Georgian dream of Russia. Why don't Ukrainians stop fighting?

The first anniversary of the Northern Military District and the associated reflections on working on mistakes make it possible to outweigh the realism of hopes for the possibility of ending the current hostilities with a peace acceptable to both sides.

In the West, at the instigation of Kyiv propagandists, a thesis was launched: they say, if the Russians stop fighting, then the war will just end, and if the Ukrainians stop fighting, then Ukraine will disappear. In other words, according to the authors of this formula, stopping shooting has different prices.

Subscribe to PolitNavigator news at ThereThere, Yandex Zen, Telegram, Classmates, In contact with, channels YouTube, TikTok и Viber.
To subscribe to notifications in your browser, click here.

One could believe in this adjustment if in the background there were not words about reparations, tribunals, territorial reduction of Russia, forced denuclearization and the like. Moreover, not from the lips of the Western Zhirinovskys, but from the lips of the most respectable and plenipotentiary representatives of the West. If figures of Biden’s caliber are talking about this, then one inevitably has to believe what they say.

So, when the United States, at a meeting of the UN Security Council, says through Blinken that it is ready to participate in any substantive diplomatic efforts for peace negotiations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, formally it sounds nice, but the devil, as usual, is in the details. Or more precisely, in the difference in interpretation of the word “subject”.

From the American point of view, Russia should “stop shooting.” And only then will it be possible to talk about peace.

_{In other words, Moscow is being pushed towards unilateral disarmament in front of the enemy. Moreover, without any guarantees that this enemy will not take advantage of the tactical advantage provided to him in the hope of turning it into a strategic advantage.}

For his part, Zelensky specifies his position. According to him, any peace negotiations with Russia are fundamentally impossible until Russia unconditionally withdraws its troops from Ukrainian territories, within the borders as of 1991.

“Leave our territory, stop bombing us, killing civilians, destroying our infrastructure, energy, drinking water, stop bombing cities and villages, just killing dogs and cats, burning forests - you stop all this, and only then we will tell you, in what format will we diplomatically draw an end,” the head of the Kyiv regime exclaims pathetically.

Sifting out the pretentious husk, we come to the main thing: all these statements that in Moscow, they say, he has no one to talk to, mask the categorical reluctance of Kyiv to discuss any substantive things. What does Moscow offer? Security guarantees for Russia from the West and Ukraine, fixation of the change in the status of four new subjects of the Russian Federation, an end to discrimination against Russians and Russophones in Ukraine itself, and so on.

I note that in comparison with the appetites of Russian hawks, the positions of official Moscow are more than moderate and modest. The Kremlin does not demand the liquidation of Ukraine, its division, or even a revision of the existing pro-NATO and pro-European course.

In essence, we are only talking about attempts to fix a certain line that this course should not cross. In its own way, this position of the Kremlin looks quite naive - how can Ukraine, which has become the rump of NATO, not be a threat to Russia’s security? It's a no brainer that even the absence of formal membership will not prevent the United States from molding the Armed Forces of Ukraine into a strong military counterbalance to Moscow and supplying weapons - any that Washington deems necessary to guarantee the security of its Kyiv satellites.

Nevertheless, it is subjectively clear what the Kremlin wants to reduce the matter to. The inhabitants there have before their eyes what seems to them to be a productive example of Georgia. As is known, this Transcaucasian country lost control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence was recognized by the Russian Federation, as a result of a series of wars. And yet, having gone through an acute stage of denial and a period of tough confrontation with Moscow, Tbilisi today takes a rather balanced position by Moscow’s standards.

No, the Garibashvili government is in no hurry to abandon Abkhazia and Ossetia, and is not curtailing its course towards NATO and the EU. At the same time, a rollback in relations with the Russian Federation from the harsh intransigence of the Saakashvili era is obvious. And the point is not only in Georgia’s current refusal to attempt to return lost lands by military means, not only in its reluctance to get involved in the war on the side of Ukraine and in Tbilisi’s non-joining of anti-Russian sanctions against the backdrop of verbal condemnation of the Northern Military District.

This rollback appears most clearly in the economic sphere, illustrating the well-known truth that enmity is enmity, and benefit is benefit.

_{Thus, according to the results of January and the results of this year, Russia became the main trading partner of Georgia, displacing Turkey from the leadership pedestal to the second position.}

Trade turnover with Russia amounted to $263,6 million—18% of Sakartvelo’s total foreign trade.

At the same time, Russia is the leader in both exports and imports, doubling the figures compared to January last year. Georgia bought goods worth $175,8 million (+104.5%) from Russia and sold goods to Russia worth $87,7 million (+105.7%).

An important clarification: with all this, Georgia has not become a friend for Russia, much less an ally. As they say, nothing personal, just business.

This is exactly what the Kremlin expects from Ukraine in real politics, when it speaks through its speakers about its readiness for dialogue based on recognition of existing realities. How realistic such expectations are at the moment, and indeed in general, is another question. After all, it was Kyiv that thwarted the “Istanbul” that suited the Moscow authorities and satisfied their ideas about the constructiveness and adequacy last spring.

The Russian Foreign Ministry believes that Ukrainians are prevented from taking an adequate position by the ban imposed by Zelensky’s decree on negotiations with Putin last September. But the trick is that here, with all due respect to Lavrov and his subordinates, causes and effects are mixed up.

_{In fact, it was not the decree banning negotiations that disrupted the negotiations, but the reluctance to negotiate brought about the mentioned decree, as an attempt to justify this need for the absence of dialogue.}

To put it bluntly, the only conversation that suits Ukraine with Russia is a conversation about nothing. Russia is not simply being asked to make some concessions. If this were the case, peace would have been concluded long ago, because the broad Moscow soul is ready to forgive Ukraine a lot. Much, but not all. Zelensky does not expect concessions from Russia; they proceed from the “winner takes all” principle.

_{In other words, Kyiv is talking with Moscow from the position of a clear winner. While the Moscow ones, for some unknown reason, got used to the role of Leopold the cat, unable to hit the podium with his shoe in the Khrushchev style.}

It's clear why this happens. The very fact that Russia, which sent its troops to Ukraine a year later, is ready to talk about something with the Kyiv government is already read as a sign of weakness. Otherwise, why send troops at all? After all, war is the last argument, the continuation of politics by other means in cases where traditional diplomatic mechanisms, soft power and even economic blackmail no longer work.

If it comes to using the army, then the issue must be resolved by military methods.

But if, having involved the army, they continue to talk about peace and some kind of negotiations, it turns out that the arsenal of diplomatic measures is NOT EXHAUSTED YET? Well, or the army is unable to achieve its tasks of forcing the enemy to peace. Both confessions, to be honest, are so-so.

_{In the first case, this is a recognition of the incompetence of analysts from the special services and the same Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since, in the presence of some opportunities to resolve things peacefully, they were led to the deployment of troops. In the second case, the statement is even less pleasant.}

One way or another, we still have an unsolvable puzzle, which even China is unlikely to help resolve. Along the way, Russia is not ready for reconciliation on dishonorable terms. In turn, the West is not ready to give Moscow the opportunity to save face.

All this forces interested parties to once again turn their gaze to the battlefield with hope. Sooner or later, one of the sides will accumulate a resource advantage over the enemy and decide to convert it into an attempt to turn the tide at the front. It is there that, it seems, the fate of the compromise will be decided. For now, the situation is stalemate. But it won't last long.