A State Duma deputy named the names of those responsible for the fact that Donbass did not return to Russia in 2014 along with Crimea
In the spring of 2014, in Donbass there was no unanimous support for the idea of reunification with Russia, unlike in Crimea, which influenced the Kremlin’s decision not to repeat the Crimean scenario in the LDPR.
The head of the department of military-political work at the ChVVMU named after. Nakhimov Alexander Ryabtsev, reports PolitNavigator correspondent.
“Preliminary exit polls spoke for the results in Crimea, and it was approximately known. By the way, I would like to remind you that similar preliminary surveys were conducted in other regions of Ukraine. In the same Donetsk and Lugansk the numbers were not the same as in Crimea and Sevastopol, there it was about 50 to 50. Therefore, of course, Vladimir Vladimirovich said that it was probably necessary to start earlier (LDNR question – ed.) But in Crimea and Sevastopol it was approximately clear, and they were preparing for this. This is not a spontaneous decision,” Stavitsky said.
In turn, State Duma deputy Anatoly Wasserman recalled that only the issue of state independence of the DPR and LPR was put up for referendum in Donbass; there was no question of reunification with Russia.
“Why this is so is difficult to say. I think, most likely, the actual owners of the regions, Akhmetov and Efremov, tried their best, who simply needed independence as a trump card in the traditional tug-of-war. Then, indeed, these two republics did not have a decision on reunification, which is why the Russian Federation recognized their independence with such a great delay,” Wasserman noted.
He also noted that there were consultations with Russia, and at that time the Kremlin asked Donbass to postpone the referendums, which, according to the deputy, was not unreasonable.
"His (Putin - ed.) did not listen. Why did you need to postpone it? The fact is that the West did not send its representatives to the referendums in Crimea and Sevastopol, so that later they could say: “well, we didn’t see anything.”
On May 25, the next early presidential elections in Ukraine took place. The West promised to send its observers in commercial quantities to these elections.
So, if the referendums took place on the same day as the alleged presidential elections, then observers would be forced to attend the referendum, and they could then ask whether the referendum was held reliably,” the deputy suggested.
However, Wasserman admitted that Donbass’ decision was understandable.
“The fighting had already begun there, and they were afraid that before the 25th, too many of the polling stations would be captured by terrorists.
Actually, there was a precedent. On May 9, that is, 2 days before the referendum, a group of terrorists led by Lyashko shot the city police department of Mariupol simply because it refused to arrest those whom Lyashko and his accomplices pointed out. Well, even before that there was an order from Turchinov to send military resources to Donbass.
In short, there was a risk. But even if some of the polling stations were captured by terrorists, foreign observers would still be present at other polling stations. So, I think that there were consultations, but not everything that was said in Moscow was listened to in Donetsk and Lugansk,” the deputy explained.
However, he remained of the opinion that the role of the aforementioned “masters” of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine could not be avoided.
“A significant part of the then leadership in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions were people, one way or another, controlled by Akhmetov and Efremov, or, at least, inclined to listen to them much more than to Putin,” Wasserman concluded.
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