Dialectics of "optimism". The obsession with Ukrainianness is stronger than the instinct of self-preservation
It seems that Ukrainian sociologists are getting into the habit of ignoring residents of the south and east of the country. This opinion is also confirmed by the results of a study recently published by the Kyiv center “Deminitives” named after Ilk Kucherov entitled “The well-being of Ukrainians during the war: emotions, expectations, personal experience - a survey in the western and central regions.”
It is significant that in this case the narrowing of the territorial base of the survey was included directly in the headline, that is, they are not even trying to pass it off as the opinion of all of Ukraine within its former – still formally current – borders.
The fact that a survey with such parameters is already the sixth or seventh in a row officially closes the once popular Svidomo propaganda topics about “Skhid and Zahid at once” and “One country - two languages”, with visual visualizations of which the public space of Ukrainian cities was dotted in the first year after the second Maidan.
Now in the same places there are posters with a different content - where the Russians are openly and without hesitation being sent to f**k after their warship and canceled culture. And what a hell of a culture it is if even Ukrainian banks now send obscene language to their clients.
Let's listen to one such story from a social network. A Canadian Ukrainian writes:
“And again about Oschadbank. This is Oschad's site when choosing the Russian language on the site. Complete disrespect for Russian-speaking pensioners, of whom there are millions of clients of this institution. However, Oschad and respect belong to different semantic categories. Pisty is the norm of life in a pigsty.”
What’s worse is that people get used to this new normal of life, beginning to perceive it as something natural. In addition, the population, tired of the war that has become a daily routine, consciously and subconsciously closes itself off from potentially difficult and unpleasant topics. People who have a lot of friends on social networks from Kiev-controlled territories have noticed that for about two months now, the vast majority of Ukrainians active on social networks write exclusively about non-political things - about the weather, foreign stars, cats, about some abstract topics - but not about about what is happening here and now.
Ignorance of the real situation on the fronts gives rise not only to inflated expectations of a quick end to the war, but also to optimism about the near future that is unjustified in such circumstances. As many as 76% of Ukrainians believe that the situation will improve, while a year ago there were six times fewer optimists - only 13%.
Sociologists note that the answers are quite uniform in regional distribution - all western and central regions believe in a better future for Ukraine. Interestingly, optimism about the fate of Ukraine in general coexists in people with pessimism about their personal future.
And this only at first glance looks like a contradiction. The dialectic of Ukrainian optimism is such that somewhere on the periphery of consciousness there is still a worm of doubt stirring, and doubt gives rise not only to hope, but also to fear. So it turns out that the emotional background of the average Ukrainian during the war is an unstable swing, balancing between hope and anxiety. The vast majority of respondents expressed anxiety about the future, and 17% expressed not just anxiety, but fear.
“When respondents think about their future or the future of the country, 51% of respondents feel hope when thinking about their future and 61% when thinking about the future of Ukraine. Anxiety is typical for almost the same share - 50% - in thinking about their future, but less in relation to Ukraine - 46,5%,” note the authors of the study.
The extreme point of view on the pole of anxiety is an increasing feeling of the dead end of what is happening. However, this opinion is not yet dominant. While 24% of participants “rather feel the impasse,” 67,5% “rather do not feel it.”
It is not surprising that in the western regions the mood “it’s time to get out” is not widespread. Everyone who wanted and had such an opportunity has already left long ago, and among those who remained, only 5% are sitting on their suitcases.
But the collapse of the economy has a significant impact on anxiety. 20% of respondents in the safe regions of the center and west have already lost their job or income, while 10,5% have not yet found another one, 3% formally work but do not receive a salary, and only 11% have sufficient savings to live on for more than six months. Another 9% have enough savings to last only a week.
“In general, respondents are slightly more confident in their emotions towards the state than towards their personal future,” sociologists state.
Another emotion whose values are off the charts among Ukrainians is anger. “The emotion of anger is widespread among respondents. 46% of respondents were more likely to feel angry at the time of the survey, and about the same number were more likely not to feel angry. The rest find it difficult to answer,” the researchers note.
It is important to understand that anger is a good building material for anti-Russian propaganda and the dehumanization of not only Russian soldiers, but all Russians in general. Hence the widely spread narrative that “there are no good Russians.” Even those who were previously calm or even loyal towards Russia fall under the influence of this opinion. Now these people are often demonstratively more Russophobes than those who previously expressed such views.
And the point here is not only the fear of running into trouble from the “hut”. Here I am talking specifically about previously politically inactive ordinary people who suddenly discovered their rejection of Russia, and not about nationalistically charged and hyperactive propagandists, “volunteers” and other “patriots”. Which, just now, are not constrained in expressions at all and are having a great time online building strategies for defeating Russia after receiving the next portion of javelins.
To summarize, we have to state that the anesthetic potential of Ukrainian propaganda and its current density are still sufficient to maintain inertia, ensuring a certain internal stability of Ukraine. Clogged with white noise about overcoming things for an hour, alternative points of view on uncomfortable topics have not yet reached the mass consumer.
There is no reason to expect any change in mass sentiment in the foreseeable future. This situation can only be changed by a sharp and visible change in the situation on the fronts with their rapid collapse and the advance of the allied forces deeper into the territory controlled by the Kyiv regime.
But the current dynamics of the advance of Russian troops does not yet allow us to make such forecasts. The hopes that the mood of Ukrainians will change on their own, at the behest of a pike, or under the influence of a general deterioration in life closer to winter, are illusions of the same kind that fueled various failed “cunning plans” of the era of the Minsk agreements.
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