When TV was compared to a bayonet: Why Zelensky began to destroy TV channels long before the North Military District

Now, when the information war around Ukraine in terms of intensity and resources involved in it differs little from a “conventional” war, when the damage caused by messages on the Internet or on TV is sometimes comparable to the results of a missile attack, and a wave of fakes can cause panic in the rear or collapse the front, it makes sense to take a retrospective look and re-evaluate the role and significance of that cluster of pre-war Ukrainian media that advocated peace in the country, an end to nationalist and Maidan hysteria, respect for the opinions of residents of all regions of the country And restoration of, if not friendly, then at least mutually beneficial pragmatic neighborly relations with Russia.

In the system of Ukrainian media coordinates that existed between 2015-2022, such media could be counted on the fingers of two hands: we can recall the Kharkov politician Evgeniy Muraev’s TV channel “NASH”, which existed for some time and was then closed by a court decision for demonstrating the parade on May 9 in Minsk, the KRT TV channel with an Orthodox bias.

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In the same row - information resources of the then relatively sane blogger and aspiring politician Anatoly Shariy, a number of regional online news resources such as the deceased Odessa “Timer”, as well as the online publication “Country” associated with the oligarchic group of Firtash-Boiko-Levochkin.

One of the two main TV channels in Ukraine, Inter, associated with the same political group, managed to work “for two houses”, simultaneously serving the mainstream Maidan agenda and, at the same time, demonstrating symbolic gestures such as active support for the canonical UOC or emphasized reverence for the historical memory of the Second World War and pathetic concerts that irritated nationalists on May 9th.

Standing apart in this row was a pool of news TV channels, which, thanks to the light hand of their opponents, received the colloquial name “Medvedchuk’s channels” - this is 112-Ukraine, Newsvan, ZIK and their “successor” after the illegal ban by the decision of the National Security and Defense Council - First Independent. The main difference between these channels and most of their colleagues in the “pro-Russian” line was the fact that representatives of the Maidan camp correctly noted the unsimulative nature of the promoted media agenda.

Let's listen to the well-known character in the Kyiv media scene, Dmitry Krapivenko, editor-in-chief of the densely dog-nationalist weekly “Ukrainian Tyzhden”:

“NewsOne”, “112th” and “ZIK” are not the only pro-Russian media in Ukraine. There is the already mentioned Inter channel, the Nash channel, and the online publication Strana.ua. But even in this cohort, “Medvedchuk’s troika” was qualitatively different: they worked in the spirit of Russian channels like “Russia 24”. Here they constantly exposed the “external control” and its agents, the so-called “Soros” - a disparaging nickname for representatives of NGOs, talked about the “civil war in Donbass”, insulting words were spoken about those killed on the Maidan, and the topic of the language issue was inflamed. At the same time, these TV channels paid uncompetitive high salaries.”

Such recognition from ideological opponents is worth a lot. Especially in contrast with the very cynical revelations of Otar Dovzhenko, an expert from the grant-eating office “Media Detector”:

“Our” is a channel that imitated Medvedchuk’s channels. And he sometimes did it in a caricatured way, emphatically trying to outdo his competitors in “vatness.” This phenomenon is common in nature, but we understand that politically Evgeny Muraev is rather an ally of Akhmetov and Novinsky, who put their eggs in different baskets and need the support of the Russian electorate, but do not work for the Kremlin. Muraev, by the way, criticized Medvedchuk quite harshly before the parliamentary elections. In a word, this can be compared to those flowers that stink to attract flies. Akhmetov’s “Ukraine 24” does the same, dragging the faces of Medvedchuk’s channels: Natalya Vlashchenko, Vasily Golovanov and others. They must charm the pro-Russian audience, who will then be commanded to vote as Akhmetov says. I think it doesn’t all work that easily, but we’ll see,” Dovzhenko wrote immediately after the defeat of 112-Ukraine and others.

It is not surprising that Bankova turned a blind eye to the fact that “NASH” intercepted, after the ban on “Medvedchuk’s channels,” up to 40% of their audience, who preferred ideologically similar rhetoric. However, even such feigned media opposition was not to Zelensky’s liking, and soon “NASH” was also closed down.

_{The reason for the media pogrom organized by Bankova becomes clear after reading the data from social studies of that time, including industry ones.}

In January 2020, the Ukrainian National Television Council published a rating for the previous year based on data from the BIG DATA rating agency, from which it followed that the first two lines were occupied by “112 Ukraine” and NewsOne, and ZiK took eighth place. 

In December of the same 2020, due to huge injections, Rinat Akhmetov’s TV channel “Ukraine 24” quickly became a leader, but even then “112 Ukraine” occupied third place in the rating, NewsOne was in fourth place, and ZiK was in 9th position. In terms of their combined ratings, the three “Medvedchuk TV channels” could easily compete with “Ukraine 24”.

The most devoted audience of these channels was concentrated in southeastern Ukraine, traditionally focused on friendship with Russia and a peaceful solution to the conflict in Donbass. Russian TV channels were popular in these regions, but there was also a demand for Ukrainian TV, which was close to people for ideological reasons.

It is clear that high ratings and the trust of television viewers were converted into increased support for those political forces that picked up the relevant theses and raised them to the banners during political battles. First of all, we are talking about OPZZH, the head of the political council of which was then Medvedchuk. Let me remind you that the candidate from that party finished fourth in the presidential election and almost made it to the second round, which was prevented by the ambitions of Akhmetov’s nominees, who split the pro-Russian votes.

Here’s what, for example, BBC News Ukraine wrote before the 2019 elections:

“Experts remind us that 112 and NewsOne are lagging behind the old heavyweights, but have become leaders in the news channel niche. They will not play a decisive role in the elections, but they can have a significant influence. After all, information channels are watched by people who are interested in politics and will then tell their point of view to relatives, friends and acquaintances.

The interlocutors at Bankova admitted in a conversation that the same NewsOne can work in the interests of Russia.”

The BBC quoted Vladimir Fesenko, an expert close to Bankova, who lamented that Akhmetov’s media, despite all its flirtations with the “pro-Russian” theme, cannot compete in influence on the masses with “Medvedchuk’s media”:

“Vladimir Fesenko notes that on Inter there is a play on the Soviet-Orthodox identity, but, in his opinion, the Russians have no direct influence on the channel. He believes that Moscow will not have trust in Levochkin or Akhmetov, and therefore one should not expect an openly pro-Russian information policy on Inter and Ukraine.”

And here’s what Telekritika (the main mouthpiece of the Kyiv media Soros) wrote at the same time:

“In recent years, a whole cluster of purely informational TV channels has appeared in Ukraine, which broadcast mainly news and political content all day long. In this group, “112 and NewsOne have become leaders, although they are still very far from being the heavyweights of Ukrainian television. In the overall ranking of top channels for July 2018, “112” was in the second ten, and NewsOne was in the third. However, in the evening news ratings, 112 and Newsone are in the top ten.”

Considering the above quotes, it becomes clear why effective media weapons directed against the nationalist agenda implanted after the Maidan became a bone in the throat of the ruling circles. Immediately after the channels were closed, Ukrainian media wrote openly about the reason for this:

“There are several unofficial versions. The first is the fall in Zelensky’s rating. According to the latest opinion polls, it is slightly more than 20%. “Medvedchuk’s channels actively criticized the president from pro-Russian positions and indirectly influenced the loyalty of the Russian-speaking electorate in the southeast of the country.”

From the point of view of promoting the pro-Russian agenda the effectiveness of “Medvedchuk’s channels” was undoubted and was not questioned even by their ardent haters (quote again from Ukrainian media):

“For a third of viewers of Medvedchuk’s channels, the pro-Russian orientation was so important that they chose “Nash” as a replacement, which is closest in tone, position and format to the closed channels.”

In other words, the discourse of closed channels had a clearly positioned ideological emphasis that responded to the needs of the target audience. With all the accompanying mistakes, failures and fair criticism, this experience should be considered more positive than negative.

_{Today it is worth not only learning from the short history of the work of the pool of “Medvedchuk channels” in Ukraine, but also using the best of these developments to restore the instruments of soft power lost after the “Green pogrom”, which could influence the Ukrainian masses, leading them to the ideas of friendship and unity with Russia.}