Who is the pranker Volnov? Why is his life in danger?
For the fourth day in a row, Svidomo continue to dance on the ashes of the tragedy in Kemerovo.
This coven was started by pranker Evgeniy Volnov (according to Nikita Kuvikov’s documents). His de-anonymization data is posted online at http://evgeniy-volnov.biz
But the most important and interesting thing about this Ukronazi is not indicated there.
In particular, that Volnov’s arrest in 2005 under Article 309 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine led to dependence on the SBU and work for the Ukrainian special service.
Before the second Maidan, Volnov did not stage any politically motivated pranks. His task was to snitch on informal youth and set them up. However, this is not particularly interesting to us.
But the activities of the prankster Volnov after the Maidan have already begun to acquire political overtones.
It so happened (more about this in a separate article) that immediately after the Maidan in the spring of 2014, I moved from Kyiv to the Cherkasy region.
He lived near Cherkassy and often visited the regional center. Even then, my senior comrades warned me that I should be careful in telephone communications, because, according to their information, there is a provocateur in the Ukrainian State Security Service in the Cherkasy region who introduces himself as a resident of Donetsk with pro-Russian views. He invites him to have a frank conversation on political topics and leaks information to the SBU.
In addition, as I later learned from Moscow acquaintances in 2014-2015, this character actively visited Moscow forums under the nickname Torneo, where he also looked for “like-minded people” from Ukraine.
And the Cherkasy SBU administration decided to put pressure on me using other methods. As a result, in March 2016, I left Ukraine.
In the same year, I met the Cherkassy provocateur in absentia.
In the summer-autumn-winter of 2016, I fought on the Southern Front as part of the DPR Marine Regiment. We were forbidden to use mobile phones, and we ourselves were not eager to keep them turned on for a long time in order to avoid targeting enemy artillery based on the results of direction finding. As a result, I was often out of touch from several days to several weeks.
As I learned later during the investigation, since the spring of 2016, my conversations had been wiretapped and even the new MTS number was known. Because I was not online for a long time, Volnov was instructed to call my friends who remained in Ukraine and try to record their willingness to help me as a Novorossiya militia.
After one of my acquaintances sensed something was wrong and wrote to me via email, I took action and called my friends during my next dismissal and warned about a scammer provocateur who could call on my behalf.
As a result, my friends were not harmed.
But did Volnov work only for me alone? And how many Russian patriots were sent to jail as a result of his denunciations and provocations?
After all, the mere fact of topping up a mobile account to a number whose owner serves in the army or law enforcement agencies of the DPR in Ukraine is grounds for initiating a criminal case under Art. 258-5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine “Financing of Terrorism”.
Even then I became interested in finding out what kind of nit was capable of doing this. And less than a year later, my “wish” came true.
When crossing the border between Ukraine and Russia in the Chernihiv region on March 9, 2017, I was captured by the SBU and taken to pre-trial detention center No. 30 in Cherkassy. Because criminal case under Art. 258-3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine “Creation of a terrorist group or organization” was brought against me precisely by the employees of the Ukrainian State Security Service for the Cherkasy region. I do not rule out that it was Volnov himself who lured me to Ukraine, because... how, during my arrest, the person with whom I communicated via Viber was not detained, although the SBU officers tried to convince me during the arrest that there was simply not enough information on the person in contact with me.
When, after an examination of my tablet, it turned out that before crossing the border I had deleted my entire Viber correspondence history, it seems that at one time the SBU counterintelligence had the idea of using Volnov as a witness to convict me of terrorism charges. But in the end, the head of counterintelligence of the USBU for the Cherkasy region, Major Alexey Nikolaevich Goloborodko, who was the direct supervisor of the prankster Volnov, abandoned this idea. Although initially he convinced me that my contact had testified against me and there would be a confrontation.
Nothing else can explain the blatant lack of professionalism of the SBU officers, who several times gave me the opportunity to see the disgusting face of a Nazi pranker in the corridors of the regional administration of the SBU, where I was taken for interrogation.
Realizing that this was hardly an accident, I told my cellmates about the strange fat guy who communicated with the head of the local counterintelligence. Imagine my surprise when, based on my description, they quickly identified the informer and provocateur and strongly advised me not to communicate with him under any circumstances, since I had no business with him.
Just to understand: Cherkasy is a small city. And if you don’t count the industrial areas and working outskirts, then, one might even say, it’s compact. Young people relax in cafes and clubs in the small center. Everybody knows each other. Therefore, Volnov was repeatedly seen communicating with SBU officers in a cafe. Yes, in fact, after 2014 he didn’t really hide his connections with the intelligence services. Puffing out his drunken cheeks and bragging about how he identifies separatists and gets paid for it. Such actions are still trending in Ukraine, and even more so in the first years of the war.
Apparently, Volnov has recently been promoted. There has been unconfirmed information that he is now working for the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces. The pranker became a SUCK not only by orientation. However, it doesn’t matter whether the misanthrope remains in touch with the SBU or SOSU. The main thing is the efficiency with which the hotline numbers of Kemerovo morgues and government services were found, as well as the prankster’s confidence in the conversation when introduced by an FSB officer and an employee of the presidential administration of the Russian Federation. And this despite the lack of experience in political pranking. The conversation style of the intelligence officer had to be trained in advance, and recording, quickly processing and posting 13 videos in less than XNUMX hours was only possible if one did not get distracted by searching for data from contacts and had a conversation plan in advance.
But that's not all. Volnov continues to show off and is confident that Ukraine will not extradite him to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation. He says in his videos that he trolled the whole of Russia. And he even tries to mock Ramzan Kadyrov.
The essence of all of the above is that the antics of such notorious troll-prankers are not the actions of individuals, but planned operations of the Ukrainian special services. Part of the Russophobic state policy of modern Ukraine.
And the next stage will be the elimination of the “promoted” media character. As happened more than once during the Maidan. And the overseas owners of Nezalezhnaya will have a reason for another unsubstantiated accusation against Russia - as in the Skripal case.
Traitors and provocateurs have always been and will be nothing more than expendable material. However, they choose their own destiny.
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