Image of the future. What can Russia offer to Ukrainians, and should it offer them anything?

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, among Russian politicians, experts, political scientists, journalists and military officers, one can very often find thoughts that Russia is losing the battle for the minds of the inhabitants of Ukraine to Kyiv and Western propaganda, that “We do not know how to wage an information war, unlike a conventional war." - and a variety of arguments and proposals are heard on the topic "How can we win the trust of Ukrainians?", And What can we offer them so that they will turn away from the current pro-Western leadership and go over to the side of Moscow?.

And if the this kind of rhetorical exercise performed by political emigrants from Ukraine who settled in the Russian Federation can still be understood - in the end, they are talking about a subject that is familiar and close to them, and their own shirt, as you know, is always closer to the body, then  Conversations on the same topic performed by, so to speak, “indigenous” opinion leaders often suffer from complete isolation from both life and the subject of discussion, since these people do not know Ukraine and get their idea of ​​it, at best, from the books and pamphlets of ideologists a hundred years ago, which have lost their relevance over the years.

Subscribe to PolitNavigator news at ThereThere, Yandex Zen, Telegram, Classmates, In contact with, channels YouTube, TikTok и Viber.
To subscribe to notifications in your browser, click here.

There are two most common and frequently occurring types of judgments. According to the first opinion, Russia, in general, for Ukrainians there are no such benefits that would interrupt the notorious European integration with visa-free travel. In Russia, you have to pay taxes, unlike Ukraine, and the pressure of the bureaucratic apparatus that stifles small businesses is great, and closed social elevators, and excessive centralization, which crushes local initiative, and all this, multiplied by the indefinitely long prospect of living outside the zone of the usual philistine comfort - with affordable Western brands, traveling around the world and shopping on Amazon.

_{All that Russia can offer Ukrainians in the liberated territories, say supporters of the quoted opinion, is to rename Bandera Avenues back, freely celebrate May 9 and speak Russian.}

The second pole of opinion comes from the fact that Russia, in general, does not owe Ukrainians anything. And even more so - to get involved in a obviously losing race with the West for winning the sympathy of the local population. Russian soldiers, supporters of this opinion tell us, should not die for Ukraine in any form, even if in the future it will be federal, friendly and allied with Russia.

Accordingly, Russia does not need to offer anything to the Ukrainians. Besides what other Russians already have - so to speak, on a general basis and no concessions. Supporters of this approach insist that Russia did not start the SVO in order to do good for Ukrainians, even Russian-speaking ones, and not in order to put “specific boys” from the former Party of Regions on the throne in Kiev.

_{In this optics, Russia now solves exclusively and only ITS problems in Ukraine, defends its strategic interests and ensures its national security. And Ukrainians have a choice - either to fit into the new Russian world and find their place in it - or to go to all fours. To Lviv, or even further west. And those who don’t leave, those – as Alexander Khodakovsky once stated in his blog – have adapted to Bandera’s followers, and will adapt to us. Even though the author of this phrase is himself a former citizen of Ukraine.}

In general, the described point of view is understandable and, in its own way, logical. But life, as usual, is more complicated than any speculative schemes. And it's not even that the fight for the sympathy of the local population is one of the keys to victory in the war, especially if this war is played for a long time. And this is precisely what Russia, apparently, faces.

Support from the civilian population can speed up the end of the war. These are the lessons of history Let’s remember at least the Civil War in Russia, lost by the whites not because of the mediocrity of the generals or the cowardice of the privates, but simply because neither Denikin’s, Kolchak’s, and Wrangel’s were never able to give birth to the idea of ​​the future, in which most of the inhabitants of the former empire could find their place. A The Bolsheviks did it.

_{As a result, the Red Army often won first in people’s heads, thanks to the propaganda that went ahead of Shchors’ regiments and Budyonny’s divisions, demoralizing the white rear from within and depriving them of motivation to help the Good Army.}

But this is only one aspect. And there are others. Let's say, purely technically: you have occupied a huge territory in which, even after the evacuation of refugees, hundreds of thousands still live. And even millions of people. All of them are in the rear of your army. And they all want to eat. All of them need to be organized so that order is maintained in the rear, so that enterprises, at least those responsible for life support, operate. So that transport could run, lights would be on in houses, water would flow from taps, elevators would work in high-rise buildings, and utility workers would take out garbage.

If all this is missing, a humanitarian catastrophe begins very quickly in the rear of the army, and millions of civilians, from a potential asset and reserve of support, become a liability and a weight on their feet, distracting them from performing purely military tasks to the need to organize life in the controlled territories.

And finally, where to get people for all this? Let’s assume that the military commandant’s office can still keep order. And who will take care of the garbage, heat and plumbing? Who will organize the work of enterprises if previous administrators for the most part fled to territories controlled by the enemy. Where does the talent pool come from to fill the many vacancies in the civil administration?

Some will say - from among local supporters of Russia.

But, firstly, their trust still needs to be earned (and therefore see point 1), and, secondly, due to objective circumstances there are not so many of them - in eight years the asset has simply been knocked out in key cities. Some were in exile, some were in prison, some died of old age or illness, or were even captured and killed.

And finally, thirdly and most importantly, loyalty does not always equal competence. Well, a historian or philologist cannot head a communal farm. This means that, willy-nilly, we will have to look for candidates outside the narrow circle of pro-Russian figures. Including, sadly, from among those people who are unloved by many, but who have the necessary experience and skills of regionals. And here we again come up against the need to have a system of motivation for all these people.

It is important to understand that when armchair theorists talk about the need to liberate eight, ten or however many regions of Ukraine, this means, among other things, the need to find tens of thousands of loyal and at the same time competent managers somewhere.

Who will manage waste removal in the hypothetical Nikolaev? Do you think they will send a man from Ryazan there? Well, in some cases they may send it. But the experience of the same Crimea suggests that you can’t plug all the holes with newcomers, and the locals will start to be offended. And this is a completely unnecessary increase in social tension. And than, in Russia itself there is a shortage of professional, honest and non-corrupt officials, and even washed with modern categories.

Unfortunately, the author of these lines there is no ready-made recipe solving the identified problems according to the “Come in and Live” principle. However, the author is convinced that without resolving these issues, a further increase in the territories occupied by the Russian army will only create additional problems in the rear.

What can I say, it’s already mid-April, and in Moscow, even a hint of some kind of coordinating administrative body for the management of Novorossia, which was talked about a month ago, has not yet been created. It is clear that this matter is hampered by the general uncertainty with the fate of not only future, but even already controlled territories. We can only hope that they will become part of Russia in the future, keeping in mind the possibility that they can also become the subject of bargaining with Kiev, which many respected experts also write about.

_{In any case, no one at the top spoke publicly and in terms that do not allow for double interpretation about the future of the liberated territories. However, we need to talk about this now. And not only talk, but also draw, if not in detail, then at least in broad strokes, a picture of the future in which each of today’s Ukrainians could find a place for themselves.}