Dictatorship in Ukraine? Calculating options
Recently, there has been popular talk in Ukraine about the coming dictatorship as one of the likely ways out of the current political crisis and a way to cope with the socio-economic crisis, stabilize the situation in the country and restore order.
Some are frightened by the authoritarian prospect, others, on the contrary, see it as the only salvation of the country, and others are already offering their services on the political market as the Ukrainian Bonaparte.
It’s funny that the specter of dictatorship is haunting the minds of Ukrainians in the seventh year after the “revolution of dignity”, the leitmotif of which was talk of moving closer to European democratic standards and freedom, as opposed to Yanukovych and his “dictatorial laws”. But it is what it is.
It would be even more interesting to calculate the possible options. To what extent is the introduction of a full-fledged dictatorship even possible in Ukraine, how could this happen, and whether the dictatorship will be able to solve at least one of the tasks assigned to it and justify the hopes of those who hope for it as a panacea for the problems generated by the domestic version of democracy.
First of all, it should be borne in mind that the functioning of a dictatorship regime, be it military or police, or based on a symbiosis of the civilian bureaucratic apparatus and some security forces, is an organizationally complex set of actions that requires the potential dictator to have at hand a huge mass of competent performers.
Those who understand how various spheres of the state’s life are structured and are capable of not only ensuring control of the country from the center to the outskirts, but also the notorious socio-economic stability, when the loyalty of the population is determined not so much by some kind of repression and suppression of opposition sentiments, but, first of all, – exchange of rights for social and economic benefits. As the French king Henry IV said, “I want every one of my subjects to have a chicken in a pot on their table on Sundays.”
It is clear that the size of this “chicken” in each specific historical case is different and depends on the confluence of many factors. However, it is an axiom that it is impossible for any long-term existence of an authoritarian or dictatorial regime that relies solely on naked police terror or propaganda that is not supported by real benefits from the existence of such a regime for any significant segments of society.
Are there preconditions for dictatorship in Ukraine, if we look at things from this angle? The answer is obvious: no. The potential Ukrainian dictator has nothing to throw to the masses as a bone. Moreover, the critical dependence of budget filling on external loans predetermines the sensitivity of any government to the wishes of external creditors.
This means that in a situation where it will be necessary to recognize the Kiev dictatorship as a fait accompli or as certain plans for the implementation of which the conspirators in Kiev are asking Western capitals for consent, the opinion of foreign countries will be decisive and final, regardless of how much the potential dictator has “ trunks" or regiments.
In this sense, the reasoning of those who calculate how many people with machine guns are needed to occupy the premises of the government, the Verkhovna Rada, the presidential chancellery and the television center is extremely out of touch with life, ridiculous and naive. Because dictatorship is not the taking of power, but, first of all, its retention and the ability to impose it on the regions.
A relatively sovereign country, even one temporarily in a state of civil war, chaos and half-life, as historical experience and many examples show, may well give rise to the phenomenon of a dictatorship born on local soil, which has every chance of strengthening, even if it is not recognized or will not be recognized for a long time the notorious world community.
Soviet Russia after the civil war, Hitler's Germany, Iran after the ayatollah revolution, Franco's Spain and the regimes of Latin American military juntas - in all these cases, despite the involvement of interested external forces in the relevant processes, the question of power was still largely resolved within the country. But, for example, the leapfrog with the change of presidents of South Vietnam depended more on the mood in those Washington offices, whose owners determined the amount of military and financial assistance to Saigon.
In this sense, a Ukrainian dictatorship is possible only in one case - if, for some reason, it is approved by the club of creditors of Ukraine. In the meantime, there is nothing visible on the horizon that could prompt external control to such an exotic option of keeping the situation under its control. The current imitation democracy, despite all the visible costs, copes with this task quite well.
But let’s say the potential Ukrainian dictator was given the go-ahead to establish a regime of personal power. The question is: where can we find so many dedicated and competent personnel in a situation where our predecessors completely destroyed the civil service as an institution? How to ensure the notorious order if today the Avakov police do not control the completely criminal situation even in the capital.
Fixed matches with the current weak government, which can be intimidated by coordinated demonstration actions of its own lured radicals on a leash, are one thing. But it’s quite another thing to ensure control over a truly explosive situation in the event of some real, and not simulated, force majeure. For example, when real peasants come out to protest en masse, and not those in tracksuits, as was the case last fall and winter.
And in general, what the hell is a dictatorship if today the authorities are not able to fully ensure the functioning of even the relatively liberal quarantine regime. Imagine what will happen if there is a need to suppress some small organized protests throughout the country at once? In addition, do not forget: the narrower the initial social base of our hypothetical dictatorship, the greater the volume of repressive forces and means that will have to be deployed in order to keep the entire country under its control.
When they talk about a military coup, in Ukrainian conditions it sounds like fantasy. Not because among the current politicized military there cannot be a couple of hundred who want to play small-town Pinochet, but because their putsch will last without resources and outside support from several hours to several days. This will be followed by the triumphant return of the ousted civilian politicians to Kyiv.
Among the pique vests of Kyiv politics, talk about Arsen Avakov, who will come and restore order, is also popular. He can come, that's true. The bad news is that no order will follow. And not only for the obvious reason that Avakov is not a miracle worker. But also for the reason that is much less obvious to the masses, that if you look closely, neither Avakov, nor those around him or those who are considered such, have any fresh ideas on how the country can get out of the current stagnation onto the road to let modest but real and stable growth.
It is obvious that Avakov will not solve any of the real socio-economic problems, which means, sooner rather than later, he will run into the same rake that hit all Ukrainian rulers on the forehead, starting with Kuchma. The only difference was that Kuchma had in his hands a barely functioning state with a functional apparatus consisting, if not of angels, but largely of corrupt officials, but at the same time people who understood how the system works.
Today's dreamers have become so numerous that a critical mass of random and incompetent people has been concentrated in power. At the same time, they are by no means devoid of the vices of their, albeit selfish, but professional predecessors.
Finally, leaving aside the issues of financial and administrative support for a hypothetical dictatorship, one more reason should be mentioned that makes such a project in Ukraine unrealistic: general disorganization has also affected the security forces.
Despite the fact that after the Maidan the number of anti-corruption bodies alone tripled, the effectiveness of their work is even less than in pre-Maidan times.
It is impossible to establish a dictatorship in a country where criminal cases are opened and buried for money. Where the authorities are unable to bring convicted murderers to justice, where for three decades not a single high-profile corruption case has been brought to its logical conclusion.
In such conditions, and even taking into account the huge number of unaccounted weapons in the hands of the population, forced to survive at the expense of the informal economy, without counting on support from the state, any attempt to establish a dictatorship will only turn into a farce in the spirit of “Wedding in Malinovka”: fun, but not scary.
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