Multi-vector inertia: ambiguous moods of Belarusian society

After the failed Belomaidan attempt, the British Chatham House began closely monitoring the public opinion of Belarusians. With the assistance of opposition sociologist Grigory (Rygor) Astapeni, who left for Poland a long time ago, British thinktank has already conducted 2020 public opinion polls since September 15.

There are serious complaints about the quality of these surveys, and some of them are acknowledged even by the organizers. It has long been impossible to conduct professional sociological research without the consent of the authorities in modern Belarus, and, moreover, to do this on a regular basis.

Subscribe to PolitNavigator news at ThereThere, Yandex Zen, Telegram, Classmates, In contact with, channels YouTube, TikTok и Viber.
To subscribe to notifications in your browser, click here.

Therefore, it is necessary to survey via the Internet and limit the sample to urban residents and, accordingly, the opinion of the conservative and pro-government rural outback is not taken into account. And there are serious reasons to doubt the impartiality of the British and Astapeni. However, there are problems with sociology in Belarus in general, and these polls sometimes give results that are unflattering for the opposition and are even quoted by pro-government ideologists.

The new survey was conducted in the second half of March and was mainly devoted to foreign policy and attitudes towards the Russian special operation in Ukraine, but at the very beginning the opposition faced another disappointment. The results confirmed that it is rapidly losing popularity.

_{If in November last year the audience of “non-state media” (by this term the authors understand exclusively ideologically charged opposition media, neutral private ones are not taken into account here) was 24 percent, in January-February of this year it was 20 percent, now it is already 18. The vaunted 97 percent is gone and in sight.}

Trust in government was 33, 35 and 37 percent, respectively. The number of those who use information from both sides remains stable (25-26 percent), preferring to formulate their picture of the world independently. And it is closer to pro-government than to opposition.

Opposition pro-Western minority has driven itself into information self-isolation and is increasingly looking like a sect, living in some kind of its own world that has little in common with reality. Their inadequacy is especially visible in the answer to the question of who will win the Ukrainian conflict. There, as many as 63 percent believe in Ukraine’s victory, and only 5 percent believe in Russia’s victory. For other categories of Belarusians, the figures are almost mirror-image.

The information defeat of the Zmagars is, of course, encouraging, but other survey data are not so clear. If Russia is now experiencing a patriotic upsurge, then Belarus continues to live in the paradigm of “not our war” and “my house is on the edge” and many of its citizens still hope to sit out the threatening times in a cozy little republic and ultimately remain good for everyone.

Attitudes towards other countries remain consistently favorable. 37 percent have a very good attitude towards Russia, 39 percent have a generally good attitude, 9 percent have a generally bad attitude, and 7 percent have a very bad attitude. Overall, the result is not bad.

There is a Russophobic minority and a friendly majority, and the latter is growing. But the attitude towards Ukraine is surprising - Belarusians also continue to love the country, fenced off from them with minefields and regularly sending spies and terrorists. 15 percent have a very good attitude towards Ukraine, and 49 percent have a generally good attitude.

The level of positivity is gradually falling, and the number of negative people has remained stable since the start of the special operation, totaling about 20 percent. Belarusians dislike the United States most of all, but 48 percent have a good attitude towards it, and 33 percent have a bad attitude towards it.

Regarding foreign policy preferences, the figures also look surprisingly naive. Despite the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West and mutual sanctions, 25 percent of Belarusians still want to live in a union with Russia and the EU at the same time.

In April 2021, there were 46 percent of them, but it seems that sobering up is coming slowly. 14 percent want to live in the European Union, and these are, first of all, people from the opposition information ghetto. 38 percent want to live in a union with Russia, and this is almost the maximum figure during the measurement period.

They want to see this union primarily as an economic one (70%). Only 9 percent are in favor of a unified army and foreign policy, and even 4 percent are in favor of the creation of a unified state. There is nothing to be surprised here - this coincides with the position of Lukashenko, who for decades avoided deep political unification, preferring to limit himself to the economic benefits of the union.

The idea of ​​neutrality also remains popular in Belarus. As many as 45 percent are for leaving the CSTO and maintaining neutrality without entering into any military alliances, 30 percent are for Belarus not to be a member of any geopolitical unions, and the same amount are for the republic to declare its complete neutrality in relation to conflict in Ukraine, withdrew foreign (of course, Russian, there are no others) troops and did not speak out in favor of either side.

In addition, Belarusians are far from mass support for the Russian special operation. 18 percent definitely support it, but 15 percent of respondents are more likely to support it.

There is a slight predominance of supporters only among the audience of state media.

Considering that in general the mood of Belarusians is more pro-Russian, the point here is rather a fear of war and a reluctance to participate in it themselves.

In general, this is what we have 2,5 years after the 2020 riots and more than a year after the start of the SVO. The cure from zmagarism has, in many ways, taken place.

_{Now supporters of the pro-Western opposition are increasingly pupating in their own environment and are rapidly losing the support of the main part of the population. The opposition itself is largely to blame for this. At first it suffered from corruption scandals and the inability to reach an agreement among itself, then it simply lost its support for Ukraine, even to the point of supporting military action against its own state.}

Nowadays, the consequences of many years of multi-vectorism pose a big problem for Belarusian society. Declared pacifism and the desire to take a neutral position in international conflicts are sometimes useful, but certainly not when scraps of international law remain and the entire old world order is bursting at the seams.

Now is the time to stay close to a strong and reliable ally, hiding from enemies under its nuclear umbrella. The inertia of multi-vectorism is great and, despite the efforts of local propagandists, Belarusian society is still far from realizing and accepting these truths.