What will a man do when the Thunder strikes?
From the very beginning of the acquisition of the so-called. “Independence”, independent Ukrainian elites do not give up hope of getting a complex of operational-tactical missiles of their own production. Despite the rich defense-industrial potential that Nenka inherited from the USSR, there were no design bureaus or research institutes on its territory whose specialization would be the design and maintenance of OTRK.
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This, in particular, resulted in the problem with the Tochka-U complexes that Ukraine inherited (the longer-range Oka complexes fell under the INF Treaty and were taken to Russia for dismantling). The fact is that a fully assembled “point” could be stored in a missile and artillery weapons warehouse for 10 years, after which the rocket had to undergo routine maintenance by representatives of the manufacturer to extend its service life. But after the collapse of the USSR, manufacturing plants remained in Votkinsk (Russia) and Petropavlovsk (Kazakhstan), and in the RAV warehouses there were “points” of various production dates.
In addition, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were not very happy with the range of the Tochka-U OTRK, equal to 120 km. Ukraine, which accepted the thesis “the most likely war can only be with the Muscovites” as a military doctrine, could not be happy with the situation with missile weapons. The post-Soviet elites had regional ambitions and were going to “threaten the Swede from now on” directly from Bankova.
As you know, nothing came of the ambitious OTR projects “Borisfen” and “Sapsan” - the matter did not progress beyond the drawings. But with the start of the “Ukrainian-Russian war,” Kyiv’s missile ambitions intensified again. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are no longer able to spend “points” on LDPR facilities - it is both expensive, and, according to some data, no more than a dozen old Soviet missile systems remain in service.
Nevertheless, being impressed by the NATO hysterics that flare up every time from the Russian leadership’s promise to deploy Iskanders in the Kaliningrad region, the Ukrainian “hawks” also want to get a similar toy into their greasy paws.
Recently, retired Ukrainian generals have been increasingly making open threats to subject the bridge under construction across the Kerch Strait to a missile attack and even talk about the reach of Moscow with the new Ukrainian Grom-2 missiles, which, in their opinion, should push the Kremlin to make concessions on Crimea and LDNR.
Irresponsible media chatterers close to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense are close to euphoria: in their opinion, Ukraine almost managed to intimidate the Kremlin by flexing its missile muscles. Maps of the border regions of Ukraine with Russia even appeared on the Internet with estimates of where military missiles should be installed in the Sumy or Chernigov regions so that they are guaranteed to reach Moscow.
And in fact, Ukrainian TV and a number of various “experts” started chatter around the Grom-2 OTRK, which is called either “unparalleled” or a “direct competitor” of the Russian Iskander. In propaganda videos, however, photos of the Iskander-M are increasingly flashed, but recently the picture has changed to shots of a new Ukrainian mobile complex, which is so far nothing more than a dummy on a KrAZ wheelbase.
What kind of “Grom-2” is this and where did it come from?
The Ukrainian side claims that the new OTRK was developed back in 2005, and only now it came to testing, but this legend is not completely believable, remembering the history with the “Borysthenes” and “Sapsan”
remaining in the drawings.
The appearance of a new OTRK among Svidomo is murky. According to some reports, Ukraine, which has no experience in the development and construction of medium- and short-range missiles, could receive critical technologies through an exchange with China, which is interested in acquiring some Soviet tank and aviation secrets. In this light, the fuss around the archives of the Antonov concern and the Kharkov KBM im. Morozova.
There is a version that Ukraine offered the PRC some of the Soviet developments of the Antonov Design Bureau and, according to some sources, the development of the secret Soviet Hammer tank with a 152 mm gun, receiving in return the drawings and specifications of the Dongfeng-15 tactical missile system, which is in service with the PLA with 1989.
Whether this is true or not is unknown, but judging by the force with which Kiev began to rattle sabers again, the Svidomo’s missile business has clearly gone uphill.
And even with a portfolio of Dongfeng-15 drawings, post-Maidan Ukraine is not in a state to pull off this rather complex and
expensive project. It turns out that the sponsor of the Ukrainian OTRK is Saudi Arabia, which had no luck with the purchase of Iskander-E and similar advanced systems. The Saudis are flattering themselves with hopes that the Ukrainian military industry will be able to not only develop the OTRK, but also initially produce the Grom-2 for them.
Other details of the missile deal between the cynical Banderas and the Wahhabis are unknown.
The main developers of missiles for Grom-2 are two large defense enterprises of Ukraine - the Yuzhnoye State Design Bureau from Dnepropetrovsk and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. Yuzhnoye has experience in designing ballistic and space rockets with engines, while PCP is engaged in the production of solid fuel for Ukrainian air defense missiles and a wunderwaffle called Alder.
According to official data, the Grom-2 OTRK missile will be able to hit targets at a distance of up to 280 km. However, the Ukrainian side claims that this restriction applies to the export version of missiles, while missiles for the Armed Forces of Ukraine will not have an export range limitation, having a range of 480 - 500 km, which is comparable to the performance characteristics of the Iskander-M. It is diligently emphasized that Ukraine has managed to create a closed production cycle for OTP.
However, declaring does not mean doing and achieving. The Grom-2 solid propellant rocket engine passed only two fire tests, and during the second, the engine was torn to shreds, even despite the fact that Ukrainian rocket scientists are trying to follow global trends in rocket science and build the engine not in the old fashioned way, but in a composite cocoon.
The Ukrainian military industry boasts that it is able to provide the Thunder with some components of the control and guidance system. This is, in particular, the Arsenal enterprise, which once supplied laser gyroscopes of its own design for the first Iskanders. The main work on guidance systems for “thunders” is carried out by the well-known association “Hartron”, which purchased components both from Arsenal and from one of the Latvian companies.
Some observers believe that the Ukrainian rocket scientists took a much steeper swing - at the Soviet OTR Oka, which carried twice as much explosives and was able to reach space (altitude 120 km) in the upper part of the trajectory. According to the most optimistic forecasts, it will take at least 5–6 years to fine-tune the “thunders,” although the Ukrainian military is threatening to put the complex into service within two years, which looks like a utopia.
With “dongfeng” or not, the Ukrainian military industry did not take it upon itself to cut down the tree. And the main difficulty lies not only in the lack of experience and specialized production, but in the shortage of personnel in a rapidly degrading system with an industry falling apart before our eyes. It’s not enough to have a folder of documents, Saudi money, a construction set and a bag of ambitions. The main thing is not visible - what allowed the North Koreans to create their own missile shield, which the United States already has to reckon with today - the state approach to science and production.
Very few countries are able to build modern operational-tactical missile systems, and their list does not include some members of the nuclear club and even countries that are showcases of high technology.
Perhaps, in a few years, Ukrainian rocket scientists will be able to create a tactical missile system that is close to or even slightly superior in performance characteristics to the Tochka-U, but there are serious doubts that they will be able to come close to the combat capabilities of the Iskander or Oka. Moreover, the main skeptic is the Chief Designer of the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau, where Iskander was created, Valery Kashin.
Perhaps, with the help of Saudi money and outside help, Ukrainian rocket scientists will be able to overcome childhood illnesses of the Thunder engines and select rocket fuel components. The video of a successful fire test shows that the combustion mode of solid fuel is far from normal. It is even possible that Ukrainian rocket scientists will sooner or later be lucky enough to create a good rocket with a predictable ballistic flight path. But it’s unlikely that anyone shared with them the secrets of how OTR needs to deceive front-line and target air defense systems, resist barrage interference and perform maneuvers in flight that are unexpected for the enemy, while maintaining the accuracy of targeting the target.
One thing can be said for sure: facilities on the territory of the LDPR will become a testing ground for testing the accuracy of new Ukrainian missiles. And, what’s even worse, the new grenade in its paws will make the monkey even more aggressive and unpredictable.
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