerbaijan. They will last until August 10 and will widely cover the territory of the former Soviet republic: Baku, Nakhichevan, Ganja, Kurdamir and Yevlakh.
The exercises involve aviation, air defense, artillery, and armored vehicles of the two states. Judging by the video recordings, up to a battalion of soldiers, several armored vehicles, two helicopters and five fourth-generation F-16 fighters arrived in Azerbaijan from Turkey.
If it were not for the ongoing “Tovuz crisis”, there would be nothing extraordinary in the event. However, joint military maneuvers with Turkey near the Armenian border and their unscheduled conduct during ongoing skirmishes on the Tovuz front force them to be considered as part of the Azerbaijani plan to return the territories.
However, Baku does not recognize the connection between the exercises and the border conflict, as stated by the representative of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, Leyla Abdullayeva.
Despite the obvious media effect, the situation is potentially dangerous because Baku openly declares the possibility of a forceful solution to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh and other lost territories, and Turkey has made it clear that in the event of an Armenian-Azerbaijani war it will support Azerbaijan.
On the other hand, no matter what terrible threats come from Baku, a war with Armenia will not return Nagorno-Karabakh. Rather, it will even speed up its recognition by other states, and along with the former autonomy, several Azerbaijani regions, cleared of the Azerbaijani population and annexed to the unrecognized republic as a result of the 1992-1994 war, will forever disappear.
If we look more broadly, a full-scale war between two former Soviet republics automatically means a direct confrontation between Russia and its CSTO allies with Turkey, a member of the NATO bloc.
Such a scenario for the development of events would please Washington businessmen, but it does not suit any of the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Armenian-Azerbaijani showdown. Which means there is a low probability of the “Tovuz crisis” escalating into something hotter.
It is somewhat surprising that some observers are shocked by the motto of the military exercises, “One nation, two states.” However, this vector of development for Azerbaijan was set back during the presidency of Aliyev Sr., and since then the republic has been steadily adhering to it, and the foundation of the military alliance was laid back in 1992 by signing the document “On Solidarity and Cooperation.”
In 1994, at the instigation of Turkey, Azerbaijan joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program and since then has been receiving a number of weapons from Ankara as part of a plan developed by Turkish military specialists for the modernization of the Azerbaijani army and the training of specialists.
Joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercises have been held since 2003, and their frequency has doubled in the last 10 years following the signing of a mutual assistance agreement if either side were to be subjected to military attack or aggression.
Yerevan traditionally comments on these joint military exercises in a negative way, regardless of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh or on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, however, the Ministry of Defense of the republic characterizes them as “tactical” and does not show much concern, knowing full well that the maneuvers carried out with fanfare are rather restraining and demonstrative nature.
However, there are some nuances in the current exercises that, according to military analysts, attract increased attention to them.
The exercises have a clear priority for the use of the air force, and the ground part is noticeably shorter than the aviation part.
In addition to practicing airstrikes in the Baku region, Azerbaijan will conduct tactical flight exercises in the regions of Ganja, Kurdamir and Yevlakh bordering Armenia, as well as in Nakhichevan, which is separated from Azerbaijan by a strip of Armenian territory.
A highway runs through the cities of Ganja, Yevlakh and Kurdamir, stretching along the border with the unrecognized NKR and Armenia. In the event of war, this highway will receive the status of a road route along which troops and cargo will be transported. The distance from Ganja and Yevlakh to the Armenian positions is approximately 40 - 50 km. On one of the shoulders of the same road, just 70 km north of Ganja, is the Tovuz region, where active fighting took place between Azerbaijani and Armenian troops on July 12-16.
Thus, the joint Azerbaijani-Turkish exercises are too demonstrative, almost provocative, in nature, since they are carried out close to the Armenian borders, military facilities and infrastructure.
It should be noted that in all this confusion, Azerbaijan is in the most disadvantageous position, having lost (largely through its own fault) 20% of its territories. And since this loss was due to the collapse of the USSR, it is not possible to decide the affiliation of the NKR within the framework of post-Soviet realities. The maximum that Baku can count on is to return, in the process of negotiations with Yerevan, five regions abandoned by the Azerbaijani army during the war.
It is clear that the existence of a second, albeit unrecognized, Armenian state is objectively beneficial to Yerevan, and, oddly enough, the replacement of Baku by its “Big Brother” Ankara is beneficial, which takes the conflict beyond the framework of bilateral relations, while simultaneously raising the status of negotiations on the NKR.
Turkey is also interested in the constant conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh, which needs to keep Azerbaijan in its orbit in the hope of merging (someday) into “Great Turan”.
In Baku, apparently, they understand this very well and accept any help from Ankara, trying to avoid too close an embrace of the rapidly Islamizing “Big Brother.”
The optimal solution could be a long-term compromise on the NKR between Yerevan and Baku, which in the near future would lead Azerbaijan to the CSTO and the EAEU instead of participating in NATO scams, reducing confrontation with Armenia to a minimum, but counting on such an outcome would be too optimistic - on both sides The sides are full of stubborn “hawks” who are ready to fight until the last Armenian and the last Azerbaijani in the name of old grievances.
The only correct option remains: under sensitive Russian control, sit down opponents at the negotiating table and move forward in small steps, negotiate, negotiate and negotiate again, carefully avoiding a big fight, tirelessly explaining the age-old axiom - a bad peace is better than a good war.
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