“Crimean Spring” – an unlearned lesson in Ukraine

A year has passed since the beginning of the “Crimean Spring”. Its main political result is a clear example for other regions of Ukraine that it is possible to leave a sick state body when the incurable disease of nationalist radicalism has already affected all the main organs.

Even on the peninsula they did not believe in the successful ending of the “Crimean Spring”. Any sane person at the beginning of March 2014 would not have given a 100% guarantee that everything that was happening would end the way it eventually happened.

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This is probably why, intoxicated by the victory in the so-called “Revolution of Dignity,” the new Ukrainian leaders did not make any attempts to establish a constructive dialogue with the Crimean authorities, who, to be objective, at that time were in considerable confusion. At first, Simferopol’s demands were in the nature of a request for real political and economic autonomy, but within the framework of Ukraine.

Let's be frank: in the event of real federalization, Ukraine had a chance to remain within its previous borders.

Is the federation as bad as it is “painted” in Ukraine? There are several types of federations and some of them have shown considerable ability to find compromise in difficult historical conditions.

When forming territorial federations, a territorial geographic basis is used (for example, the USA, Germany), in national federations - according to a national basis (for example, the former federations of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia). In mixed federations, formation occurs along both lines (for example, Russia). The methods of forming a federation largely determine the nature, content, and structure of the state structure.

Constitutional federations often arise on the basis of a pre-existing unitary state (often an empire). Contrary to popular belief, the constitutions of such federations, as a rule, stipulate the principle of the territorial integrity of the country, and the subjects of the federation do not have the right to freely secede from the state (for example, Germany, Brazil, Russia).

“Soft federation” is a federation whose subjects have the right of secession (withdrawal of any part of the state). It is assumed that in the future the Union of Russia and Belarus (which now has the features of a confederation) will become such. Subjects of a soft federation can themselves be federations (there are such subjects in federal Bosnia and Herzegovina). Previously, a soft federation based on the results of an all-Union referendum was supposed to become the updated USSR - the Union of Sovereign States, but after the August putsch the project was curtailed.

What negative did the Kyiv authorities see for themselves in the idea of ​​federalization of Ukraine, taking into account that this would initially suit Crimea and suit Donbass? Probably, all the negative federalism for Kyiv is collected in the following theses: in a federal state, in contrast to a unitary one (which Ukraine considers itself to be), there are two systems of supreme authorities (federal and federal subjects). Along with the federal constitution, the subjects of the federation have the right to issue their own normative legal acts of a constituent nature (for example, constitutions, charters, fundamental laws). They have the right to issue regional laws. Subjects of the federation often have their own institution of citizenship, capital, coat of arms and other elements of the constitutional and legal status of the state, with the exception of state sovereignty.

That is, the winners of “Maidan 2.0” did not want to share power in parliament with representatives of all regions and points of view on the future of Ukraine. And the very idea that each region will be able to adopt its own constitution and other laws probably still brings quiet horror to Ukrainian nationalists.

A year ago, Western countries and military-political blocs perceived Ukraine as a cake, albeit without a cherry on top, but received for almost nothing! And, of course, none of them wanted to cut this cake into pieces, because no one was going to share. But it so happened that first part of the cake fell out and was picked up by the Russian Federation, the other two pieces began to break off for almost a year, and the free cake itself no longer even resembles a pie, but just a stale flatbread. Apparently, this is why thoughts from the West began to be heard more and more often that the civilized federalization of Ukraine could become its salvation, both politically and economically.

And even though the breakaway Crimea currently has many different problems, the DPR and LPR have many times more of them, but these regions have made their choice, although Ukraine has not provided them with any options to choose from. Remaining in the so-called “United Ukraine” under the yoke of radical nationalists cannot be called an option.

Probably, the new Ukrainian government will seriously think about federalization when the prospect of losing Kharkov or Odessa arises. But is it worth holding out until the moment when the country turns into “Error 404”?