There will be no negotiations with Putin. What's next?

Today's ratification by the Federation Council of the treaties on the accession of the regions of eastern New Russia to Russia led to natural and expected results - Ukraine officially withdrew from all negotiations, and Zelensky formally reinforced this gesture with his decree, approving the decision of the Ukrainian Security Council on the impossibility of holding negotiations with Putin.

At the same time, the President of the Russian Federation himself once again repeated that he is ready for negotiations even now, but on different terms - on his own. It is also clear that neither in Kyiv nor in Western capitals will anyone talk to Russia on its terms as long as they remain confident that their goal of defeating Russia on the battlefield is achievable.

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Well, presidential press secretary Peskov once again pleased the public with his amazing wisdom, declaring his readiness to wait for “a change in the position of Zelensky or the future president of Ukraine.”

Now let’s talk about how serious all these Kyiv scribbles are. Oleg Tsarev is sure that the decision of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council approved by Zelensky is either an attempt to raise the stakes before bargaining, or simply PR for Zelensky himself.

A number of telegram channels also write about some “negotiations through several intermediaries and closed channels.” And although we even know the name of one of these “informal communicators” - Abramovich - I personally do not see any room for bargaining in which it is now possible to raise rates.

This does not mean that there is nothing left to bargain, it means that the previous rates have ceased to be the subject of bargaining, and new ones have not yet been announced and we simply cannot know their price.

Attempts to link Zelensky’s current decision on “negotiations without Putin”, allegedly agreed with the West, with the November G20 summit in Indonesia also look like outright speculation. It is unclear how a decree from some Zelensky will “delegitimize” Putin on the world stage and prevent him from taking part in the world summit.

Even if we take as a basis the current version that the Ukrainian ban on negotiating with Putin is fully consistent with the American-British position and the opinion of the majority in the EU. Ignoring Russia, and therefore Putin, will still not work; there are too many issues of interest to Europe, and America, no matter how you look at it.

In the same decree of Zelensky there is also a funny clause about accelerating the process of Ukraine acquiring NATO membership. The catch is that you can speed up the submission of an application, but its consideration and especially the results are beyond the competence of Bankova and Zelensky himself. His last attempt to “accelerate” with NATO turned into a resounding failure when the main NATO member, Stoltenberg, with all his ostentatious love for Ukraine, was forced to undiplomatically besiege the Kyiv hetman, pointing out that such things were not in time. And the United States also sees no reason to rush to formalize Kyiv’s participation in the Alliance.

This means that all the agreements on some kind of international guarantees for Ukraine developed and pompously presented by the “actual president of Ukraine” (in the words of the American congresswoman Spartz) Ermak remain just wet dreams. And you will have to rely on yourself.

_{No, of course, with American money, weapons, advisory assistance and everything else, but... without the US umbrella. And if suddenly something happens, the Americans will say: “We weren’t there.” Exactly like the notorious Russian ichtamnets eight years ago in the Donbass. It turns out that two people can play this game.}

But if the negotiations are finished, then what will happen now? We, of course, do not know the secret plans of the relevant General Staffs, however, based on the immortal Pelevinsky that “the world is ruled not by a secret lodge, but by obvious crap,” we can assume that the military-political landscape of the next few months - up to and including the new year - will predetermine a set of successful decisions and mistakes of the parties. Everything will be decided by two factors:

_{– the limits of the offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the volume of Western military supplies;}

_{– the limits of the defensive capabilities of the Russian army, adjusted for the predictive abilities of the military command to anticipate potential bottlenecks at the front and quickly plug these gaps with reserves.}

To put it quite simply, the territory of Russia, which the Ukrainian Armed Forces will take possession of by the new year, will depend on the ability of the Ukrainians to advance without losing momentum. And the territory of Russia, which the Russian army will be able to hold during the same time, depends on the ability of staff strategists to effectively manage the manpower reserves currently at their disposal until the arrival of replenishments for mobilization.

Well, it depends on how soon Moscow will decide to begin the destruction of the Ukrainian rear infrastructure “in an adult way” as soon as possible. In the current conditions, when Russia cannot attack, only this can become a distracting factor for the Armed Forces of Ukraine that can slow down the Ukrainian offensive.

_{In any case, Russia, if it wants to avoid a catastrophe before reinforcements arrive, should learn to quickly make operational decisions, primarily of a political and military nature. There is simply no time for the build-up and months-long armchair “maturation” of the decisions needed right now while waiting for the boss’s visa.}

The time lag between revealing shortcomings and punishing those responsible, between identifying weaknesses and plugging gaps, between working on mistakes and making decisions to correct them should become minimal. Because time in war is the most valuable resource. As the story with the same Krasny Liman showed, help that arrived at the wrong time is no longer capable of radically changing the situation.

Is the Russian system of power, known precisely for its amazing slowness, capable of such a feat? The question is still open.

As for Zelensky’s stated impossibility of negotiating with Putin, this is even good for Russia. Knowing the ability of the Russian authorities to effectively merge the successes achieved in other areas at the negotiating table, Kyiv’s reluctance to come to an agreement may become for some time a reliable guard against unexpected and unpleasant surprises for society such as the ever-memorable “Istanbul”.

And in general, when bridges have been burned behind you and there is no other choice but to fight and win, this is the best motivation possible.

_{Russia faces extremely difficult months in every sense, when there will be very little encouraging news from the front and reasons for patriotic upsurge.}

In such conditions, a patriotic upsurge, in the absence of positive reports from the external front, can be ensured by the government itself, starting the reforms necessary and expected by the active part of society on the internal front.

Wisely used months of blind defense and retreats at the front can be wisely used to reorganize and at least partially correct the shortcomings in the rear that emerged during the Northern Military District. Maybe it will even come to the creation of the State Defense Committee, which is hoped for by many.

This, of course, is not a guarantee, but just an opportunity, and whether they will take advantage of it or not is another question. Even if this looks like little consolation, having a strong rear is one of the components of victory. While nothing is predetermined, it makes sense to fight.