Moldova as a lesson for Ukraine
The parliamentary elections that took place last weekend in neighboring Moldova are of interest not only to those who closely follow the ups and downs of political life in this fragment of the former Union. The results of these elections, as well as the political technology background that accompanied them, are of direct interest to Ukrainians. In any case, that large part of them that is still torn between illusory hopes of returning everything as it was under the pre-Maidan grandmother and a sincere desire to somehow turn off the track trodden by the Maidan workers, leading to the final destination called “Anti-Russia”. The Moldovan elections may be no less interesting for those Russians who have not come to terms with the fact that the Russian Federation will be completely ousted from the former Soviet republics and hope to somehow win everything back with the help of some cunning plans, combinations and manipulations.
But enough preamble. Let's start with the main thing. The Moldovan elections are a ready-made model for Ukraine. This clearly demonstrates what it would be like if the blue dream of many about a “single candidate from the southeast” in the presidential elections, or about a single bloc of pro-Russian forces in the parliamentary elections, which, having secured the explicit and implicit support of the Kremlin, would go to “conquer” nationalists lost positions by Yanukovych’s team.
This is exactly the situation that has developed in Chisinau. The country lived for a long time in conditions of virtual dual power, when the rope of powers was pulled by the conditionally “pro-Russian” (actually pro-Moldovan) president - socialist Igor Dodon and the pro-Western government controlled by the ruling Democratic Party of the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, in whose back another popular nationalist group ACUM Maia was breathing Sandu and Andrei Năstase. Under these conditions, Moscow relied on Dodon’s support, and the Moldovan president himself turned on the mode of flirting with the Russian-speaking part of the population, demonstrating in every possible way his readiness for dialogue with Moscow, moderation and adequacy. Moscow actively played along with him in this - they received Dodon in the Mother See like a king.
At the same time, despite all the declarative pro-Russianism, the constant that brought together the positions of Dodon and the ruling group of Plahotniuc was a common vision of the Transnistrian issue. The current PMR is part of Moldova, period. This is precisely what all the “peace plans” generated by Dodon’s team boiled down to, convincing both Moscow and the EU that he would definitely “find a common language” with Tiraspol. The entire campaign was accompanied by successive anti-Russian gestures of the government and the subsequent equally demonstrative pro-Russian gestures of Dodon, who literally “apologized” to Moscow for his “domestic” Russophobes. At the same time, the peculiarities of the constitutional structure of Moldova are such that the anti-Russian attacks of Plahotniuc’s team had the force of law and were binding. But Dodon’s “pro-Russian” gestures actually remained his personal position. Even laws and government regulations that Dodon refused to sign still came into effect through the mechanism of temporarily removing the president from office and replacing him with the head of the Constitutional Court.
But the most important “brick” in the phantom edifice of the victory of Dodon’s party, on which both the Moldovan “adequates” and their like-minded people in Moscow pinned their hopes, was the actual integration of the PMR into the Moldovan electoral process. The calculation here was as follows: it is precisely the cutting off of hundreds of thousands of Pridnestrovians with pro-Russian views that is the obstacle that prevents the victory of the “healthy forces” from happening in Moldova. Therefore, the key to success lies in the mass voting of residents of the PMR with Moldovan passports for the socialists. And it will be done. Does it look like a Ukrainian plot? It’s very similar, but more on that later.
In the meantime, a massive vote of Pridnestrovians for a “pro-Russian force” was organized. And it really was the most widespread in the entire history of the separate existence of both banks of the Dniester since the early 90s of the last century. Then, as usual, there were many scandals, accusations of “driving” people to the polling stations, bribery and the like, but in this story we are not interested in this turnover, but in the meat itself. That is, the results. And as a result, it turned out that the split in Moldovan society is much deeper than the “adequate” people in Moscow and Chisinau thought. And the number of pro-Western forces is many times greater than during the time of Vladimir Voronin’s Communist Party. And since then there have also been considerable qualitative changes in the pro-Western camp. The bottom line: even taking into account the mass vote of the Pridnestrovians who “temporarily integrated” into Moldovan affairs, Dodon’s party received only a third of the votes. Honorable first place in the standings. But - without any chance of forming a majority in parliament and, therefore, changing the current government course.
The two main pro-Western groups – Plahotniuc’s PDM and Sandu Nastase’s ACUM together received more than half of the votes. Now Moldova faces either betrayal of pro-Russian voters by the socialists, or another round of parliamentary discord and new elections with approximately the same result.
Moreover, it turned out that in the two majority constituencies reserved for Transnistria, it was not the “pro-Russian” socialists who won, but Plahotniuc’s nominees. It is they who will represent the opinion of the region in the Parliament of Moldova. The scandal broke out in earnest. And now it is difficult to understand whether it was the “Sheriff” group, all-powerful in the republic, that helped business partners from the right bank of the Dniester, or, as claimed by the unionists from ACUM, who declared non-recognition of the election results in the Transnistrian districts, it was Plahotniuc who conspired directly with Dodon . Moreover, the results for the Transnistrian majority pale in comparison with the voting results for party lists. A third of Pridnestrovians with Moldovan passports voted for the Westerners Maia Sandu - in fact, for unification with Romania.
Be that as it may, the fact is clear: the “pro-Russian” PMR played not into the paw of the “pro-Russian” Dodon, but into its own autonomous game.
Now let’s return from the banks of the Dniester to the banks of the Dnieper. Don’t we hear the same mantras from local “adequate” political scientists like Mikhail Pogrebinsky? That cutting off millions of voters from Crimea and the industrial part of Donbass forever deprived “pro-Russian” politicians of their electoral advantage and doomed them to the role of defeatists. But if you “shove” back the LDPR and (usually this is not stated out loud, but it is implied) Crimea, then peace, grace and eternal friendship will come between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Another iconic “nightingale” of the Minsk agreements, Ruslan Bortnik, argues in approximately the same vein, dreaming about what Ukraine could be like with Crimea and Donbass.
It is these motives that force the Novinskys and Medvedchuks to generate all kinds of plans for the return of Donbass to Ukraine. The same considerations force the political bankrupts from the former PR to put together all sorts of blocs, in the hope that the seven political gnomes, united, will produce one fabulous Russian hero who, with one swing of his sword, will cut off all the heads of the nationalist dragon.
For this, “pro-Russian” political crooks need Donbass. After all, where else can you find so many fools ready to vote again for the old bankrupt Yanukovychs? It’s not in Galicia to look for them.
In general, everything is like in the old joke: we created a “pro-Russian” collective farm, and now send us collective farmers. All this talk about “single candidates from the southeast” is based on precisely this ulterior thought: Putin will return Donbass to us, and we will already then...Moldova is a clear model of what will happen “then.”
In the best case scenario (and that’s not a fact), everything will return to the times when the PR had first place, and the ruling coalition was formed by the nationalists with a margin of a couple of votes. But the “pro-Russian” forces will receive an excellent excuse, explaining why they don’t do anything for their voters. You gave us first place, but there aren’t enough votes. So wait for the carrot conspiracy. Or give us more “pro-Russian” voters.
And, looking at the position of the PMR authorities, where is the guarantee that Donbass residents with Ukrainian passports, following the example of the Pridnestrovians who voted for the nationalist ACUM, will not vote for some Zelensky? Will the authorities in the Donetsk and Donetsk People's Republics look into the mouths of Medvedchuk and Co., acting as electoral fodder for the next version of the Opposition Bloc? Rather, they, like their colleagues in Tiraspol, will try to play their own game with Kiev. And in Moscow offices there will be those who will approve of this.
Meanwhile, amid these conversations, the Ukrainian cart, with wheels creaking that are not oiled due to budgetary savings, will move further and further towards the horizon. To the west.
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