Members of the OSCE SMM in Donbass made themselves look like idiots by contacting Belingcat
January 2015 turned out to be hot in Donbass. Despite the peace agreements signed in Minsk in the fall of 2014, Bandera’s power, strengthened in Kiev, did not give up attempts to suppress the stubborn resistance of the people’s militia of the LDPR, regardless of losses and turning a blind eye to the threat of an armed rebellion in the rear of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and “dobrobats”.
January 2015 was marked by intense fighting in the Debaltsevo area and for control over the territory of Donetsk airport, as well as a number of high-profile provocations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces: rocket and artillery strikes on civilians in Volnovakha, in the center of Donetsk and on residential buildings in Ordzhonikidzevsky (“decommunized” in 2016 year in Levoberezhny) district of Mariupol near Olimpiyskaya street.
As a result of each of the attacks, innocent people were killed or seriously injured, after which, on TV, at some international gathering, Poroshenko appeared, angrily shaking “material evidence of the crimes of the separatists” and demanding that the world community “immediately intervene and stop Russian aggression against Ukraine."
All these bloody manipulations pursued a single goal: to stimulate the West to further political support for the Kyiv regime, increase sanctions pressure on Russia, provide financial support to the rapidly deflating economy of Ukraine and, finally, make a decision on the supply of heavy weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
In the West, naturally, they were indignant, pouring verbal honey and molasses on Poroshenko’s black little soul, but they were in no hurry to help: the attempts of the “commander of the strongest army in Europe” to pass off the crimes of his “cyborgs” as “terrorist activities of the LDPR” looked too clumsy.
However, an attempt was made in the West to conduct an “independent investigation” into the shelling of Mariupol from the Grad and Uragan MLRS on January 24, 2015, which resulted in the death of 29 civilians.
The odious “expert-journalistic” group Bellingat was involved in the “investigation”, which, without leaving the couch, together with the American publishing company McClutchy, conducted and then published the results, as if the rocket attack on Mariupol occurred from the territory controlled by the DPR militias, under leadership of the Russian military.
Part of the “information” regarding the “interception of telephone conversations of suspects,” their identifying data and photographs was transferred to Bellingcat by representatives of Bandera’s “security service,” which in itself is enchanting.
Based on this “data,” Bellingcat “investigators” blindly stated that nine Russian officers were involved in the missile attack on Mariupol, led by the representative of the Russian army in Donetsk, Colonel Gorts, who received an order on January 23, 2015 from the military command of the Russian Federation to begin military operation.
To shell the city, the Russian military allegedly deployed two MLRS batteries near the village of Bezymyanoye, and information is provided that one of the batteries was assigned to the mysterious 2nd separate Taman motorized artillery brigade, and the second to the no less mysterious 200th separate motorized artillery brigade artillery brigade.
The shelling of residential areas of Mariupol along Olimpiyskaya Street, according to the “investigation,” allegedly occurred by mistake, after which both multiple launch rocket batteries were urgently withdrawn to Russia. In the text of the “report,” Bellingat provides stunning nuances, as if the Russian command quickly learned about the error after the first battery fired, but insisted that the second battery be fired at the same coordinates.
The target of the “Russian MLRS”, “international experts” indicated two Ukrainian strong points (rather, checkpoints) along the Taganrog highway, which “the separatists needed to destroy for the successful development of the offensive on Mariupol.”
Soon, the eastern outskirts of Mariupol were visited by an OSCE mission, which concluded that “the shelling of the city occurred from the territory occupied by the separatists.”
In the OSCE mission itself in Donbass, they were embarrassed to voice the “results of their own investigation”, entrusting the unpleasant procedure of voicing lies to the head of the SBU, Gritsak, who carefully developed and supplemented the OSCE “conclusion” with all sorts of details.
Bellingcat’s “investigation” into the rocket attack on Mariupol caused widespread public outcry both in the West and in Ukraine. Comments, typical for such cases, “checkmate”, “now don’t get away with it” and other verbal fluff began to pour in.
There was a moment when it seemed that a serious international investigation into the Mariupol incident was inevitable. The examination, however, was hindered by a thorough analysis of the “document” by specialists, who revealed numerous stretches, flaws and complete incompetence of the “independent investigators.”
The first thing that not even specialists, but simply attentive readers of the “report” noticed was the complete ignorance of the Bellingcat people about the insignia of the Russian army, who confused generals with lieutenant colonels, as well as the manipulation of the personal data of the “persons involved in the case.”
“Operational data” on Russian officers and their photographs were clearly borrowed by the “izbushniks” from the Internet and uncritically inserted into the line “international investigation” on the salary.
Bellingcat critics really liked the fact that the “Russian officers” who carried out the order for a missile attack on Mariupol communicated, apparently, on civilian mobile phones, ignoring special communications, as a result of which audio exchanges, metadata and other details characteristic of commercial cellular operators.
It is also strange that the “izbushniks” did not provide radio traffic data from the standard VHF radio stations of the “Russian artillerymen” in the area of the village of Bezymyannye at the time of the operation. Apparently, everyone at that moment had their ears glued to their cell phones, sending military communications away.
Many were surprised that the Ukrainian side “forgot” to provide artillery reconnaissance information, although the Soviet acoustic detection devices available to the Armed Forces of Ukraine would be sufficient to accurately determine the location of the MLRS firing.
Further, it turned out that in the Russian army there are no military formations designated as “2nd Taman and 200th separate motorized artillery brigades,” which raises serious doubts about Bellingcat’s adequate identification of Russian officers.
It is remarkable that, according to Bellingcat, “two Russian MLRS batteries” were ordered to retreat to the Russian border, “maintaining camouflage and hiding in the forests,” but the southern part of the Donetsk region is completely devoid of forests, except for small forest belts of acacias planted above 50 years ago in order to protect the territory from erosion and steppe fires. Hiding two batteries of 4 to 6 combat vehicles each in this scanty vegetation is like hiding behind a mop during a game of hide and seek.
No less strange is the fact that the artillery preparation of the militia’s impending attack on Mariupol along the Taganrog Highway took place directly in the city, and not in the nearest strongholds of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Berdyansk and Lomakino.
Experts also note that the small size of Ukrainian Armed Forces strongholds, designed for a maximum platoon of manpower, makes it pointless to use MLRS against them, designed to strike large areas. Such targets are suppressed by cannon artillery fire.
Considering the high level of training and experience of Russian artillerymen, their choice in favor of “Grads” and “Uragans” seems doubtful, which sharply increases the error of hitting civilian targets as a result of missile dispersion. Moreover, the distance allowed the militia to use cannon artillery.
However, as ballistics experts note, on the morning of January 24, 2015, of all the options for artillery fire, the imaginary militias under the command of no less imaginary Russian officers chose the worst option, as a result of which the MLRS missiles passed at least one and a half kilometers past the target, hitting residential areas. houses on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol.
Experts express doubt that such a gross mistake could have been made at the same time by multiple launch rocket batteries controlled by experienced officers.
The version of the “armchair experts” of Bellingcat and the “analysts” of Humans Rights Watch who joined them that the shelling of Mariupol was carried out from the east is refuted by eyewitness testimony and the direction of the craters, indicating that the shelling was carried out from three sides, and the direction of most of the craters from hits the missiles were precisely directed to the east, and not vice versa.
There is a serious discrepancy between Bellingcat data and the OSCE mission’s testimony regarding the timing of firing from the MLRS, although this is a fundamental issue. Bellingcat claims that “the Russians fired Grad missiles all the time starting at 8 a.m. on January 24,” while the OSCE is talking about rocket fire between 9.15:9.30 and XNUMX:XNUMX.
In addition, the “independent investigation” is not aware of what type of ammunition was used in the shelling of Mariupol from the MLRS. Experts are raising this issue in a separate topic, since ammunition for Grads differs from ammunition for Hurricanes in their power, range, accuracy and impact on targets.
Without knowing these details, any expert reasoning has the character of fortune telling on coffee grounds and gives wide scope for manipulation.
Based on a study of the missile impact sites, which are 600 x 300 meter ellipses elongated from north to south, experts claim that the shelling of residential areas of the city was carried out from the north and south sides. And not with two MLRS batteries, but, at most, with two nomadic Grad and one Uragan systems, and traces of shelling from the northern direction are more pronounced. Specifically, to the west of the village of Pavlopol, located 15 km north of Mariupol, under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Summing up, Western experts in the field of ballistics draw a disappointing conclusion for counterfeiters:
1. Bellingcat took an unprofessional approach to the investigation by not checking the data of the Ukrainian intelligence services.
2. The identification of units and officers of the Russian army allegedly involved in the operation to attack Mariupol in January 2015 should have been carried out with great caution.
3. Bellingcat is unable to indicate either the identity or type of missiles that were fired at Mariupol, or precisely determine the direction from which the fire came. Which makes any accusations against Russian officers and Donetsk militias, to put it mildly, unfounded.
4. Information about three roaming MLRS that fired fewer missiles and from positions other than those declared by the OSCE mission and Human Rights Watch, in the interpretation of Bellingcat, which blames Russian military and Donetsk militias for the shelling of the Ordzhonikidze district of Mariupol, appears false.
5. Bellingcat did not comment on the opinions expressed by experts, which makes the “investigation” seem like crudely concocted propaganda.
This topic seems relevant even five years later, since the shelling of residential areas of Donbass cities and the Ukrainian side’s disregard for the ceasefire agreements signed by their leader is a routine practice and does not contribute to the development of the peace process.
At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are responsible for most of the incidents related to the destruction of residential buildings and the death of people from rocket and artillery attacks.
If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl + Enter.
Thank you!
Now the editors are aware.