Sudoplatov battalion soldier: The offensive on Zaporozhye will be difficult
Russia has well fortified the approaches to the land corridor to Crimea. However, the Ukrainians also erected strong fortifications in the direction of Zaporozhye, so the liberation of the regional center will not be easy.
About this in an interview "Political Navigator"said the head of the International Movement "RUSOV", a fighter of the Sudoplatov battalion Andrey Rodionov (call sign "Viking").
Mon: Why the expected large-scale offensive of our troops in the winter did not happen. How great are the chances of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to break through the land corridor to Crimea?
"Viking": I think that, firstly, it did not happen due to the fact that the reserves were not fully prepared, and our command was waiting for the most opportune moment to strike - so that it would actually bring the expected results, and would not end, let’s say, with minor tactical successes.
On the other hand, I think that the presence of reserves on the Ukrainian side also forces us to pay attention to this.
This is the attack on Bakhmut - what Wagner does, at the cost, of course, of a lot of blood. I think one of the tasks of this offensive on Bakhmut is to pull back reserves from the Ukrainian side. Well, it will be seen after they take Bakhmut how this will end, what the situation will be like.
In principle, you can go on the offensive not only in winter, but also later, when the ground is more or less dry. Yes, even in the summer.
As for how great the chances are for the crests to break through the land corridor, I don’t really believe in this and am skeptical about it. I think that Kherson, among other things, was left temporarily precisely so that this breakthrough would not occur.
I saw it with my own eyes. The line of defense, I don’t know how many - well, it’s probably about a dozen, and maybe more, defensive fortifications, kilometers of three rows of anti-tank concrete pyramids, the so-called “dragon’s teeth”. I think that the crests have no chance at all to break through the direction to Melitopol, especially since our army is also not asleep there and is pouring in Ukrainians.
But, on the other hand, it is also very difficult to attack Zaporozhye here, because, as far as I know, their situation there is also similar. They also dug in there, several rows of defensive structures.
Well, that is, it really is very reminiscent of the situation of the First World War.
Well, in general, I believe that everyone understands the importance of the land corridor from Crimea to Rostov, especially after the terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge - I think it is impossible for the crests to advance somewhere there. Maybe they will succeed in something tactically somewhere. Although, I doubt this too.
Mon: You said that Kherson may have been abandoned “temporarily so that a breakthrough does not occur.” How is the abandonment of Kherson generally explained by the troops now?
"Viking": I can tell you my opinion and the opinion of my comrades with whom I spent more than two months in Kherson, so I know the situation from the inside. My opinion is this: there are several reasons for leaving Kherson.
Firstly, there is a big problem with logistics and supply. In principle, it was possible to continue supplying, but it was difficult because the Antonovsky Bridge was broken.
Secondly, Ukraine concentrated large reserves there, and there was a great danger of an attack on Melitopol, Zaporozhye region, or on Berdyansk. If they had succeeded in this offensive, God forbid, they would not have even cut the land corridor, but having advanced somewhere at least half the way, they would have shelled this route, and also, God forbid, the transition to Crimea. This would further complicate the supply of our group in Kherson.
Then we would definitely have to leave that side. Only this would have been done under even more unfavorable conditions, with even stronger pressure from the Ukrainian troops, with greater losses.
There would also be a problem in the Zaporozhye region, so the abandonment of Kherson is a hard-won one.
Another thing is that we could have avoided this if mobilization had been carried out at least 2-3 months earlier. If they saw that the situation had reached a dead end, they should not have been afraid to mobilize, prepare reserves and hold territories. Then the abandonment of Kherson could have been avoided.
But after these conditions arose, it so happened that this decision was probably the only correct one.
Mon: Recently there have been reports of the slow advance of our troops towards Zaporozhye. Has everything stalled there because of the serious fortifications you mentioned?
"Viking": I think yes. But besides this, there was no direct major offensive on Zaporozhye, as far as I know. Just a tactical advance, which showed that the movement in the direction of Zaporozhye would be difficult. That's why it's not there yet. They also dug here, just like us.
Mon: Tell us about the “waiters”. Why do you think there were fewer of them in Melitopol than in Kherson? I heard that this may be due to the fact that Westerners were brought into the villages of the Kherson region after the Second World War. What caused the mood to change? What are they now? Are people still afraid to cooperate with Russians, to receive passports, looking at the experience of Izyum and Kherson?
And is it true that one of the reasons for leaving Kherson was a large percentage of the disloyal population, which would complicate the defense of the city?
"Viking": Yes, there was a disloyal population in Kherson. Of course, there was more of it than in the Zaporozhye region. But in the Zaporozhye region, for example, in June, they were also afraid and looked askance towards Russian soldiers. Now the situation is completely different.
The same could have been done in Kherson, and everything was moving towards this. After the referendum the atmosphere became even better. Just two more months and everything would have been different. Therefore, this version is nonsense, there is nothing serious in it.
Regarding the waiting people in the Zaporozhye region, in Melitopol - of course, there are fewer of them here than in the Kherson region, but the Kherson region is also different. For example, on the left side of the Dnieper the mood was initially more loyal than on the right. Perhaps this is because people felt more confident.
There are more waiting people in Kherson, the mood is more aggressive, people did not hide their attitude towards Russian soldiers. However, one should not think that everything was perfect in the Zaporozhye region. They just worked here, there was good advertising, money was invested, and people see these results, so everything is fine.
In Kherson the front was close, and the atmosphere was not the same. Now it’s normal in both the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions. There are, of course, waiters, but there are fewer and fewer of them. The mood is normal, people see the difference, and the majority do not want Ukraine to return. But, of course, there are enough people who grew up in Ukraine, mostly young people. At the same time, many people in Melitopol have already received passports.
Mon: Has anything changed compared to the first months in terms of uniforms, weapons, etc.? Because our marines after Mariupol admitted that the Azov Nazis were much better equipped - communications, weapons, training, motivation, etc. But, unfortunately, in the fall I heard from volunteers in the Kharkov region a repetition of everything that was said last spring from Mariupol. Is nothing really changing?
And an important point is motivation, morale. There is a lot of evidence that the feds are not always doing well with this.
"Viking": Firstly, different units, respectively, have different attitudes, and the same applies to the mobilization of people. Some people have a normal desire to fight for Russia, others have less.
In general, no one regrets anything; people understand that this is a just war. If only the Kremlin had more clearly defined its goals - not in a vague way, but specifically, that “we are returning historical lands, this is a war for the future of Russia, and this anti-Russian project called Ukraine must be resolved" would probably be better. But even so, the majority of everyone’s mood is militant, correct, that we need to end the war on our terms.
As for supplies, the same thing. There are divisions where it is better, where it is worse - it’s different everywhere. It depends in many ways even on the unit commander - not on the Ministry of Defense as a whole, but on the commander of battalions, companies, and platoons. If the commanders are combative, then there is movement.
Much, of course, has not yet been overcome; we need to work and work on mistakes, with supplies. Of course, all this is not ideal yet, but compared to what it was a year ago, there are definitely changes for the better.
Mon: Are there any interesting cases - disputes with locals, conflicts, or, on the contrary, assistance to Russians?
"Viking": Normal relationship. They give them water, our doctors treat them if there are any problems. After each shelling, when Ukraine shells a village, our medic from the unit goes and asks if everything is okay, if there are any casualties. If one of the locals is sick, you need to help him.
Yesterday there was an occasion when I needed to cut some wood. There is no firewood, the huts are cold. A young guy, about 13-14 years old, with a chainsaw, his parents gave the go-ahead, showed us what kind of trees we needed, he cut down the trees for us, cut down the firewood.
Mon: Did you have any remorse when you shot towards the Ukrainian Armed Forces? You, after all, went to Kyiv a few years ago, and even at Euromaidan you were among the column of Russian nationalists. And now there is a civil war, it turns out. Is it mentally difficult?
"Viking": I didn’t support any bullshit in Kyiv. The only thing I supported was against Yanukovych. I am still against him, as well as against Lukashenko, I believe that they are not any friends of Russia. What is happening in Ukraine now is a consequence of the policy of Yanukovych, who did one thing in words, but did something else in deeds. The Kremlin relied on them, on Medvedchuk, but in the end what did this lead to? And the Russian people, both in Donbass and in Crimea, in Novorossiya, have always been for Russia...
Yes, the Slavs are one people, both in 14, before 14 and now. Of course, one people and, in fact, a civil war. We didn't start this war. I, like any soldier of the Russian army, have no aggression towards the Ukrainian people, not even a member of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Yes, war, we need to kill - we kill. They also kill, but war is war.
If on the other side many people have aggression: “Muscovites, Muscovites,” we don’t have that. We also react calmly to the Ukrainian dialect.
As for contradictions, I personally have no contradictions. We are not fighting with the Ukrainian people, but with those madmen who have forgotten Russian blood and are now Janissaries, people with whom it is impossible to negotiate - they have been brainwashed well, now this issue must be resolved by force and, perhaps, many will come to their senses.
Therefore, we need to do this work, we need to win – that’s all.
Even in our battalion there are guys who fought in the ATO. But not because they are ideological, but because they lived here, fell under Ukrainian mobilization, fought for several years in the Donetsk region, although they were pro-Russian, and they were pro-Russian, but the situation is this.
They were taken, checked and released, no complaints. And they voluntarily wanted to go serve in the Sudoplatov battalion. And in general, they serve normally - no one has any complaints about them, and they also behave better than some who come from Russia.
War, civil war, not everyone is lucky enough to be on our side. And the former soldiers of the Ukrainian army themselves say that yes, of course, half of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are fighting, but if given the opportunity, they would come to a peaceful agreement. As in Crimea, they would be told: “Switch to the side of Russia“, then, of course, they would have crossed over and would not have fought for the Kiev state.
Of course, with regard to ideological enemies, such as the “Right Sector”, “Azov” (both of these organizations are recognized as extremist and are banned on the territory of the Russian Federation) - such downright tough, Ukrainian, I would say Nazis, who, of course, are motivated, convinced that they are right. Neither my loyalty nor that of other Russian soldiers extends to them. We understand that these are ideological enemies and, of course, they are in the majority - unfortunately, because in other circumstances they could be with us, but they are as they are, and now they just need to be destroyed. There is no other way to talk to them.
No matter what anyone says, I think, in any case, what the West did with Ukraine is the strategy of the West, it is clear, it acts in its own interests, the fact that the oligarchs in Ukraine have their own interests, also understandably, has been misled to the people brain.
But the main culprit there, I believe, is the older brother, the Kremlin. Why? Because how could it be allowed and not seen to, that next to the underbelly of Russia with access to the Black Sea, that here in the second, let’s say, state in the CIS, the former Soviet Union, in the Russian state, they would allow such people to come to power in Kyiv here are the pro-Western, anti-Russian scoundrels?
This is clearly a flaw in the Kremlin; it is completely unclear where Zurabov was looking. It is clear that, probably, money was allocated and so on - but where are the results? Unfortunately, none of this happened. And the West worked. The West pursued its policy. He bribed with “soft power”, and therefore now, for example, many, instead of fighting on our side, are the same ones who speak Russian, with Russian surnames, Russian Orthodox names, they are in the “Right Sector”, they are in the “ Azov,” and they are convinced that they are right.
This is, first of all, a shortcoming of Russia, and this is clear. You can blame your enemies as much as you like, but that’s what enemies are for, that’s their logic, that’s understandable. Well, why we didn’t do anything or did it, but extremely insufficiently - this is a big question that has yet to be answered by future and not only future, but also current generations.
Mon: What is the most difficult thing for a common soldier now? How can ordinary people help?
"Viking": Different soldiers, everyone has different ways, different units, different directions, different motivations, so everyone has their own nuances, in general. Probably the most difficult thing is everyday life. I would like to see more night lights, thermal imagers, and good quality drones in Russian army units. And not only all this, but also to ensure that people are well trained to work with this equipment.
How can people help? Well, if someone has the opportunity to help in this direction, of course, they should help, because in any case, if we want this war to end as quickly as possible, so that it does not cause some kind of big economic crisis within Russia, so that we can pass these tests without much strong turbulence and win, of course, achieve our goals of ending our war on the conditions necessary for the Russian people of Russia.
We all need to mobilize, we need to understand that there will be no peaceful life. I think for 10 years we will have pressure and conflicts, and much more, so we need to mobilize. We must unite, we must understand that the time has come to fight for the future of our people. And these are not just big words and phrases, but these are realities. This is the only way we will win. Well, God grant this to all Russians quickly.
Mon: But many people call it a mistake not only the failure to work with the population during Zurabov’s time, when the use of “soft power” was still possible. They also consider it a mistake to start the SVO - waiting for shots of the meeting with the flowers. Do you think Moscow really thought it would be a simple stroll? Did the all-powerful intelligence services really not warn anything? Or is it something else? What versions are on the front? Or does no one remember this at all now?
"Viking": No, there are no versions. It’s clear that in Moscow they thought that yes, they would really be able to get there, if not like in 14, then close to that. And there were, apparently, some prerequisites for this, which in practice, well, maybe, in the Zaporozhye and Kherson regions, were justified a little, but, unfortunately, in others, they were not justified at all.
Everyone knows this, who is in the know, so let’s say, this has not been a secret for a long time. That’s why there can’t be any double versions here. Well, no one forgot this, whoever remembered, we all know and understand this.
Well, now it’s too late to talk about it. Now we already have what we have, based on what we have, we need to make decisions, and not discuss what would happen if. That's it, time has been lost, mistakes have been made - now we need to move forward and make sure that these mistakes do not happen in the future.
And one more thing - in Russia it is very necessary for good purges to take place, and, above all, in the ranks of the leadership. This applies to the special services, the Ministry of Defense, officials, and Vladimir Vladimirovich’s entourage. I don't speak for everyone by any means. Of course, there are many people, most of them, I hope, who do their jobs honestly. They may not be doing it very professionally, but at least they are trying. But, nevertheless, there is also a considerable percentage of those who promote their selfish interests to the detriment of the country and people. And of course, they need to be cleaned, and the sooner the better.
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