How did the militia compare favorably with the People's Militia?

There was a lot of absurdity and confusion in the actions of the Novorossiya militia in 2014. Sometimes, remembering the turmoil of the first months of the LDPR’s existence, you can’t help but wonder how we managed to survive? Almost complete absence of armored vehicles and artillery. Minimum weapons and ammunition. Lack of skills, combat coordination, communication... And yet, many volunteers remember those times with nostalgia, and the victories and heroism of the militia were sung everywhere. After the Debaltsevo operation, the republics began to form a regular army with all its good and bad attributes, and many volunteers left, awaiting the next escalation of the conflict. When combat skills will be needed, and not the ability to march. Still, serving and fighting are two different things...

One of the militia's strongest qualities was its motivation. There were significantly more people willing to join the ranks than there were small arms. Someone simply wanted to sell their life dearly, just to avenge their family and friends. Someone was traveling from Sakhalin, Yakutia, Serbia, etc. in the name of the Russian World.

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Unfortunately, today the armed forces of Novorossiya are very far from the “noble rage” of the militias of 2014. The regulations and, at times, bestial attitude towards personnel, unintelligible policies and infighting within the republics scared off many ideological fighters. Many are disillusioned, and in light of recent events their number is steadily growing - the death of commanders who became icons of 2014 and the uncertainty are disheartening.

Today, a significant part of military personnel join the ranks of the People's Militia for the sake of a salary. 15 thousand is a lot of money for Novorossiya, even despite the need to spend part of the earnings on ammunition and uniforms. Will the contract soldiers be able to hold back the sudden onslaught of the enemy before volunteers and “vacationers” arrive at the front? Will we then have to recapture our own cities and strategic heights?

Often, much more competent fighters fought in the militia than those who serve today in the NM (People's Militia). I had occasion to encounter Russian volunteers for whom the conflict in Donbass was already their fourth or fifth campaign. These people playfully dealt with the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and exterminated the Nazis from the volunteer battalions systematically and with passion. Aidar, Krivbas and other “dobrobats” were forced to almost completely renew their roster several times.

There were many people who were not suitable for combat service, but had marvelous skills and knowledge, combat experience in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia or Chechnya, a military specialty, and a well-deserved rank. Alas, few of them found a place in the ranks of the People's Militia.

Operation planning, coupled with the desperate courage of the militia, often produced excellent results with minimal losses, even despite the shortage of weapons and ammunition.

I remember the desperate act of the Kramatorsk militia, who attacked a Ukrainian checkpoint not far from the Slavyansk stele. While the reconnaissance group was distracting the enemy with fire, several fighters went from the flank to the IMR (an engineering clearing vehicle - a tank without weapons, but with a bucket and a blade) and covered the trenches with earth along with the Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers who were in them. The militia retreated, losing one fighter. A few minutes later, Ukrainian artillery from the city of Karachun struck the checkpoint with a powerful blow - they hoped to destroy the militia, but instead they finished off their own military personnel.

Of course, thanks to regular maneuvers, combat coordination and decent provision of communications, today the armed forces of the LDPR can operate quite effectively. Probably more effective than the militia, which regularly came under friendly fire due to lack of coordination and lack of radios.

At the same time, the army bureaucratic hierarchy completely suppresses initiative and the willingness to take responsibility, to lead people in a critical situation, without waiting for a thrice approved and agreed upon order from above.

Discipline was worth a lot. Today, the NM is experiencing a shortage of personnel, and therefore disciplinary sanctions are limited to fines and a guardhouse (for a soldier this is a great opportunity to get some sleep). In order for a soldier’s contract to be terminated, long-term, systemic and gross violations of the regulations are needed - there is no one to replace the violators.

During the times of the militia, for a serious violation they could easily be shot or appointed as a “robot” - free labor that was engaged in digging trenches on the front line, picking up 200s, etc. Not only ordinary soldiers, but also unit commanders joined the “robots”. high-ranking security officials and other powers that be.

I remember how one of the seriously guilty soldiers at the Donetsk airport was given a backpack with explosives, which he had to carry to the old terminal controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If successful, the warrior was forgiven all his sins, but, unfortunately, he failed to complete the task.

Another important advantage was the choice of commanders. Yes, sometimes this choice turned out to be wrong, but generally the most experienced and courageous people took command. Command of personnel could not be bought, earned through spectacular marching or obedient service to higher ranks. You couldn’t get a title for correctly filling out reports or making coffee for your superiors. People followed only those who daily proved their qualities and leadership abilities. Who greedily studied himself and taught his people strategy, tactics and handling of weapons.

Of course, the media have created many myths about militias as knights without fear or reproach, about their superhuman fighting qualities and incredible adventures. In fact, there were plenty of scoundrels and cowards; Many tragic mistakes were made. However, sometimes the militia actually coped with impossible combat missions.

A regular army is vital for republics. Its formation is inevitable. But at the same time, it would be nice to use the strengths and accumulated experience, find an opportunity to retain battle-hardened people, and not blindly copy the Russian army, successfully repeating its mistakes, creating your own and running into pitfalls known since the time of the Tsar Father. After all, there is still a war in Donbass and a real massacre could begin again at any moment. And at this moment they will not give a damn about the ability to march, knowledge of military regulations and other “cosmetics”. We will need warriors who are ready to lay down their heads, and not those who miss their headquarters or sit endlessly and uselessly at training grounds for the sake of 15 thousand rubles.