German intelligence officer: The SBU ordered the murder of Nemtsov! Full text of the report

Ordered the murder of a Russian politician Boris Nemtsov there was the Security Service of Ukraine. The authors of the investigation from the “Eastern Lens” group of a former intelligence officer of the German special services came to such sensational conclusions Wilhelm Dietl. The report was presented in Berlin on June 14. “PolitNavigator” publishes the full text of the document in Russian for the first time.

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Report

The murder of Boris Nemtsov: political versions a year later

Part 1. The role and place of Boris Nemtsov in Russian politics

Russian opposition politician Boris Efimovich Nemtsov was killed on February 27, 2015 at 23:31 Moscow time in Moscow, on the Bolshoi Moskvoretsky Bridge, in close proximity to the Kremlin. At the time of the murder, Nemtsov was moving from a restaurant in the center of Moscow to his home in Zamoskvorechye. He was accompanied by 23-year-old Anna Duritskaya, a model from Kyiv, with whom Nemtsov had a romantic relationship. The girl was not injured.

Immediately after the murder, a number of versions were put forward regarding the alleged masterminds of this crime. Despite the fact that Zaur Dadaev, who was arrested on suspicion of Nemtsov’s murder, told investigators that the murder was planned and carried out by an initiative group because of Nemtsov’s insult to Islam, the Russian opposition and some Western politicians continue to insist that the reason for the death of the oppositionist was his political activity .

A detailed analysis of the plausibility of this and other versions, as well as an indication of the most probable of them, is the purpose of this report. When creating it, insider information from exclusive sources was used, including in Chechnya and Ukraine. However, before moving on to considering the versions of the murder, we consider it necessary to briefly dwell on the political biography of Boris Nemtsov and his way of life, since such a political portrait is extremely important for understanding the possible true reasons for the murder.

Boris Nemtsov, despite his relatively young age for a statesman, came to politics a long time ago. Since 1986, together with his mother Dina Eidman, Boris Nemtsov has been an active participant in the environmental movement “For Nuclear Safety,” which was created by a group of activists in Nizhny Novgorod under the impression of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. In 1989, Nemtsov tried to nominate himself as a candidate for people's deputies of the USSR from this movement, but did not achieve success. The following year, 1990, Boris Nemtsov was elected people's deputy of the RSFSR (present-day Russia - then a republic within the USSR).

In 1991, Yeltsin appointed Nemtsov governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region. Boris Nemtsov later claimed that this appointment was accidental. It’s just that among the Russian deputies who supported Yeltsin, he was the only one from Nizhny Novgorod. The appointment was caused by the need to urgently replace the leadership of the region, which supported the coup attempt organized by the leaders of the Soviet communist regime and known as the State Emergency Committee. Nemtsov, in his memoirs, claimed that Yeltsin was embarrassed by his young age (32 years old) and he considered this appointment as temporary, for two months, until a replacement was selected. However, as a result, Nemtsov led the Nizhny Novgorod region for 5,5 years (from November 1991 to March 1997). He became one of the most famous governors of Russia and was close to the first president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin.

In the last years of his rule, Yeltsin began to promote Nemtsov into the highest echelons of Russian power. In March 1997, he appointed Nemtsov first deputy chairman of the Russian government in the Cabinet of Viktor Chernomyrdin. In this government, from April to November 1997, Nemtsov worked as Minister of Fuel and Energy. In April 1998, during the change of Cabinet, Nemtsov retained the position of Deputy Prime Minister in the Cabinet of Sergei Kiriyenko.

At this time, Nemtsov interacted with Boris Berezovsky and other oligarchs who controlled power in Russia. Nemtsov later (in May 2005) testified against Berezovsky in the Royal Court of London at the trial of Boris Berezovsky against Mikhail Fridman. Rumors are leaking into the media that Yeltsin is considering Nemtsov as his possible successor. It is difficult to say how true these rumors were. The appointment to key government positions may indeed have been due to Yeltsin’s desire to provide his eventual successor with both government leadership experience and a political biography. Moreover, at the beginning of 1997 (that is, precisely during the period when Nemtsov’s advancement into the highest echelon of Russian power began), his (Nemtsov’s) presidential rating was the highest of all Russian politicians and amounted to 29%. At the same time, this appointment could have been as accidental and caused by a confluence of favorable circumstances for Boris Nemtsov as his appointment to the governor’s post. In any case, after Kiriyenko’s government resigned on August 23, 1998 (due to a default on the domestic public debt on August 17), Yeltsin made no attempts to return Nemtsov to the leadership of the government.

Boris Nemtsov himself focused on party activities. With his direct participation, the Union of Right Forces was created, the list of which was headed by Nemtsov in the State Duma elections held in December 1999, along with Sergei Kiriyenko and Irina Khakamada. Having been elected to the State Duma, Nemtsov in 2000-2003 held the position of head of the Union of Right Forces faction in the State Duma. At the same time, from mid-February to the end of May 2000, he was deputy chairman of the lower house of the Russian parliament. In 2003, the list of the Union of Right Forces headed by Nemtsov did not overcome the 5% barrier in the elections to the State Duma and Nemtsov no longer held high government positions.

It was from this moment, with the defeat in the 2003 elections, that Nemtsov went into strong opposition to the regime of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, even during the 2000 presidential elections, Boris Nemtsov and the Union of Right Forces actively supported Putin. In particular, Nemtsov said: “For right-wing forces, Putin is a completely acceptable figure. He is a capable, experienced and intelligent person.” Nemtsov also called Putin the most worthy of all the candidates who entered the race for the post of President of Russia in 2000. He characterized him as a responsible, honest person who is not afraid to make difficult decisions. He expressed confidence that Putin will be elected president of Russia and will form a capable government.

In 2009, Nemtsov took part in the mayoral elections of Sochi, which he predictably lost. Russian experts then argued that participation in the election of the mayor of the city, which was preparing to host the Winter Olympics, was a regular advertising campaign - a politician who had been released was trying to remind people of himself. Nemtsov’s last political success took place in 2013. The list of the Republican Party of Russia, the People's Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS), headed by him, received one seat in the elections of the Yaroslavl Regional Duma and Nemtsov became a deputy of the regional parliament.

The political biography of Boris Nemtsov gives us information for the following important conclusions, which will allow us to further assess the plausibility of some versions of the murder.

Firstly, the peak of Nemtsov’s political successes occurred in 1997-1998. After that, he only lost popularity with voters, and his political career moved in a downward direction. Since 2004, Nemtsov has been a near-zero figure in Russian politics. In particular, this is evidenced by the fact that for a whole decade his only success was the mandate of a deputy of the provincial legislative assembly. This is much less than the positions (member of the Russian parliament and governor of one of the largest industrial regions) with which Nemtsov began his political career.

Secondly, his political failures are not related to opposition activities. Nemtsov’s career began to decline even during the period when he strongly supported and praised Putin. At the same time, Putin’s rise to power did not put an end to it. Nemtsov held an important parliamentary post for another four years, until the political force he represented lost the elections. The fates of Nemtsov’s colleagues in the leadership of the Union of Right Forces, who headed the 1999 list with him, also do not confirm the version of persecution by the authorities. After her defeat in the 2003 elections, Irina Khakamada quickly left practical politics, but continues to remain a popular public figure and political expert. She hosts her own radio and television programs, and is also a member of the Russian Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights. Sergei Kiriyenko, who was the head of the last government, which included Boris Nemtsov, and in the previous Cabinet who replaced Nemtsov as Minister of Fuel and Energy, in 2000-2005 worked as the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Russia in the Volga Federal District (in fact, he was the curator of one of the eight parts , into which Russia was then administratively divided). From 2005 to the present day, he has led Rosatom, one of the largest state-owned corporations, whose net assets are estimated at 1,5 trillion rubles (20 billion euros). The director general of Rosatom is appointed by the government.

Thirdly, this is not the first time Nemtsov has opportunistically changed his opinion about a person. In 2005, in the Royal Court of London, he impartially characterized Boris Berezovsky, with whom he had previously had experience of interaction, in particular, they together supported the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004. Boris Berezovsky was also actively involved in financing the Russian opposition to President Putin. Similarly, in 2000, Nemtsov actively called for voting for Putin, and ten years later he said that he himself had never voted for him. In 1991-1992, he actively criticized Yegor Gaidar, calling his reforms “sluggish schizophrenia,” and then, already in the 2000s, at the head of the Union of Right Forces (of which Gaidar was a member), he argued that these reforms were salvation for Russia. According to the recollections of People's Deputy of the RSFSR, member of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ilya Konstantinov, in 1993, during the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament, Nemtsov also tried to maneuver between the parties until the winner was determined, argued that Yeltsin had taken too harsh measures and that it was necessary remain within the constitutional field. In 2003, Nemtsov stated that dispersing the Russian parliament was the only right decision.

Fourthly, Nemtsov’s own admissions regarding the accidental nature of his appointment as governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region allow us to look at his career as a chain of political accidents. Boris Nemtsov was lucky several times to be in the right place at the right time. As soon as the luck stopped, the career fell apart like a house of cards. It is characteristic that the professional Kiriyenko, who literally followed Nemtsov up the career ladder in Moscow government offices, not only overtook Nemtsov (having moved in 1998 from the post of Minister of Fuel and Energy to the chair of the Prime Minister, while Nemtsov himself became from the first deputy prime minister as a simple deputy), but also remained in big Russian politics after the resignation of his Cabinet, despite the fact that it was Kiriyenko who was responsible for the 1998 default. Nemtsov, against whom there were no formal complaints, quickly found himself on the political sidelines. These facts indicate that most likely we are dealing with unprofessionalism, which became obvious after Nemtsov’s transfer to the government and had the most detrimental effect on his political career.

From this angle, Nemtsov’s opposition activities receive a completely different motivation. With a high degree of probability, Nemtsov’s opposition can be explained by the personal resentment of a man who, practically without any effort on his part, had a successful political career and who already saw himself as a contender for the highest post in the country. As a result, Putin took this post, and Nemtsov himself, unlike his colleagues in the government and in the Union of Right Forces, turned out to be completely unclaimed. Moreover, since the decline of Nemtsov’s career began under Yeltsin, it can be assumed that the authorities lost interest in him much earlier than Putin took the lead in Russian politics, which means Nemtsov’s political marginalization would have occurred in any case.

Nemtsov’s activities as an oppositionist were also not very effective. In 2004, Nemtsov and the Union of Right Forces (SPS) supported Yushchenko and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. For this, Nemtsov was appointed as an adviser to Yushchenko and was listed as such in 2005-2006. When asked what specific advice he gave, Nemtsov could only say that they were “not fateful.” In 2007, Nemtsov topped the SPS list in the State Duma elections, in which the party did not receive a single mandate. That same year, Nemtsov was nominated by the Union of Right Forces as a candidate for the presidency of Russia in the 2008 elections. Since, as of December 2007, Nemtsov’s presidential rating was 1%, he withdrew his candidacy even before the start of the election campaign.

In February 2008, Nemtsov announced the suspension of his membership in the Union of Right Forces, and in November of the same year the party itself ceased to exist, joining the new political project “Right Cause,” in which Nemtsov did not take part. Together with Garry Kasparov and a number of other politicians, he announced the creation of the amorphous social movement “Solidarity”, which preferred street forms of struggle to party-political forms of struggle. Thus, Nemtsov actually admitted that opposition projects cannot count on coming to power as a result of voter support and made a personal political bet on a “color revolution.”

However, Nemtsov’s personal contribution to the preparation of the “color revolution” in Russia was limited to the release of several reports in which he harshly, but without evidence, criticized the government, accusing its representatives, including President Putin, of corruption.

The first report, “Putin and Gazprom,” was published in September 2008 and remained unnoticed by the general public.

The same fate befell the report “Putin and the Crisis” released in February 2009.

At the same time, in February 2009, the report “Putin. Results." Experts criticized the report, citing financial interest as the main motive for its publication. A participant in many programs of the opposition radio “Echo of Moscow” and the international economic forum in Krynica (Poland), political scientist Alexey Mukhin characterized this report as follows: “For Nemtsov, this is an opportunity to stay afloat after the lost parliamentary elections, after his refusal to participate in the presidential campaign under a shameful excuse for a politician - he couldn’t find the money.”

The report “Sochi. Olympics" also went unnoticed.

Following the first, the second report “Luzhkov. Results." After the report was released, Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and the city government filed a lawsuit against Nemtsov. The court ordered Nemtsov to pay Luzhkov 500 thousand rubles in compensation.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012, the reports “Putin. Results. Ten years", "Putin. Corruption", "Putin. Life of a galley slave. Palaces, yachts, cars, planes and other accessories.”

In May 2013, Nemtsov’s latest report, “Winter Olympics in the Subtropics,” was published.

The last four reports were published in large numbers and distributed by activists of the Solidarity social movement, but did not have any socio-political effect. The same fate befell the report “Putin. War,” which Nemtsov’s colleagues released after his death (trying to use the murder to attract attention to the report), allegedly based on materials collected by Nemtsov.

The co-authors of some of the reports were: Leonid Martynyuk, Vladimir Milov and Vladimir Ryzhkov.

The main weakness of all the reports is the lack of evidence of the accusations (the data were presented with links to publications on the Internet, or without evidence at all). The report “Putin. The life of a slave in galleys, Palaces, yachts, cars, planes and other accessories,” an attempt was made to attribute state property to Putin as private property.

Ultimately, neither Nemtsov’s reports nor the street actions of the Solidarity movement were able to shake up the situation in Russia, and the attempt at a “color revolution” on Bolotnaya Square in Moscow failed. It should be noted that a huge role in the failure of the opposition was played by the personalities of Putin, who enjoys the trust of the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens (from 60% to 89% in different years) and Nemtsov, whose personal rating fluctuated around 1%.

While working as governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region in the Russian government, Boris Nemtsov was associated with several corruption scandals. Thus, in 1993, the Kommersant newspaper claimed that Nemtsov’s election campaign to the Russian Federation Council was financed by previously convicted businessman Andrei Klimentyev. Klimentyev actually worked in the early 90s as an adviser to the Nizhny Novgorod governor Nemtsov, and then successfully participated in several privatization competitions in the region. In 1995, Nemtsov initiated a criminal case against Klimentyev on charges of embezzling $2,5 million. loan allocated to the Oka plant, of which Klimentyev owned a 30% stake. Klimentyev was found guilty, but the Supreme Court of Russia overturned the verdict and completely acquitted him. However, in 1998, during the political rise of Nemtsov, Klimentyev was again tried in the same case and sentenced to six years in prison. Klimentyev argued that the criminal case was revenge on the part of Nemtsov, who extorted and received bribes and, in particular, demanded 800 thousand dollars. for assistance in obtaining a loan. However, Klimentyev could not prove his accusations.

Another adviser to Nemtsov from the early 90s, Boris Brevnov, who later worked for some time as chairman of the board of RAO UES of Russia, also appeared in the case of the theft of a loan from the Oka plant, as the head of the Nizhny Novgorod Banking House bank, but there are charges against Brevnov didn't move forward.

At the same time, it should be noted that some aspects of Nemtsov’s governorship in Nizhny Novgorod were assessed positively. Thus, Yuri Kotov, Chairman of the State Committee of the Republic of Chuvashia for Land Resources and Land Use, speaking about the land reform carried out in the Nizhny Novgorod region, noted that “Nemtsov gave everyone an equal starting opportunity.” Nemtsov’s role in the development of media in the region was also noted. In particular, Danila Galperovich, a journalist for the BBC Russian Service, called the region a journalist's paradise. Polls also showed a fairly high level of Nemtsov’s popularity among the region’s population.

It is also obvious that despite accusations of corruption, Nemtsov did not become one of the Russian oligarchs during his work in the government and did not gain direct or indirect control over large state-owned enterprises. In 1999, he stated that he earned about 20 thousand dollars a month. and pays all taxes on them. In 2008, his income was estimated at 185 million rubles (7,5 million dollars at the exchange rate in force at that time), and in bank accounts there were about 93 million rubles (less than 4 million dollars) in 2013. As a deputy of the Yaroslavl Regional Duma, Nemtsov declared an annual income of 17 million 622,5 thousand rubles. All these numbers correlate with each other.

Thus, the decline in Russian voters' trust in Nemtsov cannot be attributed to some of his personal negative qualities. It is due to the rejection of the political line that Nemtsov personifies. That is why all elections after 2004 are lost not only by Nemtsov, but by the entire pro-Western Russian opposition, of which Nemtsov was one of the leaders.

It should also be taken into account that even among the opposition, Nemtsov’s popularity was low, and there was little practical benefit from him. Blogger Alexei Navalny, who is read by millions of social network users, was much more active and convincing in exposing corrupt officials in the Moscow ruling elite than Nemtsov with his unpopular reports. The leader of the Other Russia party, Eduard Limonov, who calls himself a “National Bolshevik” and served a prison sentence for his opposition, was able to bring significantly more motivated and organized revolutionaries onto the streets than Nemtsov could.

If you believe the materials of wiretapping of the politician published in 2012, the authenticity of which Nemtsov did not deny, but which was not officially confirmed, since no one took responsibility for the publication and the fact of wiretapping, then the only two activities that Boris Nemtsov as one of the leaders of the anti-Putin opposition indulged in enthusiasm, these are gossip-based squabbles with partners in the opposition camp and a fierce struggle with them for leadership, which gives access to financial flows.

In this regard, it is not surprising that Boris Nemtsov was easily replaced as the formal leader of the opposition by Mikhail Kasyanov, who was just as unpopular among the masses, a man who served as chairman of the Russian government during the entire first presidential term of Vladimir Putin (from May 2000 to February 2004).

It is also necessary to dwell on the personal life of the murdered politician. Boris Nemtsov was officially married to Raisa Nemtsova, with whom he had a daughter, Zhanna. Nemtsov also has two children (son Anton and daughter Dina) from journalist Ekaterina Odintsova and another daughter (Sofia) from his secretary Irina Koroleva. Nemtsov also had close relationships with Zamira Duguzheva from Karachay-Cherkessia and with Gazprobank employee Ekaterina Iftodi. Anna Duritskaya, in front of whom Nemtsov was killed, also said that they had a close relationship and dated for three years. Obviously, these are only Nemtsov’s long-term and public connections known to the public. There should be many more unknowns and short-term ones. In the end, the public, including some of Nemtsov’s friends, learned about the same Anna Duritskaya by chance - as a result of his murder, which the girl witnessed.

It can be stated that the politician had success with women and willingly took advantage of it. However, he knew how to maintain good relations with them, despite the fact that they all knew about his infidelity. In particular, according to the recollections of friends, Nemtsov’s 50th birthday was attended by both his official wife and the mothers of all his children and all his children from different mothers.

So, based on the biography of Boris Nemtsov and his lifestyle, we can draw some conclusions.

At first, a politician was killed, whose era of popularity remained in the distant past. Boris Nemtsov was a promising careerist until the turn of 1997-1998. We don't know what happened at this time. In any case, at this time there can be no talk of a decline in his popularity among voters. However, since April 1998, Nemtsov began to quickly lose his positions in the apparatus and political prospects. Apparently, for some reason, Yeltsin’s entourage decided that Nemtsov was not suitable for them as a successor to the first president of Russia.

Secondly, Nemtsov was not a super-rich man, like another Putin opponent, Mikhail Khodorkovsky. He could not finance the fight against the regime from personal funds. Boris Nemtsov was a wealthy enough person not to need money to pay for a comfortable life in the expensive Russian capital, but he depended on external sources to finance the political struggle.

Thirdly, Nemtsov was not involved in significant business; rather, he led the life of a rentier. That is, he could not have serious contradictions with large business structures.

Fourthly, Boris Nemtsov easily changed his opinion about a person with changing political circumstances. He was an unreliable partner, ready to betray and betrayed his allies. Nevertheless, Nemtsov’s unreliability caused virtually no serious harm to anyone. The position and political prospects of almost all of Nemtsov’s former allies and partners in the last years of his life were significantly better than his own. It can be said that Nemtsov himself suffered the most from Nemtsov’s unreliability, whose political reputation turned out to be hopelessly damaged. Perhaps it was precisely this unreliability that served as the basis for Yeltsin’s circle to cross Nemtsov off the list of potential successors already at the beginning of 1998.

FifthlyNemtsov led a rather chaotic personal life. However, he managed to avoid quarrels with his numerous official and unofficial wives and temporary companions, as well as conflicts between them.

At sixth, as an opposition leader, Nemtsov had absolutely no prospects and rather hindered the opposition with his ambition, inability to work hard in a systemic manner, unwillingness to use a flexible strategy, to attract oppositionists other than right-wing liberal ideological preferences as allies.

Seventh, Nemtsov had a negative attitude towards Muslims. In 2007, a scandal erupted due to Nemtsov’s statement that Putin’s policies pose a threat to the future of Russia because it stimulates the birth rate in the Islamic regions of the country. Nemtsov was accused of Islamophobia by representatives of several Muslim regions of Russia. In January 2015, commenting on the death of the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo, Nemtsov called the incident an “Islamic inquisition” and stated that “Islam is in the Middle Ages,” which once again caused an outburst of indignation among Russian Muslims.

Eighth, Nemtsov was closely associated with the politicians who came to power in Ukraine as a result of the February 2014 coup d'etat, also known as the “revolution of dignity.” Most of them were part of the team of Viktor Yushchenko, whom Nemtsov supported during the “Orange Revolution” of 2004 and whose adviser he worked in 2005-2006. In 2014, Boris Nemtsov again spoke out against the annexation of Crimea to Russia and in support of Ukrainian revolutionaries. At the same time, Nemtsov, who did not influence the situation in Russia and did not enjoy the support of the population, had no practical benefit for his Ukrainian partners.

These conclusions give us the opportunity to test the main versions of Nemtsov’s murder for plausibility.

Part 2. Versions of the murder of Boris Nemtsov as a weapon of political struggle

The main versions of the reasons for the murder of Boris Nemtsov and possible customers were put forward in the very first hours and days after the death of the politician. These versions are as follows:

1. Punishment for Islamophobia. This version was voiced by Lieutenant of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs battalion Zaur Dadaev, who was arrested on suspicion of murdering Nemtsov. This version is indirectly confirmed by repeated scandals related to Boris Nemtsov’s offensive statements for Muslims. However, it also has weaknesses. Nemtsov was not the only and not the most popular politician in Russia who made intolerant statements against Muslims. Nemtsov’s statements were not the most offensive of what Russian politicians (especially of the nationalist persuasion) periodically say; rather, they suffered from increased emotionality. In addition, Nemtsov's main target of criticism was President Putin. In this sense, even the 2007 statement can be considered directed not so much against Muslims as against Putin.

Another distrustful aspect of this version is the self-organization of the performers (they decided themselves, they organized it themselves, they performed it themselves). It is impossible to completely exclude this option. Especially if we take into account the peculiarities of the organization of life in Chechnya, which, after two wars, by default received from Russia not fixed by law, but no less broad internal autonomy, allowing Chechens to live in accordance with their laws and traditions, which do not always coincide with the laws Russian state. Therefore, conflicts with the law of Chechens outside Chechnya are not an isolated phenomenon. They are accustomed to the fact that certain actions are not punished, and if they are punished, they are still considered honorable.

However, taking into account the characteristics of the personality and political activities of the murdered man, the version of the organization of the murder by an amateur group of indignant Muslims cannot be considered as a priority. In any case, when a politician is killed, it is customary to look for political beneficiaries of the murder.

In addition, the organization of the murder itself was quite complex and cold-bloodedly executed, as for a group of indignant Muslims. Zaur Dadaev’s version would have looked more plausible if Nemtsov had been killed in the entrance of his own house. Anna Politkovskaya in Moscow, Galina Starovoitova in St. Petersburg, and Oles Buzina in Kiev were killed in exactly this way - in an elevator, an entrance, near a house - where it is easiest to find a person, where he most often happens. A complex assassination attempt was carried out on Nemtsov in the center of Moscow. Moreover, there is reason to believe that the perpetrators initially wanted to kill him as close to the Kremlin as possible, which does not matter at all for the version of indignant Muslims, but is important in the case of a contracted political murder.

2. Household version (murder motivated by jealousy or unrequited feelings).

As we noted above, Boris Nemtsov could hardly be called an exemplary family man. However, he managed to happily avoid scandals like the one that once rocked the Clinton family. It seems that in private life Nemtsov was a much more subtle and prudent diplomat than in politics. In any case, all his friends and people who knew him closely confirm that the women whom Nemtsov loved for years maintained good relations both with each other and with him personally.

Just like the previous one, this version cannot be completely rejected. In the end, not all of Nemtsov’s hobbies are known to the general public. Someone might have a grudge against him. However, this version still seems extremely unlikely. After all, a woman did not just have to feel so insulted to order a murder (that is, to commit a criminal offense punishable by a long prison term, up to life). She would also have to find professional performers (and Nemtsov’s murder was carried out professionally), and find considerable funds to pay for professionals. Finally, she had to manage to stay out of sight of the investigative authorities, and also not to be betrayed by her accomplices. What would be the point for the performers to shield a random employer by taking all the blame on themselves and putting forward the above-mentioned version linking the murder with Boris Nemtsov’s statements offensive to Muslims?

Let us note that the official investigation, the opposition, and foreign observers almost immediately dismissed this version as implausible, and in this we agree with them.

3. Murder for business reasons. This version, like the previous one, at first glance, may seem quite reasonable. But only at first glance. In fact, as we indicated above, Nemtsov did not have any serious business. In his declarations, he indicates interest on capital, income on shares and from transactions with securities as sources of income. We believe that this data can be trusted.

Firstly, being an opposition politician, Nemtsov could not help but understand that his declarations would be checked especially carefully. Any inaccuracy can be used against him during any election campaign. Since he had a fairly large income, it made no sense for him to try to evade paying part of the taxes, which in Russia are small compared to the EU and, in most cases, amount to 13% of total income.

That is, Nemtsov led the life of a fairly wealthy rentier. He did not have the political influence to slow down or speed up the implementation of any project, help with obtaining a loan, etc. He simply could not have such serious business contradictions with anyone that they would become the reason for the murder. In addition, it is extremely unlikely that, given his fairly open lifestyle, his friends or acquaintances would not know about the presence of such problems, if they appeared.

The only major conflict that is reliably known and which could make him want to deal with Nemtsov happened with Andrei Klimentyev, his adviser and business partner in the first years of his governorship in Nizhny Novgorod. In 1998, Klimentyev even received a six-year sentence on charges initiated by Nemtsov back in 1995.

However, almost 20 years have passed since this conflict. In addition, the further fate of Andrei Klimentyev, who repeatedly unsuccessfully tried to break into both the regional government of Nizhny Novgorod and the State Duma and who in 2006 was again convicted in a case that was in no way connected with Nemtsov, indicates that he had powerful ill-wishers a lot of. For example, in 2001, when Klimentyev ran for the post of governor of the Nizhny Novgorod region, Sergei Kiriyenko, who at that time worked as the representative of the Russian President in the Volga Federal District, said that he would resign if Klimentyev won the election.

It is unlikely that in 2016 Klimentyev could suddenly remember his problems with Nemtsov, which ended in 1998, and decide to take revenge on him, and not on those people who haunted him for the next decade. And the investigation, of course, was one of the first to work out Klimentyev’s version. It lies on the surface and is most easily verified by the investigative authorities. And any police in the world first works out versions that do not require much effort and are quickly verifiable, in order to be able to concentrate all forces and resources on as few remaining numbers as possible.

4. Version of indirect guilt of the Russian authorities. It was put forward by the opposition. Without directly blaming the authorities, the opposition leaders stated that with the help of propaganda, such an irreconcilable atmosphere was created in the country towards the oppositionists that some people, on their own initiative, decided to make a gift to the authorities and kill one of the opposition leaders.

This version does not withstand even the most superficial criticism and almost instantly falls apart for the following reasons.

Firstly, Nemtsov’s entire behavior and his lifestyle in recent years indicated that he did not feel any threat. He appeared in public places without security, and in an environment where he would be guaranteed to be recognized and when there could be people around him who did not share his political views. The same applies to other opposition leaders who did not change their behavior after Nemtsov’s murder, which allows us to assume that they themselves do not believe in this version.

Secondly, none of the opposition leaders contacted the police with allegations of persecution or requests for security. Meanwhile, for example, in Ukraine, former opposition deputy Elena Bondarenko, after the strange deaths of several of her party members (declared suicides), as well as the demonstrative murder for political reasons of the famous writer and journalist Oles Buzin, demanded that the Minister of Internal Affairs provide her with state security, in due to the fact that threats also began to be received against her.

Thirdly, opposition leaders, when communicating with the press loyal to them, quite often hinted that they were under some vague threat, but they never specified this threat and never turned to the authorities. People who are truly afraid for their lives do not behave this way. This is how they behave when they are trying to score political points.

Fourthly, and this is the main thing, in any country politicians from opposing camps do not like each other, do not hide this dislike and wage a harsh, sometimes even dirty campaign against each other in the press. Based on this, in the event of the death of any politician in any country, his political opponents can be accused of creating an atmosphere of bullying.

It should be noted that Russian legislation in this matter is quite strict, and law enforcement agencies vigilantly monitor its implementation. Therefore, neither the authorities nor the social and political structures that support it have ever made calls for reprisals against the opposition, and the necessity of its existence has never been called into question. Many prominent opposition supporters, such as Kiriyenko or Chubais, still occupy important positions in the Russian government.

Therefore, this accusation can hardly even be called a version; rather, it is an attempt to use the fact of murder in an informational and political game against the authorities.

5. Sacred sacrifice brought by the opposition to the altar of the revolution. It must be said that not only opposition supporters tried to squeeze the maximum out of Nemtsov’s death in terms of information. Supporters of the authorities put forward a mirror version. In their opinion, the opposition, acting in contact with the intelligence services of Western countries, could itself organize the murder of Nemtsov.

The authors of this version focus on the fact that Nemtsov, as one of the opposition leaders, began to interfere with his own comrades. He had a vanishingly small rating (about 1% on the eve of the 2008 presidential elections). There was no hope of growing popularity.

Dissatisfaction was also caused by Nemtsov’s attempts to control all flows of financial assistance to the opposition.

Nemtsov was not a systemic political fighter. He was often distracted from active political work by personal problems. In addition, Irina Khakamada, who, together with Nemtsov and Kiriyenko, headed the list of the Union of Right Forces, which overcame the barrier in the elections to the State Duma in 1999, recalls that in critical situations (for example, during negotiations with militants who took hostages in “Nord-Ost” ) Nemtsov demonstrated excessive caution and tried, if possible, to avoid activities that could pose a potential threat.

It can be said that for Nemtsov, opposition activity was more like entertainment for an unclaimed politician than serious work for the future.

From these facts, supporters of the “sacred sacrifice” version conclude that the Russian opposition and foreign (most often called American) intelligence services could come to the conclusion that a dead Nemtsov would be much more useful to them than a living one, since his death could be blamed on the authorities and on on this basis, organize a mass protest, flowing into a “color revolution” in Moscow.

From our point of view, this version suffers from all the shortcomings of a conspiracy theory. But to reliably refute all its absurdities, there is no need to analyze in detail. It is enough to point out that if Western intelligence services were included in the conspiracy against Nemtsov, then immediately after his murder we should have seen some actions directly tied to the murder and aimed at whipping up protest sentiments. The intelligence services do not kill to see what happens; they prepare a whole range of measures that begin to be carried out automatically after the murder. Thus, the trace of the secret service is always visible.

In addition, given the extremely tense nature of Russian-American relations, as well as Russia’s relations with the EU, which had developed by February 2015, not a single responsible Western politician would risk such a provocation, especially if its ultimate goal was to overthrow the government in Russia. The danger of an uncontrolled escalation of confrontation was too great, and the dividends from trying to support the “color revolution” in Moscow were too small. After the failure of the “Swamp Revolution” of 2011-2012, the mobilization potential of the Russian opposition is assessed very low in the West.

Let us note once again that this version is a mirror image of version No. 4 and is a standard element of political struggle.

6. Direct order from the Kremlin. This version is a more thorough and deeply developed version of version No. 4. It is also distributed by the opposition. But in this case, the Kremlin is no longer accused of indirect complicity, but of directly ordering the murder of Boris Nemtsov.

The evidence used is the service of Zaur Dadaev, who was arrested on charges of complicity in the murder of Boris Nemtsov, in a battalion that is part of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs. Without any evidence, it is stated that there is a connection between Zaur Dadaev and the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. It is unfoundedly stated that Kadyrov could not but know where and why Dadaev went.

Then, just as arbitrarily, a “connection” between Ramzan Kadyrov and Russian President Vladimir Putin is established. Since Kadyrov has repeatedly made statements in support of the policies pursued by President Putin, the opposition argues that this is sufficient reason to believe that if the order to eliminate Nemtsov came from the Kremlin, Kadyrov would carry it out.

The opposition does not explain why it believes that Putin is capable of giving and Kadyrov is capable of executing a criminal order. For her this is an axiom. However, such accusations must be proven, even if they are made by a pro-Western opposition government that has strained relations with the West. Moreover, it is in this case that such accusations must be especially carefully proven, since otherwise space is created for the emergence of versions similar to version No. 5.

The authors of versions such as version No. 5 reason as follows: “If the friends of the West can accuse us without evidence, and the West believes them, then they know in advance what result they want to get. So why, if they want to get a result in the form of a change in our government, they could not organize the murder of Nemtsov in order to blame us for it.”

Speculative construction of topics is dangerous because the result depends on the initially given position. From an arbitrarily chosen starting point of reasoning, you can easily logically and consistently lead the chain of reasoning to any desired result.

By the way, as one would expect, Kremlin supporters responded to this version with a mirror image of it.

7. The person who ordered the murder is Kasyanov. We will not analyze this version in detail, since the evidence given in support of it will be analyzed in detail by us in the next section, devoted to the most plausible version, in our opinion. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note its existence, if only to show how the same facts, being interpreted differently, can be used to justify different versions of what happened.

This version was put forward by Oleg Lurie - Russian journalist specializing in investigative journalism, one of the founders of the Versiya newspaper. In the past, he was a columnist for the investigation department of the Soversheno Sekretno holding company, a special correspondent for the investigation department for Novaya Gazeta, and a special correspondent for the investigation department for Express Gazeta. As you can see, in this case we are dealing with a person who is engaged in investigations professionally. Although these are journalistic investigations, dissatisfied persons can always sue you and it will be necessary to provide undoubted evidence of their innocence, even more stringent than the prosecutor’s office provides.

Since, as we have already said, we will consider in detail the system of evidence presented by Mr. Lurie during the study of the next version, we will only note that the chain of connections leading from the direct executor to London to Akhmed Zakayev, who calls himself “the head of the government of Ichkeria in exile,” The author has traced it in detail and convincingly.

The weak point of this version is the figure of Mikhail Kasyanov. Mr. Lurie claims that Mr. Kasyanov became the main beneficiary as a result of the murder of Nemtsov and on this basis accepts as an axiom the statement that Kasyanov is one of the organizers and the main customer of the murder.

From our point of view, this cannot be stated unambiguously, since the fact that Mr. Kasyanov turned out to be the only leader of the opposition party after the murder of Nemtsov (RPR-PARNAS, and since the summer of 2015 simply PARNAS) was not predetermined. Kasyanov and Nemtsov jointly expelled its third co-chairman, Vladimir Ryzhkov, from the party. Thus, after the murder of the second co-chairman Boris Nemtsov, Kasyanov was formally left alone. But the party could disagree with this and choose one or two co-chairs or even re-elect Mr. Kasyanov. That is, Nemtsov’s death did not give Kasyanov a guarantee of control over the party.

In addition, it is difficult to imagine that a person who headed the Russian government for four years could order the political murder of his fellow opposition member and former government colleague because of control over a minor political party that has never demonstrated success in national elections in twelve years. Moreover, Kasyanov and Nemtsov had no serious contradictions.

Finally, Kasyanov was one of the figures who should have come under suspicion first, due to the obviousness of the motive. Therefore, for him, ordering the murder of Nemtsov carried unjustified risks, and did not significantly improve his position. As before, as now, Kasyanov’s opposition activities leave him no hope of returning to big-time Russian politics.

Having analyzed these seven main versions of what happened, which are currently being used by investigative authorities and the media, we can draw the following conclusions:

– Not a single version can be discarded, but not a single one is supported by a significant evidence base. None of the motives can be considered serious enough, from the point of view of Boris Nemtsov’s real, and not fictitious, relations with the authorities, comrades in the opposition, family and friends.

– Versions suggesting the participation of special services in organizing the murder of Nemtsov deserve the closest attention, due to the high professionalism of its organization, as well as the fact that the location of the murder indicates that it was a targeted political strike on the Kremlin.

“At the same time, neither the domestic Russian opposition nor Russia’s geopolitical opponents from among Western countries were obviously prepared for this event, as a result of which the strike did not reach its target.

“The Chechen trace in this case is obvious, just as it is obvious that it was planned initially, since it cast a shadow on the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, and additionally marked the “Kremlin trace.”

– Kadyrov at one time was a much tougher opponent of the Kremlin than Nemtsov. He even fought against Russia in the ranks of the Chechen rebels, and is now Putin’s main support in the Caucasus. A blow to him, among other things, was supposed to put Putin in a “fork”: either refuse to support Kadyrov and, as a result, get a complication of the situation in the Caucasus, a region strategically important for Russia; or support Kadyrov and accept charges of complicity in ordering the murder.

– The fact that the Russian President managed to avoid this unpleasant choice also testifies to the poor miscalculation of the situation by the organizers.

– As a result, we have a professionally planned and organized political murder, which could not cause significant damage to the Russian leadership only because the development of the situation was unprofessionally calculated.

“Consequently, we can assume that in this case we are dealing with a special service that is able to find good technical performers, but cannot effectively calculate the results of the planned actions. There is such a special service. She really has a vested interest in destabilizing the situation in Russia and in driving the Kremlin and the West into the most intense confrontation possible. The participation of this service in organizing the murder of the politician explains the phenomenon of Anna Duritskaya, ignored by other versions, who saw the killers, but remained alive. She agreed to testify to the Russian investigation, but went to Kyiv and immediately “changed her mind.” This is the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). And this is the next version that we will look at.

Part 3. Ukrainian trace

Oleg Lurie, the author of the version about Boris Nemtsov’s ally in the RPR-PARNAS party (now simply PARNAS) Mikhail Kasyanov, as the customer of Nemtsov’s murder, writes: “...All previously put forward versions of Nemtsov’s murder do not contain the main thing - none of them has a direct beneficiary, and, accordingly, the final customer. And without finding out who benefits from the bright and loud murder of Nemtsov on the bridge near the Kremlin, any conclusions and assumptions are empty. It is the one who reaped the greatest “harvest” from the death of Boris Nemtsov who is the likely customer. And such coincidences, in my opinion, do not happen. The theory of probability excludes them.” However, his evidence of Kasyanov's interest is not rigorous. They are based only on the fact that Kasyanov met twice in London with Akhmet Zakayev, who calls himself “the head of the government of Ichkeria (Chechnya) in exile” and on the fact that after the murder of Nemtsov, Kasyanov became the sole leader of the opposition.

This is a mirror image of the opposition's accusations against the Kremlin and the leader of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov. Only in this situation, the Chechen trace can be traced not to Chechen elites loyal to Moscow, but to groups of jihadist Chechen emigrants who continue from abroad to wage a war with Moscow that was lost in their homeland.

The Chechen people have strong ancestral and tribal traditions and ties. Therefore, its split as a result of the civil war led to the fact that relatives who continued to maintain ties within their clan found themselves in both warring camps: among Chechens loyal to Moscow and among jihadist emigrants. As a result, many Chechens' connections can be traced in both directions. This is what makes Chechens ideal executors of contract political murders. No matter who the perpetrator is, a shadow will almost always be cast on the leadership of Chechnya, which is loyal to the Kremlin, and on the Kremlin. Moreover, in fact, he can be recruited through relatives abroad.

In this regard, the version of organizing the murder of Nemtsov with the help of leaders of jihadist groups seems justified to us, especially since the experienced investigative journalist Mr. Lurie collected a large number of facts and established direct connections between the murder suspect Zaur Dadaev and the jihadists. But only the fact of his meetings with Akhmed Zakayev is used as evidence of Kasyanov’s own connections with jihadists.

Let us note that Kasyanov, like, by the way, Nemtsov (while he was still alive), and other Russian radical oppositionists meet with all political opponents of Russian President Vladimir Putin, including emigrants, and not only Chechen ones. Kasyanov, for example, met with the radical anti-Russian leader of the Crimean Tatars Mustafa Dzhemilev shortly before the emigrant leaders of the Crimean Tatars began the blockade of Crimea, but this does not mean that Kasyanov ordered the blockade of Crimea or even discussed this issue. It is not only among Russian oppositionists that it is customary to support each other in the fight against the government. This is a characteristic feature of any opposition. We have already mentioned that Nemtsov was an adviser to President Yushchenko, who pursued a pro-Western policy and was in constant conflict with the Kremlin. And the current Russian oppositionists, including Mr. Kasyanov, support the regime of President Poroshenko in Ukraine, who claims that he has been waging a war with Russia for two years. In this context, Mr. Kasyanov’s meetings with Akhmed Zakayev are not something out of the ordinary. Rather, this is a routine practice of the opposition, and there is no other evidence of Kasyanov’s connection with Nemtsov’s killers, much less ordering this murder from them. Moreover, Mr. Kasyanov’s behavior in public and during conflicts with pro-government activists and journalists indicate that this politician is extremely cautious (if not something more than cautious). And to order a murder, you need to have a kind of courage (albeit somewhat specific) - a quality that Mr. Kasyanov lacks.

Nevertheless, all the other facts established by Mr. Lurie about the participation of jihadist Chechen emigrants in the murder of Boris Nemtsov are of undoubted interest to us. Oleg Lurie sets out these facts as follows: “But Zakayev, who is in the UK, was not so well prepared, or did not expect that journalists would start questioning him and immediately started talking about Chechens supporting today's Ukraine, denying their any relation to the murder of Nemtsov, although no one asked him about it. This is the story “according to Freud”. See for yourself: March 9, 2015, Akhmed Zakaev in an interview with the Radio Liberty program “Current Time” said: “The version about the “Chechen trace” in the murder of Russian oppositionist Boris Nemtsov is a propaganda fiction. For many years, the Chechens and the entire nation were demonized. Today we have added Ukrainian to this. They (Russian propagandists) could not help but use the fact that Chechens who support the idea of ​​independence are on the side of the Ukrainian government».

And now I propose to trace a rather simple chain, which may well be a real connecting link between the likely mastermind of the murder of Boris Nemtsov and his perpetrators.

So, the connection between the accused in the murder of Nemtsov by Zaur Dadaev and Adam Osmaev, the commander of the Ukrainian battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, fighting on the side of the National Guard against the armies of the DPR and LPR in southeastern Ukraine.  They (Dadaev and Osmaev), according to colleagues' information, met, and also talked a lot via cell phone.  Although, it is quite likely that Osmayev, without participating in the process of “placing an order,” simply arranged contact Dadaeva with a man who will be discussed below. Which is quite possible.

The battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, fighting in the Donbass on the side of the Ukrainian security forces, was founded in March 2014 native Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya by Isa Munayev, with whom Osmayev had close and long-standing contacts. Thus, a chain can be traced: Dadaev – Osmaev – Munaev.

And here is the most interesting thing in the continuation of this chain: In the period from 2005 to 2015, Isa Munayev had a long and fruitful conversation in Denmark and Great Britain with... Akhmed Zakayev, a good acquaintance and like-minded person of Mikhail Kasyanov.

That's what говорил Akhmed Zakaev: “I knew Isa Munaev very well since the First Russian-Chechen War, when his battalion was part of the South-Western Front of the Armed Forces of the ChRI, directly in the 3rd Sector, which I headed. After the March 1996 operation (Operation “Retaliation”), on my recommendation, the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev, awarded Isa Munayev the Order of “Koman Turpal” (“Hero of the Nation”).”

Moreover, less than a month before Nemtsov’s murder, by a strange coincidence, this chain was broken. On February 1, 2015, Munaev was killed during fighting in the Debaltsevo area. However, according to the head of Chechnya Ramzan Kadyrov  “Isa Munayev was liquidated on behalf of the SBU and the CIA.” It turns out that with the death of Munaev, the connecting link in the chain leading to those who ordered the murder of Nemtsov was broken. That is, the Moor has done his job by organizing a connection between the customer and the killer, the Moor must leave.

As a result, the scheme confirmed connections possibly related to the murder of Boris Nemtsov are as follows:

Mikhail Kasyanov______Akhmed Zakaev______Isa Munayev______Adam Osmaev_______Zaur Dadaev_______Boris Nemtsov».

Since, as we have already said, the version about the customer Kasyanov looks unconvincing, the chain presented by Oleg Lurie loses one link, but the most important one - the final beneficiary - the customer. It was not on their own that Zakaev, Munaev, Osmaev and Dadaev decided to kill Nemtsov. And why Ramzan Kadyrov claims that Isa Munayev was killed by the CIA and the SBU. It is unlikely that the intelligence services of the United States and Ukraine would act as cleaners in the service of Akhmed Zakayev. If the latter needed it, he would obviously find a way to remove Munaev himself. But the version of the fact that a jihadist who emigrated to London actually hired employees of two special services at once in order to remove another jihadist fighting on the side of the Kyiv regime against the Donbass rebels is almost impossible to believe.

Meanwhile, the commander of the Chechen volunteer battalion “Death” Apti Bolotkhanov confirmed to us that the Chechen leadership has information about the liquidation of Isa Munayev specifically by CIA and SBU officers. As we have already indicated, any Chechen is entangled in thousands of clan and tribal ties. Therefore, despite the fierce confrontation (in fact, a civil war) between the leadership of Chechnya, loyal to the Kremlin, and the jihadists who fled to the West, Chechnya knows about almost every step of foreign Chechens. The reverse is also true. An ordinary Westerner or Russian resident of Moscow or St. Petersburg cannot even imagine the speed and channels of information dissemination in the Chechen environment. At the same time, it is almost impossible for strangers to gain access to this information; it is distributed only among our own - according to the principle of consanguinity.

So what do we end up with?

1. The suspect in the murder of Nemtsov, Zaur Dadaev, is associated with jihadist Chechen emigrants who hate Russia and are ready to fight with it wherever possible and in any way.

2. The suspect persistently claims that the reason for the murder was Nemtsov’s statements that were offensive to Muslims and that he had no other motives or motives. Although this version is unprofitable for him, since it places full responsibility on him, including for organizing the crime. Meanwhile, as a simple executor of someone else’s order, he would have received a shorter sentence. He also faces life imprisonment.

3. If the customer was Mikhail Kasyanov, the suspect would have no reason to shield him. One Russian politician ordered another Russian politician, why should a Chechen take his blame.

4. But if the order to kill came from foreign Chechen jihadists, the behavior of the suspect is quite understandable. Firstly, he shields his own. Secondly, it is possible that he was inclined to participate in the murder, and now continues to shield the customers and organizers due to the fact that in their power (among the jihadist emigrants) is one of his close relatives, who serves as collateral “ correct" behavior of Zaur Dadaev.

5. Akhmed Zakaev, when asked a question about the murder of Nemtsov, suddenly, for no apparent reason, begins to talk about “Chechens who support Ukraine.” What does Ukraine have to do with it if a Chechen killed a Russian oppositionist?

6. After the death of Isa Munayev, information begins to circulate in the Chechen environment, which officials in Grozny (the capital of Chechnya) consider genuine and claim that it has been thoroughly verified and leads to the SBU and the CIA.

7. The Chechen battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev, which Isa Munaev commanded (now in the Ukrainian media is called the battalion named after Isa Munaev) sharply reduced its combat readiness and, according to its own press officer Amina Okueva, in April 2015 asked Arsen Avakov about the opportunity to join the squad special battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Golden Gate". Since then, any mention of the independent activities of the battalion has ceased. Although the media now “rank” him not with the “Golden Gate” special battalion, but with the “Azov” special regiment.

8. A drop in combat readiness is not unexpected if the battalion fighters know that their commander was killed not by the enemy, but by the intelligence service of the state on whose side they are fighting. In this case, the desire to officially join the Ministry of Internal Affairs is nothing more than an attempt to protect oneself from the SBU with an official status in a competing power structure. Still, it is one thing to eliminate some Chechen mercenary, and another thing to eliminate an officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.

9. The investigation believes that there were at least three direct participants in the murder, and maybe more. However, it cannot name anyone other than the arrested Zaur Dadaev. This is quite strange, because if the other participants were also Chechens, then their names would already be known not only to the jihadists in London, but also to the loyalists in Grozny. Perhaps the other participants in the murder were not Chechens, but Zaur Dadaev was brought in specifically to organize a “Chechen trail” with access to Ramzan Kadyrov, and through him to the Kremlin.

10. We should not forget about the crime witness, model Anna Duritskaya, who, according to her, had a romantic relationship with Nemtsov for several years, while the murdered man’s friends almost entirely did not know about her existence, which contradicts everything we know about Boris’s manner of communication Nemtsov with the women with whom he had relationships. As a rule, they knew each other and the politician's friends knew them. Nemtsov was not a secretive person. And for a young, unknown model trying to break into high society, Anna behaves unconventionally. She has been hiding her relationship with Nemtsov for three years, while it is in her interests to advertise this relationship - this is her social capital, her pass into society. Moreover, as we know, Nemtsov would hardly be against such openness. Previously, in similar situations, he felt completely free.

11. Anna Duritskaya saw the shooter in the face (or could see). The murder was organized professionally. Professionals should have killed Duritskaya as a witness capable of identifying them. But they didn't even make such an attempt. No one fired a single shot at Duritskaya, who stood alone at the crime scene for several minutes.

12. After the crime, Duritskaya expressed her desire to cooperate with the investigation and her intention to stay in Moscow for this. However, a few days later she changed her position and declared her desire to return to Ukraine, which was clearly unsafe, since there, unlike Russia, no one was going to provide her with protection. And the killers may well have wanted to correct the mistake made at the crime scene and kill the only witness who could identify them.

13. Before flying from Moscow to Kyiv, Duritskaya again promises to cooperate with the investigation. However, upon arriving on Ukrainian soil, he immediately forgets about his promise and disappears from the sight of both investigative authorities and the media.

14. Once again, this model does not behave as it should. At first, she did not use her long relationship with Nemtsov, who had nothing against publicity, in order to break into high Moscow society - the ultimate dream of any model from any corner of the former USSR. Then she becomes the main character of a criminal and political scandal. She attracted the attention of the press. She could still bask in the glory. Monica Lewinsky wrote an entire book and still periodically gives interviews on much less interesting matters.

15. The model must work for some agency. And even if she herself adheres exclusively to puritanical ethics, her agency or the agent promoting her would not miss the opportunity for self-promotion. But, by a strange coincidence, they turned out to be as “modest” as Duritskaya.

16. The behavior of this model is more similar to the behavior of an intelligence agent. Moreover, now it is unlikely that anyone will be able to confirm or refute her claims about her long-term affair with Nemtsov. Nemtsov, as we have seen, had a wealth of experience communicating with beautiful and far from ordinary women. The image of Nemtsov that we know does not fit the manner of running for three years on secret dates with an ordinary model, of which there are thousands in Moscow alone.

All these facts, some of which are difficult to explain, and some of which contradict each other, instantly fit into a coherent system, one has only to assume that the murder of Boris Nemtsov was planned and organized by the Security Service of Ukraine, and the jihadist Chechen emigrants played only a technical role. They organized the supply of the final contractor - shooter Zaur Dadaev and provided a “Chechen trace” stretching to Ramzan Kadyrov, which, if desired, could be extended to the Kremlin.

But the approach to Nemtsov with the help of Duritskaya’s pseudo-model, placing the victim in the line of fire and the arrow on the target, could only be organized by a professional intelligence service.

What is the interest of Ukraine or the SBU? There is such interest. Or rather, it was. Let us recall that Nemtsov was killed at the end of February 2015. Just when the second, carefully prepared offensive of the Ukrainian army in the Donbass failed. Moscow, Paris and Berlin imposed agreements on Kyiv, known as Minsk-2 and absolutely impossible for the Ukrainian authorities. Later it became clear that Kyiv had no intention of fulfilling them, but simply needed a peaceful respite. But a break is needed for something.

By the end of February 2015, it became finally clear that the Kyiv authorities’ bet on forcefully suppressing the uprising in Donbass had failed. The reason was also clear. Donbass relied on political, economic and military-technical support from Russia. The Ukrainian government found itself in a trap. She could no longer abandon the idea of ​​returning Donbass to unitary Ukraine (otherwise she would have to explain why a civil war was started with a region that wanted fewer rights than Bavaria has as part of the Federal Republic of Germany). But she could not return Donbass as long as Russia stood behind it. By this time, it also became clear that Russia could not be broken by Western sanctions, and that it would not leave Donbass alone with the Kyiv authorities.

The only chance for a change in Moscow's policy was a change in power in the Kremlin. A victory for the anti-Putin opposition would instantly radically change the situation in favor of Ukraine. A government friendly to Kyiv would appear in Moscow, which would stop supporting Donbass.

In 2014, the Ukrainian authorities and the expert community still seriously hoped that Western sanctions would cause increased dissatisfaction with the policies of the Russian authorities, and that the example of the Ukrainian Maidan would have an inspiring effect on Russians. Western intelligence services, after the failure of the “Swamp Revolution” of 2011-2012, were skeptical about the potential of the Russian opposition. But in Ukraine, different sentiments prevailed. In Kyiv, including in government agencies, many sincerely believed in the reality of the Russian revolution, following the example of the Ukrainian one, and based on this belief they built public policy.

It should also be noted that the SBU, as a special service, is quite professional in technical matters. Observation, eavesdropping, provocation, liquidation – she is capable of performing these technical actions at a fairly high level. But the analytical and prognostic apparatus of this special service leaves much to be desired. All five presidents of Ukraine (including the current Petro Poroshenko) demanded from the intelligence service not an objective political analysis, but confirmation of their own views and misconceptions. Accordingly, the personnel composition was selected to meet this requirement, and professional political analysis has not been the SBU’s strong point for many years. Therefore, it is not surprising that this special service admits the possibility of pushing a revolution in Russia.

Let's look at the situation with the murder of Boris Nemtsov from this side. We have confirmation not only of the contacts of the suspect in his murder, Zaur Dadaev, with the jihadist diaspora in London, carried out with the help of Chechen jihadist emigrants fighting in Ukraine, but also of the corresponding contacts of Isa Munayev and Adam Osmayev with the SBU. The representative of the Chechen volunteer battalion “Death” Salakh Duchaev, whose competence was the “leadership” of Isa Munayev, told us about this. We also remember the strange reaction of Akhmed Zakaev, who, in response to a journalist’s question about the murder of Nemtsov, suddenly began talking about helping the Chechen jihadist emigration to the current Ukrainian regime.

The Ukrainian authorities, in general, and the SBU, in particular, are vitally interested in destabilizing the situation in Russia, and, ideally, in changing power in the Kremlin. At the same time, they overestimate both the protest potential and the capabilities of the right-liberal wing of the anti-Putin opposition, to which Nemtsov belonged.

The SBU knows that at the end of February - beginning of March 2015, the opposition is preparing several street actions with which it will try to shake up the situation in the Russian capital. The intelligence service is also aware that to accelerate the build-up of the “Maidan”, a sacred victim is required - an ideally well-known opposition politician or journalist, whose death can be blamed on the authorities.

The SBU has established contacts with Chechen emigrant jihadists who can help create a trail leading to Russian power. Some of these jihadists are on Ukrainian territory and are fighting in the battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev. But a performer is needed, who will then be exposed, who could be tied to Ramzan Kadyrov, throwing a bridge through him to Putin.

In Kyiv they believe that the murder of Nemtsov, at that time the most popular among opposition leaders, being assigned to the Kremlin, could intensify the Russian opposition, give the protest movement a second wind, and sharply increase its street potential. Even if Putin retains power, in the event of mass unrest, he will have no time for Ukraine for some time, and Kyiv will try to suppress the protest movement in Donbass by force during this time. Victory will bring the authorities increased support from the population, while the defeat of the Donbass rebels should further weaken Putin in Russia. And then it will be possible to put the issue of Crimea on the agenda and demand Western support, increased sanctions pressure on Russia, etc.

Since Boris Nemtsov’s weakness towards the female sex is well known, he could have been identified using either an SBU employee disguised as a model, or a recruited model, Anna Duritskaya. The girl’s task is to bring Nemtsov into the line of fire in close proximity to the Kremlin. Therefore, the date is arranged in such a way that after the decision to extend it in the politician’s apartment, the way home would definitely pass by the Kremlin. In fact, he walked along the Kremlin from the moment he left the meeting place in the cafe in GUM, until the scene of the murder.

The killer provided by the jihadist emigration, a recruited employee of the security forces of Chechnya, who provides a link to Ramzan Kadyrov, is led to the target by a professional group of the SBU. He is instructed to shoot only at the politician and not to touch the witness. This is additional indirect confirmation that Duritskaya is a career employee of the SBU and the intelligence service was afraid that in the event of her death, the investigation would reveal her real place of work. The Russian prosecutor's office had no grounds to detain a foreign citizen who cooperated in good faith with the investigation (Duritskaya refused to cooperate only after finding herself on the territory of Ukraine).

After the job is done, the killer Zaur Dadev is handed over to Russian investigators. According to expert Ruslanbek Dokuev, close to the Chechen authorities, Dadaev’s loyalty is ensured by the jihadists’ control over Dadaev’s relatives or friends. Dadaev gives clearly absurd testimony, claiming that the murder was committed by offended Muslim believers. It is precisely the deliberate absurdity of this testimony that allows the Russian opposition to claim that Ramzan Kadyrov is behind the organization of the murder, thus casting a shadow over the entire power vertical of Russia.

However, the Ukrainian authorities, who do not have high-quality analytical and forecasting structures, are mistaken in their calculations. There is no surge in opposition activity. The rallies do not go beyond the standard limits of up to 15-20 thousand people, and Kasyanov, who replaced Nemtsov at the head of the opposition, turns out to be the same weak organizer, moreover, a politician devoid of even Nemtsov’s very moderate charisma. The political goal has not been achieved. The power in the Kremlin has not been shaken.

Technically, the murder was organized flawlessly, which indicates that it was prepared by professionals and not a group of enthusiasts. The political result was zero, which indicates that the operation was not developed by any of the Western intelligence services. They have quite powerful analytical centers and extensive experience in forecasting all possible scenarios for the development of the situation as a result of certain actions. In addition, we saw that the murder of Nemtsov was a surprise for the West. No accompanying events were prepared that would allow a sharp increase in the activity of the opposition. The only intelligence service that organically combines the professionalism of the performers and the absolute lack of professionalism of the planners of such an operation is the SBU. As we indicated, the reason for this state was its entire development over almost 25 years of Ukrainian statehood - the requirements placed on the intelligence service by Ukrainian presidents.

Naturally, even if the operation was developed in secret from the CIA officers controlling the SBU, after its failure (and it actually failed, the West weakly emphasizes the topic of Nemtsov’s murder and even the Russian opposition formally remembers him once a year - on the day of his death) the SBU’s initiative did not could have escaped the attention of American intelligence. Since the United States at that time actively supported the Kiev regime, the scandal with the murder of a Russian opposition pro-American politician friendly towards Ukraine on Russian territory by the Ukrainian special service was of no use to the United States. Accordingly, a cleanup was carried out, breaking the ties between the perpetrators and those who ordered the crime. Hence the information about the murder of Isa Munayev by SBU and CIA officers.

We will never know whether Isa Munayev was the only victim of the purge, or whether several SBU officers tragically died at that time. In the end, fighting continues in the Donbass and intelligence officers there are also dying along with ordinary soldiers. But we know that the leadership of the Chechen battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev (Isa Munayev) was frightened by something to such an extent that they, who until April 2015 jealously guarded their autonomy (this, by the way, in Chechen traditions, is a formation of Chechen jihadists fighting against the regime of President Assad in Syria they also try not to mix with local formations) suddenly decided to join the special battalion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine with a reduction in status to a separate company. This is all the more strange since the much smaller Chechen battalion named after Sheikh Mansur, stationed in Dnepropetrovsk, continues to maintain an autonomous status, without joining any armed formations of Ukraine.

Chechen jihadists did not depend on the Ukrainian authorities and could at any time return to Europe, from where they came to the Ukrainian civil war. It is unlikely that they would be afraid of some Ukrainian special service. Ukraine does not have many motivated military professionals to waste such personnel as those assembled in the battalion named after Dzhokhar Dudayev (Isa Munayev). Only a special service capable of reaching them all over the world could scare them. This is the US CIA and this is another (in addition to the information voiced by Mr. Lurie and transmitted to us by representatives of the Chechen volunteer battalion “Death” Salakh Duchaev and Apti Bolotkhanov) indirect confirmation that in the liquidation of Isa Munayev, in addition to SBU officers, representatives of the CIA also took part. Most likely, the Ukrainian special service carried out the liquidation work, and the Americans ensured the legitimation of their actions in the eyes of the Chechens. Otherwise, an armed clash could have occurred between the battalion and the liquidators.

With the murder of Isa Munayev (and most likely with the purge of the entire team that took part in the murder of Nemtsov), the threads leading from the perpetrators to the SBU were severed. However, as we see, not everything. If it is not possible today to prove the participation of a specific representative of this special service in the murder of Nemtsov, then the role of the SBU as an organization seems to be quite prominent.

We do not know whether the CIA received information about the amateur activities of their Ukrainian colleagues before the murder (when everything could still be stopped) or after. But we are inclined to the second option. It is unlikely that the CIA would have decided not to interfere and see how the SBU could provoke the Maidan in Moscow. The CIA employs professionals who know well how finely tuned all the components must be for the Maidan to be a success, and sometimes there are failures. It would have been immediately clear to CIA professionals that the operation to provoke dissatisfaction with the Russian authorities by killing Nemtsov was doomed to failure, for the following reasons:

– Nemtsov’s unpopularity as a politician;

– a high level of voter support for the current president of Russia;

– political and organizational impotence of the opposition.

That is, the organizers of the murder were set up, guaranteed not to achieve the goal.

It is very likely that the unusually cool attitude of Western politicians and the press, the lack of demonstrative interest in the progress and outcome of the investigation into Nemtsov’s murder, is caused by the fear that the Russian investigation was able to obtain some evidence of the participation of the SBU in the preparation of the murder, but simply has not yet presented it. This is the style of the Russian authorities - wait until the opponent starts a scandal, and then make him look like a fool.

It should also be noted that in June 2015 (three and a half months after Nemtsov’s murder), SBU Chairman Valentin Nalyvaichenko retired. Meanwhile, this man was recruited by the CIA about 14 years ago. He first headed the SBU during the sharp increase in American influence in Ukraine under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko and led the intelligence service from 2006 until the end of Yushchenko’s presidential powers in 2010. After the overthrow of President Viktor Yanukovych and the return to power of Yushchenko’s team, but already headed by President Petro Poroshenko, Nalyvaichenko was immediately reappointed head of the intelligence service and was considered the most unsinkable Ukrainian politician, since he directly implemented US interests in controlling the SBU.

At the same time, Nalyvaichenko’s resignation was confidently talked about in Kyiv in the early spring of 2015, immediately after the murder of Boris Nemtsov. This resignation was explained by his increased political ambitions and the failures of the SBU to provide evidence of Russian assistance to the rebels in the Donbass and even failures in intelligence work. But intelligence is not the prerogative of the SBU. It is handled by the independent Foreign Intelligence Service and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Nalyvaichenko's political ambitions never conflicted with US interests. That is, if the SBU was tasked with dealing with it, then that’s exactly what he would do. In fulfilling its immediate responsibilities - ensuring the internal security of the SBU regime - the pro-Russian movement in Ukraine was defeated by the end of the summer of 2014. The most important thing is that with the departure of Valentin Nalyvaichenko, the Security Service of Ukraine clearly did not work any better.

And yet Nalyvaichenko was removed as soon as a replacement was found for him. Despite the fact that he officially allowed American intelligence officers into the building of the Ukrainian intelligence service, subordinated his employees to them and even hung an American flag on the building, along with the Ukrainian one. In order for such a trusted person, who, moreover, had been specially preparing for this particular job for years, was suddenly taken out of the political game and has not received any appointments for a year, he had to make a very serious mistake. It was the preparation and implementation of the SBU under the leadership of Nalivachenko for the murder of Nemtsov that could have been such an oversight that jeopardized the reputation and interests of the United States. Moreover, it does not matter whether Nalyvaichenko authorized this operation or whether it turned out to be an initiative of lower levels. He failed to cope with the assigned task of ensuring comprehensive control over the intelligence service. In this situation, the fact that he is still alive is already his great achievement.

Part 4. Conclusion: “Who benefits?”

There is a well-known Roman expression: “The one who benefits” did it. The murder of Nemtsov was unprofitable for the Russian authorities. For her, he was a weak and predictable opponent—a convenient sparring partner. In general, the situation developed in such a way that with the death of Nemtsov, the authorities lost almost nothing. Even in the opposition, not everyone believed in the version about the Kremlin trace. But the situation could have turned out differently. The main thing is that the authorities have gained nothing except a headache with the investigation of this criminal case.

The murder of Nemtsov was completely unnecessary for the opposition. It changed practically nothing for most of its leaders. And things only got worse for Mikhail Kasyanov, whom Oleg Lurie accused of ordering the murder of Boris Nemtsov. Previously, as one of the two leaders of the opposition, he was mainly involved in cabinet work and international meetings. At rare opposition street events, the more charismatic Nemtsov often played the main role. Now Mr. Kasyanov is forced to speak at rallies through force, and at the same time becomes an object of persecution by pro-Kremlin social activists and journalists. Previously, this more often fell to Nemtsov.

The murder of Nemtsov was not beneficial to the West. The United States at this time was not ready to support a revolutionary scenario in Russia. The opposition lost the street to the authorities. There was nothing and no one to radicalize. Meanwhile, the Russian opposition has a catastrophic lack of bright, visible leaders with political experience. Against the general background, even Nemtsov, with all his shortcomings, was a valuable personnel. It was advisable to save it for the future. Even in Kyiv, where about a hundred people were killed under the fire of unknown snipers, not a single one of the high-status protest leaders was injured. With their invulnerability, leaders breathe courage into the masses. If the leaders begin to die, then the little simple person thinks: “If such a famous person was killed, then what will they do with me. I’d rather sit at home.” In general, at a minimum, this murder came at the wrong time for the United States, and if it did not lower the degree of the already sparse protest, it did not increase it. Moreover, this result was easily predicted in advance.

The murder of Nemtsov was of no use to his many girlfriends and friends. With him they all felt more comfortable and prosperous than without him. Apparently, Boris Nemtsov got along with people better in everyday life than in politics.

Nemtsov did not have a business and there were no business conflicts that could lead to tragedy. No one benefited materially from his death.

Nemtsov did not have personal enemies who were offended by him so seriously that they would be ready, many years later, to organize his professional liquidation.

The murder of Nemtsov was absolutely of no use to Ramzan Kadyrov. A representative of a marginal party, who in twelve years of public politics (after leaving the State Duma) managed to achieve only a mandate as a deputy of the legislative assembly of Yaroslavl - far from the largest and most important regional center in Russia) did not particularly attract his attention at all. Even among the opposition there were people with whom Kadyrov often got into public altercations. Nemtsov was not very noticeable in the information field.

Nemtsov’s murder was of no use even to “outraged Muslims.” Russian politicians (for example, the rather popular Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who has been leading his party into parliament for twenty-five years) make much harsher statements and this does not cause any excesses.

A demonstrative, staged, theatrical murder against the backdrop of the Kremlin was necessary only for those who could hope to derive political benefit from it. Due to the unprofessionalism of analytical and forecasting structures, due to the inadequacy of the assessment of the internal political situation in Russia, only the Ukrainian special service could hope to use this murder to change the geopolitical situation in its favor. And only the SBU combined under one roof the absolute inability to make a sound assessment of the situation and high-level technical professionals capable of committing such a murder.

Unlike other opposition Russian politicians who rarely appear in Ukraine, Nemtsov was well known in Kyiv and could find the right approach to him.

All materials on this topic that were available to us (both open and exclusive) also point to the Ukrainian trace.

But most importantly, only the SBU could believe that this was beneficial for Ukraine.

We cannot blame the political leadership in Kyiv. But the Ukrainian special service had the opportunity, believed that it could get a concrete benefit and several times indirectly showed up in this matter, to which, in theory, it should have nothing to do with at all.

The fact that, having arrived in Ukraine, Anna Duritskaya literally disappeared, and the relevant Ukrainian structures, in principle, were not interested in witnessing such an incident, with the help of which they could theoretically expect to cause trouble for the Kremlin and investigate the death of the Russian friend of Ukraine Boris Nemtsov, also indicates that that the SBU knew in advance what Duritskaya could tell and did not want her testimony to ever see the light of day.

To the question “who benefits?” we can answer - it is beneficial for the SBU, at least they thought it was beneficial for them.