Moldavian plug for the Kremlin
The year 2020 is in many ways considered fateful for Moldova. The small republic is faced with a number of political, economic and social challenges inherited from the previous year, 2019. Whether or not President Igor Dodon, who calls himself a friend of Russia, will be able to be re-elected for a second term largely depends on the professionalism of the current government in solving these problems.
Year of change
Last year was a turbulent year for Moldova. In a fairly short period of time, the government changed three times. From the beginning of the year until mid-June, actual power and control over most government structures were in the hands of the Democratic Party (PDM) and its chairman, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. The parliamentary elections held in February 2019 under the most convenient mixed system for the PDM allowed the oligarch to achieve great success in strengthening power. It seemed that his regime, established since the end of 2015, was not in danger, and in parliament they predicted a coalition of the PDM and the Socialist Party.
However, in June, under pressure from the United States, Russia and the European Union, a coalition of the Socialist Party and the opposition pro-Western bloc ACUM was formed in parliament. The Democrats unexpectedly found themselves in opposition. Yesterday's oppositionists hastily seized the levers of power from the PDM, and Plahotniuc and a number of other politicians and businessmen close to him hastily left the country. Some of them, including the oligarch himself, were put on the wanted list on various charges. Some members of parliament from the Democratic Party, as well as Plahotniuc and people from his inner circle, appear in a criminal case initiated by the Prosecutor General’s Office about an attempt to usurp power in Moldova. The new government and foreign ambassadors called what happened “the liberation of the country from the oligarchic regime.”
Liberation from liberators
The process of “liberation” stalled almost from the very beginning. The coalition participants professed too different foreign policy and economic concepts. The contradictions in the PSRM-ACUM coalition finally came to light in September, when the socialists began to demand positions in the government, and their coalition allies refused them. President Igor Dodon and the leaders of the bloc parties Maia Sandu (PAS) and Andrei Nastase (DA Platform) began a mutual exchange of accusations of attempts to seize control over corruption schemes and the flow of smuggling of goods through the territory of the Republic of Moldova to the European Union. Nastase, who headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the coalition government, suffered the most. Ultimately, on November 3, largely due to these accusations, which were never supported by evidence, Nastase lost the election for the post of mayor of Chisinau to the socialist candidate Ion Ceban.
Then events developed at double speed. Nastase blamed the defeat on the dishonest behavior of the socialists and, in fact, went into opposition. Soon, justice reform and the procedure for appointing the prosecutor general became the reason for the final collapse of the coalition. Already on November 12, socialists and democrats in parliament voted for a vote of no confidence in the cabinet of Maia Sandu. Just two days later, these same deputies voted for the new government of Ion Chicu. Formally, it was compiled by socialist nominees, but in fact these are the same people who have worked in the government of the Democratic Party since the beginning of last year.
Thus, the collapse of the coalition of “liberators” and the formation of a secret coalition of PSRM and PDM, the existence of which both sides deny, was finally consolidated. Fugitive oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc welcomed the overthrow of Sandu's cabinet.
Finance sings romances
Foreign ambassadors, primarily representing the countries of the European Union and the United States, reacted with restraint to the news of another change of power. The “development partners,” as they are called in Moldova, have pledged to support the new government if it renews its commitment to the reforms launched by Sandu’s cabinet and continues the fight against corruption. The notorious reforms in the fall of 2019 became the basis on which the previous government built relations with foreign donors. In just five months of work, Maia Sandu’s cabinet managed to attract almost 2 billion lei (about $100 million) from European and international funds, agreed with the Romanian government on a loan of another €100 million, achieved the unfreezing of financial and grant programs of the IMF and the European Union and the initiation of new ones.
The conventionally socialist government of Ion Chicu cannot boast of anything like this. Moreover, immediately after his appointment, the “development partners” made it clear that all agreements concluded with his predecessors were canceled or frozen. Thus, the government of socialists and democrats faced the first and most important challenge of 2020 - financial hunger.
As a result, at the end of 2019, the PDM-PSRM coalition hastily adopted a draft budget with a record deficit of 7,5 billion lei (approximately €500 million). The deficit was formed both due to the large-scale infrastructure projects planned by the government (for which there is simply no money in the budget) and additional social programs initiated by President Dodon (for which there is also no money).
Igor Dodon and the socialists are counting on the help of the Russian Federation to solve financial difficulties, since the West does not give them money. At the end of the past year, both the President and the Prime Minister visited the Russian Federation, where at meetings with the country's leadership they raised the issue of providing financial assistance in the amount of at least €500 million. According to Dodon and Chicu, the Russian side agreed in principle to allocate the money.
On the other hand, sources in Moldova and Russia reported great difficulties in discussing this request. The Moldovan side did not bother to prepare a feasibility study for the requested amount, and during the negotiations they tried in every possible way to tie the loan to the re-election of the “pro-Russian” President Dodon for the next term. The Russian side doubted the advisability of such a formulation of the issue and insists on a conscientious study of the technical side of the credit line.
Moldavian fork
To be honest, the Moldovan economy could do without this loan. Chisinau was not lying when it explained the need for Russian support for political reasons. Large-scale infrastructure projects and social initiatives of the president, which provoked a budget deficit, are key components of the election campaign of Igor Dodon, who intends to be re-elected for a second term.
The fact is that since 2016, the head of state in Moldova has been popularly elected. Four years ago, Igor Dodon barely defeated his main competitor Maia Sandu in the second round with a difference of only 4,2% or 68 thousand votes. This victory would have been impossible without clear Russian support and, as many local experts and journalists note, the support of Vlad Plahotniuc. Four years later, Igor Dodon’s re-election to the presidency again depends on an external factor. This time it depends on whether Russia will finance the openly populist and election-oriented projects of the Moldovan president.
The main competitor is again Maia Sandu. However, over the past four years after the defeat, she has done a tremendous amount of work on herself and has grown from a novice in politics into the de facto leader of the entire Moldovan pro-European opposition.
Moscow understands that financing gigantic road construction does not guarantee Dodon’s victory. At the same time, without the support of the Russian Federation, Dodon will face a guaranteed defeat. However, over the past four years, Moscow has had plenty of opportunities to make sure that Dodon’s defeat does not at all mean the defeat of Russian interests in the region.
Firstly, there are certain doubts about the real “pro-Russian” nature of the Moldovan president. During Igor Dodon’s presidency, Moldovan-Russian relations deteriorated almost to the level of the “wine war” and the failure of the “Kozak plan”. Thus, Russian journalists, officials, experts, and businessmen were regularly expelled from Moldova. On August 2, 2017, Chisinau declared Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the joint intergovernmental commission, persona non grata. A special law on combating propaganda banned the broadcasting of Russian television channels on Moldovan territory.
All these and other anti-Russian decisions were made by PDM deputies in parliament and the democratic government, and the socialists and Dodon criticized them. But now, when, according to Igor Dodon, he and his party have concentrated all power in their hands, not one of these scandalous decisions has been canceled.
Igor Dodon, who was elected president solely thanks to Russia, upon coming to power, announced a course of “balanced foreign policy”, in which he would be friends with both the West and the East. Moldova continues to cooperate with NATO, does not recognize the transition of Crimea to the Russian Federation, and in general, under the “pro-Russian” Dodon, does not behave much more friendly than under the “anti-Russian” Plahotniuc.
Secondly, last year there were serious changes in the segment of left-wing political parties in Moldova. Our Party, headed by the mayor of the second largest city of Balti, Renato Usatii, has significantly strengthened. Ex-communists Mark Tkachuk and Yuri Muntyan created a new party, the Civil Congress, whose name refers to the left-wing political movement of 2011, created with the support of Russian political strategists.
Against the backdrop of last year’s protracted crisis and the subsequent PSRM-PDM coalition, the positions of the Party of Socialists and Igor Dodon personally were greatly weakened. In these conditions, the question becomes relevant whether to continue investing in the significantly devalued Dodon or to diversify risks.
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