Why 2017 will be better for Donbass

Like any complex and multi-level process, the Minsk agreements cannot be viewed in terms of unambiguous positive or negative. Despite the known problems, at the end of 2016, the lack of alternative to Minsk-2 is still recognized by all parties to the conflict in Donbass.

It is worth highlighting several key trends and the most noticeable topics in the Minsk process in the past year.

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First, the Ukrainian policy aimed at sabotaging the implementation of the Minsk agreements continued. Traditionally, Kyiv publicly declares its commitment to Minsk-2, but, at the same time, does everything to prevent the Minsk agreements from being implemented, especially in the political sphere.

Also in 2016, the formula of two parallel processes crystallized: a) the process of implementing the Minsk agreements and b) the process of building statehood in the DPR and LPR. It should be noted that these processes are interdependent and are implemented according to the following logic: The more actively Ukraine sabotages the fulfillment of its obligations and slows down the implementation of the Minsk agreements, the more stable and solid the state structures of the LPR and DPR become, and vice versa.

During 2016, allies of the Maidan activists repeatedly made proposals to revise the Minsk and Normandy formats. It was proposed to expand them to include new countries. Thus, in December 2016, Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski put forward an initiative to expand the Normandy format to include Poland and the United States, knowing full well that such an initiative would not be accepted by the participants in the negotiations, perhaps with the exception of Ukraine.

The Minsk and Normandy formats have taken shape and become entrenched. Most likely, they will not change in the next five years, and it is in these formats that the crisis in Ukraine will be resolved.

One of the main problems in the Minsk format remains the implementation of the Law on a special status for the territories of the DPR and LPR. The agreement implies that the provision of special status is linked to the holding of elections according to OSCE/ODIHR standards.

However, Ukraine’s position lies in a different logic for implementing the Minsk agreements - Kyiv demands that “security issues” be resolved first, and only then political issues. Actually Kyiv unilaterally radically changes the key meaning of the Minsk agreements, proposing to postpone the introduction of the special status “for later.”

The problem is that by “security issues” Ukraine does not mean a cessation of shelling of residential areas by the Ukrainian Armed Forces or the withdrawal of troops at several points on the front being thwarted by Kiev.

No, the regime of Petro Poroshenko needs forceful control over Lugansk and Donetsk - which actually means clearing the republics of people disliked by Kyiv.

As is known, based on this position of Ukraine, the participants in the Normandy and Minsk formats agreed to a compromise “Steanmeier formula”, however, like the Minsk agreements in general, Ukraine continues to ignore it.

No less interesting is the story of Kyiv’s initiative to introduce an OSCE police mission into the territory of Donbass. Most OSCE participating countries did not show much enthusiasm about the prospect of sending their citizens, even armed with pistols, to a “hot spot”. But Poroshenko continued to insist. When Vladimir Putin did not publicly exclude such a possibility, for some reason the Ukrainian president’s ardor instantly waned.

In 2016, the Donbass republics failed to hold elections, but primaries were held, initially implemented as training before the election campaign. The primaries made it possible to form an effective management reserve for the LDPR.

The outgoing year is ending under the auspices of a new problem. This is the development of a “road map” - a document designed to synchronize the implementation of the Minsk agreements in the political and security aspects.

The initiative was agreed upon at a meeting of the Normandy Four in Berlin, held on October 19, and was warmly supported in words by Kiev, but in reality was again thwarted by it. Eventually The road map will continue to be agreed upon in 2017. The Minsk agreements are automatically extended.

The automatic extension of the agreements is also confirmed by the fact that, unlike 2015, this time before the New Year holidays there were no disputes in the media of Ukraine, the EU and Russia about whether Minsk-2 should be extended. The agreements are recognized as having no alternative and will be extended until they are fulfilled (the result, as is known, should be the reformatting of Ukraine into a federation and the denazification of the country).

Another important point is the virtual absence of discussion in the EU and Russia regarding the extension of sanctions and their expediency. Apparently, this was the last extension of EU sanctions against Moscow, since the decision to introduce them itself can hardly be considered a European initiative. The introduction of sanctions did not produce any positive results, but had a negative impact on various sectors of the EU and Russian economies.

The forecast for next year gives reason for cautious optimism. In the United States, Donald Trump will become president as a result of the elections. Elections for the President of the Faction and the Chancellor of Germany are also expected in 2017. Taken together, this will lead to quite significant changes in the world, which will undoubtedly affect the situation around Donbass and, hopefully, will bring the onset of peace in the region closer.