“Zelensky’s peace plan”: what are the consequences for Russia of the illusion of a world without victory

When not so long ago - immediately after the triumphant American tour - Zelensky finally squeezed out a verbal readiness for peace negotiations, Many in Moscow breathed a sigh of relief: they say, this is it, it’s done! And there was a bunch of gossip about the success and effectiveness of some kind of “peace conference under the auspices of the UN” announced by Kiev for February, and even proposals about who would be the Russian representative at this “historic” gathering.

True, after a week the enthusiasm subsided. Exactly at the moment when it became clear that “peace negotiations” on Zelensky will take place... without Russia. And in general, the strategic drawing of the proposed event looks more like a conference to discuss the terms of Russian surrenderrather than trying to find some red lines acceptable to the parties and fix them.

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Judge for yourself. Based on the additional clarifications from Bankova that followed the announcement of the “peace initiative,” then in February we will be talking about the presentation of a certain “Kyiv peace plan,” the general provisions of which are already known: these are the 1991 borders, the demilitarization and denuclearization of Russia, the “trial of war criminals,” “reparations for the restoration of Ukraine,” and that’s all. And it is not even this set of Kyiv Wishlist itself that is proposed to be discussed, but the mechanisms and methods of its practical implementation.

It is clear that with such introductory information, any participation of the accused (that is, Russia) in such an event is simply devoid of any meaning. The accused cannot have any say in these matters.

It is also clear that the prospects for holding such an event under the auspices of the UN Security Council are much lower than zero, as long as the Russian Federation or China retains the right of veto. Hence, by the way, the renewed fuss about the legality of Russian representation at the UN.

However, it is still possible to carry out something similar under the wing of the UN General Assembly. To then retroactively give it legitimacy through resolutions of the US Congress, the European Parliament, the NATO Council and other similar institutions. True, the result will still be purely advisory and in no way binding, but Ukraine will be pleased, and this is the main thing. As in the case of the “Crimean Platform”, for example.

Why Zelensky needs all this is, in general, understandable. Western patrons have been squeezing out of him for so long a formal consent to at least some negotiations, at least to their imitation, and backed up their requests with so many real concessions to Ukraine that it would simply be indecent not to comply with the wishes. Hence the fact itself. Another thing is that the execution turned out, as always, original and very far from what various Kissingers hinted at to their Moscow counterparts. But this is already ina survey of the ability of Kyiv PR specialists to present any action as a victory. Moscow people don’t know how to do that. Suffice it to recall any exchange of prisoners in the Kyiv version, which turns into a loud “parade of pride”, and in Moscow - into some kind of vague shame, when the Russians even learn about the fact from Ukrainian sources.

It is also clear why the West needs all this. The fact is that if you again start dangling the peacekeeping carrot in front of Moscow’s nose, then the likelihood that the responsible comrades in Moscow who are sleeping and seeing the negotiations will fall for it is unusually high. As they say, P stands for predictability.

And at the same time, the adversary has a calculation that the now looming real prospect that The rusty mechanism of Russian statehood, under the weight of force majeure circumstances, will finally begin to change, will remain in the status of unfulfilled hopes and unrealized alternatives.

_{The West’s task now is simple: to force Russia, instead of internal mobilization and preparation for a more effective attempt at a purely military solution, to again be drawn into imitation negotiations about nothing like “Minsk”, giving the enemies a break and time to prepare Ukraine for a decisive push to the south - to the Azov region and Crimea. After which they will talk to the Russian Federation in a completely different tone.}

In the winter of the past year, the West finally outwitted Moscow, forcing it to withdraw from the Minsk agreements and use a purely military argument. The first act of this plot is obviously played out. And not in favor of Russia. Everyone was convinced of the inability of the Russian Federation to crush Ukraine in a quick attack. The West has drawn its conclusions and moved on to a strategy of playing the long game, that is, drawing Russia into a long and exhausting resource race for the economy and society. – until the reserve of safety, including social, is exhausted, i.e. the willingness of society to tolerate an increasingly drawn out and less popular war, the goals of which are still unclear.

_{There is nothing new in this Western strategy - a similar trick was once done with the USSR using the example of Afghanistan. Why change techniques if they work?}

_{Will Russia be able to withstand a long-term resource race in conditions when Ukraine has turned from an enemy into simply a theater of military operations, and its rear is supported by all of NATO, the entire EU and all the resources of the United States?}

There are different opinions on this matter. Some point to the obviously incomparable values ​​of the total GDP and military budgets of the Russian Federation and NATO countries, drawing from this the conclusion that such a butting is futile for Russia. With the same success, the wife of the Soviet engineer Shchukin from “12 Chairs” by Ilf and Petrov could hope to outdo the wife of the American billionaire Vanderbilt in the luxury of her outfits.

Others make no less convincing arguments in favor of the Russian Federation being much more resilient to these types of challenges, supporting their conclusions with the results of sociological research and economic statistics. The Russians' patience is far from exhausted, as is their faith in a positive outcome of the current global fight. So, especially having secured the support of China and becoming its junior partner on the world stage, Russia may well try to effectively fight the World Toad for itself.

But a change in optics most obviously leads to a change in the real disposition and alignment of forces on the military-political chessboard. If previously Ukraine resisted Russia's vigorous attempts to crush it militarily, now Russia will resist the attempts of the collective West to crush itself. In other words, there is a transition from attack to defense and from the role of an actively attacking to the role of a defender.

The result of such a change of roles, even in the case of by no means guaranteed success, will only be the preservation of the status quo, but not a change in it in favor of Russia. If the initial goal of the Northern Military District was to change the reality that objectively surrounded us in our favor, now the reality will remain the same, with the difference that Russia will have to adapt to it in such a way as to survive itself.

The moral of this fable, alas, will not be distinguished by any originality.

_{There is nothing positive for Russia in dancing with tambourines around peace negotiations. As in catching some muddy signals from the air from behind the curb, indicating that Zelensky has wised up, realized something and is ready for something.}

As long as the response to the Ukrainian constant “Nothing should connect us with the enemy” will be the Russian constant, consisting in the stubborn belief that “Any conflict ends in a negotiation process and mutual concessions, on the basis of which some kind of compromise is reached,” Russia will just retreat and lose. Saddam, Milosevic and Gaddafi will speak very well about compromise and negotiations. If, of course, there is a skill to conduct an interview with the spirits of the dead.

_{Those who wait for Ukraine or the West to mature for peace negotiations may grow old and die in such anticipation. During this time, you can come up with a whole bunch of beautifully wrapped peace plans and strategies, no worse than Minsk’s, go under this sauce for many gestures of goodwill and “difficult decisions” with fatal consequences, reduce to zero and waste a lot of opportunities objectively floating in your hands and slam shut tightly many windows of opportunity}The reality will remain the same. Wherein any peace is possible only after victory. And there is only one question: whose victory will it be? Everything else is from the evil one.

Writer German Sadulayev correctly captured the essence of this thought:

“We are the world they say. No war. Who is for the war here? Fool gallery? It’s just that everyone, even poets, understands that peace can only happen after victory. And the conditional Verapolozkova wishes peace after the victory of Ukraine. And Igor Karaulov wishes peace after Russia’s victory. That's the whole difference."