The offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It's time to tell the ugly truth

The result of the three-day mini-blitzkrieg of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kharkov region was a sharp change in the configuration of the front in this area - Russian-controlled territories have shrunk by two-thirds, the main cities have been lost, and Ukrainian troops now directly threaten the recently liberated territory of the LPR with great difficulty., from the northern settlements of which (Svatovo) there is already a mass evacuation of the population.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces also reached the approaches to Krasny Liman, which was recaptured a couple of months ago in the DPR, threatening to nullify almost all the achievements of the summer operation in Donbass and put an end to plans to capture Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

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The reaction of the Russian military staff turned out to be predictable: in a belated and made public after the fact and essentially useless to anyone (everyone in the subject had already made their conclusions by that time) in the release, the incident was called “an operation to curtail and organize the transfer of the Izyum-Balakleya group of troops to the territory of the Donetsk People’s Republic, during which a number of distracting and demonstration activities were carried out indicating the real actions of the troops.”

All this, according to the official press, was done (I quote) “to achieve the stated goals of the special military operation for the liberation of Donbass.” All in all, as in the well-known joke: not leaving the lines, but retreating to pre-prepared positions. Well, at least it’s not a gesture of goodwill, thanks for that.

_{Nevertheless, the defeat in the Kharkov region (and it is precisely a defeat, no matter what anyone says) leaves a whole series of questions and gives grounds for some generalizations.}

First of all, the very fact that the Russian military group was not ready for such a development of events, and the defense collapsed in a matter of days, tells us about the presence of serious problems at the level of planning the operation itself, the absence of any feedback between the military command at all levels and the expert community.

Almost everyone has been talking all summer that there will be a Ukrainian counter-offensive. – only the lazy didn’t respond to this topic. And the fact that in the end what happened was a surprise and took us by surprise speaks volumes about the dismal state of military planning and staff analytics.

_{It turns out that retired Strelkov, excommunicated from the Ukrainian theater of operations, or civilian military officers and volunteers foresaw in advance what the active generals involved in the operation did not see? And if you saw it and were not prepared, then the potential assessment of the military command’s professional suitability will be even less favorable.}

However, let the specialists comment on the purely military materiel, but we will dwell on what has already been said and move on to the political part.

From a political point of view, everything is more than bad. The Ukrainians not only successfully completed their conditional “pitching” on the feasibility of further armament, but, therefore, deliveries of increasingly advanced Western “hardware” will continue to increase, and counteraction to this “hardware” will consume more and more efforts and resources on the Russian side.

Much more important is that in the minds of both the Ukrainian military and their rear support group an important psychological barrier has been overcome: the enemy has once again become convinced that there is no point in negotiating, the Russians can be successfully beaten, the main thing is to try hard.

And this, of course, does not in any way contribute to negotiations and ending the war on Russian terms. Vice versa, motivates Ukrainians not to seek negotiations, to put the squeeze on, taking theirs on the battlefield. By the way, this is exactly what the Kyiv Reznikovs, Arestovichs and Podolyaks have been saying in recent months - that it is possible to talk with Russia only by significantly improving the Ukrainian negotiating position.

The unpleasant news for Russia here is that appetite comes with eating, and if the Armed Forces of Ukraine are so lucky, then the Kiev authorities are unlikely to refuse the temptation to press the trigger all the way - in order to break the whole bank, since luck itself floats into their hands. So it is not at all a fact that Ukraine will be satisfied with the current improvement in its negotiating positions and will enter into negotiations.

_{Another bad news is that the reputation myth of the Russian army has been reset. In conditions when the Russians do not of their own free will leave Balakleya, Izyum and Kupyansk, talking about the victorious prospects of a campaign against Lvov or about the Northern Military District in Latvia is somehow “wrong.” However, there is a breed of talkative propagandists for whom shame will not eat away at them. The only good thing is that this unpleasant truth became clear now, during a clash with Ukrainian NATO proxies, and not during a possible direct clash with the alliance’s military machine, which the Russian army in its current state and under the current command, I fear, simply will not survive.}

It is possible to restore the reputation of the RF Armed Forces if there is a desire. But the process is long, and most importantly - The public no longer believes words, PR reports about successfully conducted exercises, and the like. Strength will have to be confirmed by serious successes on earth - during real combat operations.

_{In fact, each new success of the Armed Forces of Ukraine makes the prospect of any peace negotiations with Ukraine more and more elusive. Leaving only one format for such negotiations - the surrender of Russia. Moreover, it is not a fact that there are no people in Moscow willing to sign it. Provided, of course, that everything is arranged beautifully and gradually - so as not to upset the Russians right away.}

_{This, of course, is pure conspiracy theory and the author’s speculation, but if in the coming weeks we do not see any organizational conclusions regarding the Kharkov region; if after a while, when society has digested the abandonment of the Kharkov region, according to the same pattern, the turn of the Kherson region or the already liberated areas of the Lugansk region will come; if by the end of autumn the promised referendums at least in the LPR and DPR do not take place, but instead their territory decreases; if everyone involved in the disgrace of Izyum and Balakleya retains their positions and posts, and the political class continues to pretend that nothing special is happening; unless, finally, there is a radical change in the paradigm of conducting air defense, this will become a powerful support for suspicions that the special operation is being quietly leaked. Like that frog that is boiled over low heat so that it does not suspect something is wrong ahead of time.}

In the meantime, the time has come to voice the unpleasant truth for many. Today, the SVO is closer to failure than ever before. Moreover, regardless of whether it will be possible to stop the further advance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and preserve at least part of the achievements of the spring-summer campaign, or whether the fighting will again return to the starting point and it will be necessary to re-defend the already liberated cities in the Donbass, rolling back to the demarcation line on February 24.

_{Again, without going into purely military-tactical issues (for this, go to Strelkov and other military experts), it is necessary to note the main political weakness and vulnerability of the Northern Military District. The point is that, to this day, six months after the start of hostilities, it is not at all clear what Russian soldiers are fighting for in Ukraine, what they are doing there, and what result they ultimately want to achieve.}

If you believe the top political leadership of the Russian Federation, there is no reason to panic, nor any reason to tense up: everything is on track, the SVO is moving according to plan, will be completed on time, and its goals and objectives will be achieved.

And in this sense, oddly enough, everything is so. They can stop the SVO in Moscow at any convenient moment, declaring what was actually achieved as initially planned. We will also learn about what goals Russia has achieved and what tasks have been completed after the fact - exactly at the moment when we are informed about their successful implementation and achievement. As for “on time,” no one gave any specific deadlines. Right? Right.

“All our actions are aimed at helping those who live in Donbass. Go to the Donbass and ask the Ukrainians who live there - what values ​​do they defend there?” - these, if anything, are the words of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who quite clearly and without equivocation outlined the framework of the tasks of the Northern Military District at the recent EEF in Vladivostok.

_{So you shouldn’t be too surprised if in the end it turns out that no one in Moscow planned any annexation of anything other than the LPR and DPR. This is if Kiev still shows good will and decides not to recapture Donbass by military means. Which is not a fact, given the mood of Ukrainian society and the absence on the Russian side of at least some arguments in favor of convincing Kyiv that a campaign in Donbass is expensive and useless.}

When talking about the goals and objectives of the Northern Military District, you can change your optics, stop fantasizing about the topics of “liquidation of Ukraine”, “reunification of Russian lands” and the like, and simply ask one single question: in the six months since the start of the special operation, has Russia become closer or further from the initially announced goals?

In any area, be it the protection of Donbass from shelling, demilitarization, or denazification or recognition of Crimea and the independence of the LDPR, neutral status or preventing the transformation of Ukrainian territory into an appendage of NATO. I don’t know about anyone, but for me personally the answer is obvious: compared to the end of February, in all of the above parameters, there is not progress, but significant regression.

_{In six months, Ukraine has become much more militarized, much angrier and closer to NATO, and the degree of nationalism and Russophobic hysteria is much higher. At the same time, Donbass has turned into an arena of fierce fighting and shelling, increasing tenfold, without a clear prospect of their completion, becoming much less protected and safe than before February 24.}

At a minimum, this is a reason to think about what Russia is doing wrong and change something in the existing score. Because instead of returning Ukraine, the Russians are losing it more and more every month.