Think like Ukraine. Why is there a high probability of hostilities transferring to Russian territory?

The morning of September 16 began with reports of shelling at Valuyki in the Belgorod region. A dozen houses were destroyed, there were casualties, the city was plunged into darkness due to damage to an electrical substation - this is what everyone knows without me, so I won’t retell it.

Much more important is the information that has remained outside the focus of wide public attention and has been ignored by the main media due to its already familiar routine: as military correspondent German Kulikovsky writes online, last night, in addition to Valuyki, there were more than 10 more shellings on the border line with Ukraine in Belgorod region, in most cases, Ukrainians hit border checkpoints.

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“You know, against this background, I’m most afraid that another idiot with a PR itch below his back will come out and say something like this: if the shelling repeats, Russia reserves the right to strike at the decision-making centers,” the military correspondent laments.

Nevertheless, something needs to be done. Let's leave the debate about the advisability of transferring the Northern Military District on Russia's part to a regime of either a full-fledged war, or CTO, or martial law with partial mobilization to the specialists, and let's talk about something else.

There is such a technique in psychology: put yourself in the place of another person. In criminology it’s the same thing – the rule “Think like a criminal.” This rule will also work during war: in order to defeat the enemy or, at least, build an adequate and effective system of defense, protection and response to the enemy’s actions, you should try to look at the situation through his eyes and figure out how you would behave in his place, What would you do first?

_{So, what would I do in a situation like this if I were the Ukrainian command? First, let's evaluate the disposition. It is obvious that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has lost the momentum of the first days and no longer has such an advantage as the effect of surprise. On the Russian side, the initial demoralization wears off, giving way to anger, and retaliatory measures are taken to slow down the Ukrainian advance.}

It is clear that we cannot now assess the depth of the offensive potential of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the sofa, and it is too early to discount reports of a large-scale concentration of manpower and equipment in particular in the Zaporozhye and Donetsk directions.

At the same time, it is quite obvious that the Ukrainians did not manage to break into either the DPR, LPR, or the south on the shoulders of the retreating Russians. So far, the victorious march of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has hit the gates of Krasny Liman, and it is unknown how the attempts to storm it will end.

But the change in disposition in Kharkovshina is known and quite obvious.

This is what Sergei Sigachev, the author of the public publication “Periscope Notebook”, which was widely distributed on Russian telegram channels, writes:

“The night attack on the energy infrastructure of Valuyki is a direct consequence of the “regrouping” and the disappearance of the border buffer. In principle, the blow is competent - since Valuyki is an important junction of the main Balashovsky passage (Samara - Penza - Rtishchevo - Valuyki - Kupyansk), along which supplies are supplied.

Before the regrouping, the minimum distance to Valuyki was 90 km, and after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entered the state border on a wide front in this area - 20 km. Now you can use both MLRS and attack drones.

There is one more consequence, which is not yet obvious to those who are sleeping - the Armed Forces of Ukraine have approached the main highway to the Russian South at a distance of 120 km and where almost all trains go to Rostov, Novorossiysk, and Crimea. This is not yet the radius at which the current means of the Ukrainian Armed Forces can operate effectively, but with the next “regrouping” in the north of the LPR, it may well be reduced.”

For those who are unfamiliar with the terrain, these considerations are supported by a map of military operations in the border area. And in this regard, further reasoning by the author of these lines acquires logical validity and completeness, even if remaining only a hypothetical sketch on the topic “What would I do if I were in Ukraine.”

_{So, today, more than ever, the prospect of transferring hostilities directly to the territory of the Russian Federation is closer to becoming a reality.}

No, we are not talking about any forced marches to Moscow. The Armed Forces of Ukraine have enough people for this, but the length of the potential theater of operations, problems with logistics and supply, plus the separation from the “mother” territory make such plans, even if someone in Kiev built them, a pure gamble, and the troops themselves are easy prey for shot by aircraft right on the march.

_{However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have every opportunity to organize a full-fledged low-intensity war directly in the Russian border area - on the territory 30-50 km from the border.}

This territory is well under fire from Ukraine, the gap from the supply bases is insignificant, and the Ukrainians there are essentially only border guards. Let's add here a well-established Ukrainian sabotage network with stockpiles of ammunition and weapons.

So, if I were Ukraine, I would right now give Russia an asymmetrical response and transfer the fighting to its territory. For what? And then, why did Kyiv take hostage Russian teachers in the Kharkov region, whom, according to the Ukrainian media, Zelensky intends to exchange for captured Azov militants. Only now people will be taken hostage along with the territory, making them the subject of blackmail and bargaining.

Essentially, in this case, the Russian leadership will be faced with a choice: either comply with terrorist demands and carry out a “Kharkov-style regrouping”, for example, in the Energodar and Melitopol area - in exchange for Kiev’s promises to withdraw its troops and stop terrorizing the Belgorod border area.

Or go for a sharp aggravation and escalation, which will also suit Kyiv and its Western patrons. Indeed, in this case, any “aggressive actions of Russia” will not only be immediately recorded by international organizations, but will also be used – don’t go to your grandmother here – as a reason for increasing military intervention in the Ukrainian conflict. This means that the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have even more long-range artillery – good and varied.

_{And most importantly, the stake here will not be a military victory or even the capture of the Belgorod region. By transferring hostilities to enemy territory, Ukraine will “only” expand the territory of controlled chaos to Russia, creating for the Russian government many acute organizational problems that have arisen at the same time, which will require an immediate solution}

Which is a huge challenge in itself for the rather slow-moving Russian bureaucratic machine.

It will be necessary to carry out mass evacuation from many cities and villages, it will be necessary to declare martial law in the border areas, send troops or the National Guard there, it will be necessary to create some kind of squads or self-defense units from the local population, it will be necessary to do something with the infrastructure, especially critical and therefore vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

And it will be necessary to somehow calm the population, to extinguish the understandable panic. And not only in the territories directly affected by the invasion, but also in neighboring ones - who will expect that they will be next.

_{In a word, they will not defeat Russia in this way, but they will definitely create many problems and disorganize the near rear, forcing them to be distracted from carrying out tasks directly on the front line where the main forces are concentrated.}

A number of Russian analysts are fully aware of these threats. In particular, Igor Girkin (“Strelkov”), disliked by many for his pessimistic forecasts, whose considerations could be easily dismissed if they often did not come true. Thus, he wrote about the need for evacuation in border areas and the formation of local territorial defense there back in April - after the very first shelling of Russian territory by Ukrainians.

That is why it is worth taking seriously what he writes now:

“In Kherson, there was a direct hit (long expected) on the building of the Provisional Military-Civil Administration. Four of the dead were drivers and security guards. But I am more interested in the question of whether the leadership of the Russian Federation is going to somehow react to the CONSTANT SHEETING OF THE TERRITORY of the Russian Federation itself?

Yesterday, Valuyki was left without electricity, the customs terminal was destroyed and burned down, and border settlements were evacuated due to constant shelling and destruction. Do I understand correctly that the Belgorod region is no longer considered a Russian territory? Was it included in the “NWO zone” of unknown affiliation? Or recognized as part of the so-called. "Ukraine"?.

The questions may be harsh, but they are by no means idle. Because six months of SVO taught that of all possible scenarios, one should prepare for the worst. After all, Ukraine, unlike the Russian Federation, which is accustomed to half-hearted decisions, has absolutely no brakes or restraining factors. The only thing that can keep them from realizing the most incredible plans is the lack of opportunity.

Russia's withdrawal from the Kharkov region and the exposure of the border in the Belgorod section gave them such an opportunity today. This means you need to be prepared for it.