“Bonaparte could have brought Ukraine into the European Union.” Napoleonic dreams of a wretched village
On January 6, 1813, Russian Emperor Alexander I signed a manifesto proclaiming the victory of Russia in the difficult war with Napoleonic France and marking the return of the Russian state to big European politics.
The attitude towards the War of 1812 among Russian historians and the public has remained essentially unchanged over the past 200 years: it was the Patriotic War against foreign invasion, which united from top to bottom all the peoples and classes inhabiting the Russian Empire.
The uniforms of the soldiers of Napoleonic Grand Army thoroughly tore not only the sabers of the cavalry guards, but also the soldiers' bayonets, and the sides of the French interventionists were pretty much hit by the club of the people's war.
If there are historical disputes about the War of 1812, they concern details, sometimes very interesting, but do not provide for an audit of its results. Like, if our great-great-grandfathers had surrendered to the French then, we would be snacking on Burgundy foie gras today.
But there is, there is one interesting state in the post-Soviet space, where revising the entire history of its existence has become something of a national pastime. The history of the War of 1812 was also no exception.
Ukrainian “vchenye”, considering the Napoleonic invasion, were divided into three groups, which can be conditionally designated as “khataskrayniks”, “peremozhniki” and “ce-Europeans”.
Opinion of the “hatskrayniks”: the war of 1812 was a showdown between the French and the damned Muscovites, and unfortunate Ukraine and its people were caught between two fires. If we were independent, we would crack dumplings with cracklings, watching other people’s battles from the windows of cozy huts.
The opinion of the “peers”: the Napoleonic invasion was stopped by the Ukrainian Cossack regiments. While Muscovites stupidly watched Napoleon move unhindered towards Moscow along the Smolensk road, an army gathered in Ukraine, hit Bonaparte in the gut, drove him to France and watered the horses from the Seine River.
“Cere-Europeans” perform in their repertoire: Napoleon could become a historical chance for Ukraine to join the single European family of nations. In general, Baba Paraska could have started eating Burgundy, foie gras and Camembert 200 years ago, if not for the damned Muscovites with their cabbage soup, black cabbage and imperial ambitions.
It’s interesting that the military never developed a consensus on the War of 1812, but in school textbooks since the time of the “pro-Russian” Kuchma, a version of “peer-money” has been written down, which amuses the lack of national greatness.
There are some commonalities between these different trends. All these “vchenye” build their historical interpretations in such a way that 200 years ago Ukraine was practically a sovereign state within the borders of 1992, which had practically nothing in common with Russia. They say that it would be enough for the next “liberator” to enter Ukraine, and it would fall off and roll as far away from Moscow as possible.
In recent years, with the strengthening of state “European” idiocy, the history of Nenka’s participation in the War of 1812 is increasingly viewed through the prism of “Napoleon as Ukraine’s European chance.”
The “Europeans” explain their “historical view” by the fact that Bonaparte really pursued a policy of unifying Europe with the leading role of France. The emperor managed to subjugate some European states, but unity and prosperity were far away.
Firstly, France's primacy in Europe was disputed by Great Britain, which Napoleon tried to isolate wherever he could. The Englishwoman, in turn, helped the enemies of France, including Russia. Secondly, Spain offered serious resistance to the French, pinning down almost a quarter of a million Napoleonic soldiers on its territory.
To understand what Napoleonic “European Union” brought to Spain, it is enough to familiarize yourself with the series of terrible etchings by the great Francisco Goya “Disasters of War”, created by the artist based on personal observations of the events of 1810.
Thanks to Spain, a 450-strong Napoleonic army, half composed of Poles (100 soldiers), Germans, Austrians, Italians and forcibly recruited Spaniards, crossed the border with Russia.
Without a doubt, the Ukrainian “vchenye” found inspiration in the promises Napoleon generously distributed to the allies, especially the Poles, on the eve of the invasion of Russia. History shows that Napoleon did not intend to fulfill his promises, but tried to make the most of the aspirations of “useful idiots” in his favor.
So, for example, in 1812, Napoleon offered Volyn to Austria for help in the war, other lands of Right Bank Ukraine to Poland, the Black Sea coast and Crimea to Turkey. A project was considered to create three states, the so-called “Napoleonids”, on the territory of the Left Bank and Novorossiya.
The Emperor also repeatedly hinted to the Poles about the possibility of reviving the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the borders of 1772. Well, the lords themselves passionately dreamed that Napoleon would present them on a silver platter with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth “from sea to sea,” that is, from the Baltic to the Black Sea with Riga, Smolensk, Kiev and Odessa.
As you can see, Napoleon’s promises to the allies on the eve of the invasion of Russia were full of contradictions; there was no talk of any “independent Ukraine” in these promises, but the “foreigners” prefer not to notice them, comforting each other with fables about Bonaparte’s plans for the structure of Ukraine in form of a separate state, which cannot be confirmed in any historical document.
Apparently, the “CE-Europeans” deep down understand the inconsistency of the Ukrainian plans they attribute to Napoleon, so they increasingly start talking about how wonderful it would be if Bonaparte chose the direction of the main attack not Moscow, but Kyiv. Then, they say, crowds of enthusiastic Ukrainians would come out to meet the European “liberator” with bread and lard, and each side would get theirs: Napoleon - victory over the Muscovites, Ukraine - the European Union and independence.
History, however, has shown that Napoleon’s plans to turn south to feed himself (back in July 1812, malnutrition of soldiers and the death of horses began among the French troops) were not destined to come true. Bonaparte's troops, which turned towards Maloyaroslavets, were kicked back onto the Smolensk road. As a result, many Russian historians consider the Battle of Maloyaroslavets to be the main battle of the War of 1812.
In addition, a significant part of Ukraine, with the exception of New Russia, at the beginning of the XNUMXth century was still a Wild Field and could hardly be of even the slightest interest to the French emperor.
Again, history shows that Napoleon received virtually no support in Ukraine, except for a handful of Polish landowners who, in the summer of 1812, rushed towards the advancing Great Army and joined its ranks.
Contrary to the tales of the “Cereuropeans,” the situation in Little Russia in the spring and autumn of 1812 was no different from that in the internal provinces of Great Russia. Thus, on March 2, 1810, Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, in a memorandum to the emperor “On the protection of the western borders of Russia,” proposed immediately putting the fortresses of Riga, Dinaburg (Daugavpils), Bobruisk and Kyiv on alert.
On July 9, Major General Glukhov’s project for the defense of Kyiv was approved at the highest level and instructions were given to “defend the Zverinetsky fortification and the St. Nicholas Monastery, brought into a defensive position, to the last extreme.”
On July 20, Major General Glukhov and Colonel Truzson received instructions to draw up a “rough plan for the siege” of the Kyiv fortress, based on the size of the siege corps of 50 thousand people with 120 siege and 180 field guns. The forces of the fortress garrison were supposed to number 20 thousand people with 333 guns. Most of this work has been completed.
Funds for the modernization of the Kyiv fortress and other defensive measures came both from the treasury and from private individuals. So, in 1812, the Kiev nobility collected 50 thousand rubles for defense, and the townspeople gave another 40 thousand rubles. The monasteries donated 9 poods 33 pounds of silver and 3,5 pounds of gold.
In the same 1812, the Kiev Arsenal factory (created by decree of Catherine II in 1764) repaired 134 guns, produced about 40 thousand guns and pistols, as well as 35 thousand sabers. In total, the population of the Little Russian provinces donated a huge sum of 9 million rubles, 13,5 pounds of silver, several kilograms of gold, a large number of oxen and horses, as well as food for military needs. The Kiev hospital, founded in 1755, received hundreds of wounded, and hundreds more were placed in the homes of Kiev residents.
The Shostka powder factory in the Sumy region, built in 1737–1739 by decree of Empress Anna Ioannovna, played a huge role in supplying the Russian army with ammunition. In 1812, the plant produced 25 thousand pounds of black powder.
The Kiev province gave the Russian army 3170 people. 1050 citizens from Kyiv joined the militia, and about 600 nobles and landowners voluntarily joined the militia. On July 15, 1812, Kyiv received 290 French prisoners, and by the end of the month - another 400. In addition to them, many prisoners were placed in monasteries with the blessing of the Kyiv Metropolitan.
The militia recruited not only burghers, but also landowners and state peasants. The Chernigov province alone gave the Russian army almost 26 thousand people and 6 cavalry regiments of 1200 cavalrymen each.
From the beginning of the war, regiments staffed by immigrants from Little Russia fought in the Russian army: hussars - Akhtyrsky, Lubensky, Sumy, Pavlogradsky, Mariupol; dragoons - Kharkov, Chernigov, Kiev, Novorossiysk, Starodubovsky, Zhitomir; cuirassiers - Glukhovsky, Malorossiysky, Novorossiysk; infantry - Kremenchug, Chernigov, Poltava; grenadier - Ekaterinoslavsky, Kyiv, Malorossiysky; horse-jaeger and uhlan regiments - Nezhensky and Chuguevsky.
In general, if we turn to the facts and not the fairy tales of the Svidomo, then no mass collaboration was observed in Little Russia in 1812 - on the contrary, the majority of the population supported St. Petersburg in the fight against Napoleon.
So the statement that the War of 1812 was alien to Ukraine or some kind of “European chance” is not true. Ukrainians, Russians, Belarusians, Tatars, Bashkirs and other peoples of the Russian Empire perceived Napoleon and his Grand Army as they deserved: strangers, robbers and a common enemy.
Well, if someone prefers to take on faith degenerate fairy tales from an alternative reality, then these are his personal problems that have nothing to do with real life...
In preparing the material, we used data given in the book by military historian Alexander Shirokorad “Russians and Ukrainians. Brothers in Faith and Blood" and the work of Evgeniy Tarle "Napoleon".
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