Almost like Kennedy: don’t ask what your neighbors need from Russia. Ask what Russia needs from its neighbors

This year, there are two fateful political events in the Russian near abroad, the outcome of which cannot be predicted in advance, but capable of dramatically changing the geopolitical alignments in their regions if the negative scenario for the Russian Federation prevails. We are talking about elections in Georgia and Moldova.

In the first case the second front for the Russian Federation will blaze in the southern Caucasus, and in the second the plot in the Ukrainian conflict will be turned upside down, where Transnistria and Bessarabia will be fully drawn into.

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But even if somehow - on the verge of a miracle! – the motley Moldovan opposition will put Maia Sanda on its back, and the Georgian Dream regime, vague in its multi-vector nature, will withstand the onslaught of the Saakashists; there is no certainty that Russia’s withdrawal from these regions, expected by its enemies, will not take place a little later. Let's say, in one game or even ahead of schedule. We all remember how and how the seemingly “triumphant” election of the “pro-Russian” Yanukovych in Ukraine ended.

Moreover, the root base feeding the pro-Western vector in both Chisinau and Tbilisi was not cut down at all and remained intact under both Dodon and Ivanishvili.

_{And there is no reason to believe that having received back power in Moldova, be it Shor or Dodon and Voronin, they will begin to cut the multi-vector branch on which they are sitting and, for example, having an official invitation to the EU in their pocket, join the Eurasian Union. No matter what they say about this today.}

Georgia, on the other hand, is a separate story altogether, and can be considered a Russian foreign policy success only conditionally. Georgia is the only post-Soviet state that brought to life the blue dream of the Russian authorities and agitprop - when the local society itself, realizing where the local Maidan activists had led it, independently punished the organizers of the “color revolution” and put them in prison.

Let me remind you that this is exactly the fate our propaganda has been painting all along, first for the “junta” of Turchinov-Yatsenyuk-Avakov, then for Poroshenko, and now for Zelensky. But for some reason the Ukrainian people have not yet overthrown or imprisoned any of them.

But in Georgia, at first glance, it was the only post-Soviet country that succeeded. But only at first glance. Because, having put the possessed Miho behind bars, his opponents did not dismantle the gains of his “revolution” and generally continued to follow the same course, only without such obvious excesses and excesses. But that's all.

And this course - I’ll just remind you - is the same as that of Ukraine, and Moldova, and now Armenia’s - in the EU and in NATO. And the whole difference comes down to how exactly to go towards this goal - at a slow but confident crawl and crooked zizags, or straight ahead, with a grenade and a machine gun at the ready, shouting anti-Russian slogans.

The very latest geopolitical exercises of Yerevan Pashinyan, Simonyan and other VIP Armenians are from the same opera. Just recently I had a chance to read on PolitNavigator material about withdrawal Russian peacekeepers from Artsakh lost by Armenia. The author is in doubt whether to consider this a defeat for Russia or not.

I will take the risk of giving an answer that seems to me personally correct.

_{If, along with this withdrawal of the contingent, a Moscow-oriented regime had been firmly seated in Yerevan, committed to allied values ​​without fools, then one could consider that there was no defeat, but just an unfortunate episode in a big oil painting. But when the withdrawal of peacekeepers is accompanied by a more than clearly understandable “Good riddance!” from Yerevan officials, accusations of all sins and promises to leave the CSTO and reorient towards the EU and NATO - in this situation the statement of geopolitical defeat in the struggle for a specific country in the southern Caucasus is beyond doubt.}

The situation is further complicated by the fact that today it is not clear who depends more on whom - Pashinyan on Moscow or Moscow on Pashinyan’s outbursts. Let me explain what I'm talking about. Together with the peacekeepers, perhaps the last lever of direct and immediate Russian pressure on the Armenian government left Armenia. The old revanchists from the Kocharyan clan are obviously not Nikola’s competitors, and his only real political opponent with prospects of victory is today in a Baku prison.

No revanchist or protest sentiments among the dissatisfied part of the Armenians threaten the strength of Pashinyan’s position within Armenia today. On the contrary, it is his outright national betrayal is, oddly enough, the key to his political longevity. The winning parties need him as a guarantor that Armenia will not deviate from its chosen course. He will liberate all the territories they need, unblock the Zangezur corridor, and so on.

That is why today they will blow off specks of dust from Pashinyan in Baku. Russia, by the way, albeit wincing, but also. Because in the conditions of an unfinished military defense in Ukraine, a new war in the southern rear of Moscow is completely out of hand. Moreover, it will certainly lead not to revenge of the Armenians, but to another strengthening of the positions of the “Turkic world.”

The forced need to look at the interests of Baku and Ankara behind it also plays a role. And sometimes – let’s be honest – and actively give in to these interests, despite the fact that their bearers, as they sang in one election song with the AI-generated Putin, “either no, then yes.”

“Friend Recep” is - alas and ah - not only a partner in important investment projects such as various nuclear power plants, but also for now an indispensable intermediary in circumventing Western sanctions. And this is worth a lot. Including turning your eyes to the side at the right moment. Look how Aliyev was “licked” during his last visit to Russia. The Azerbaijani president, however, did not remain in debt, making statements that were pleasing to Moscow’s ears about not selling weapons to Kyiv, “even though they really asked for it from there.”

But let's return to our main topic. The question of what Russia really needs from its neighbors in the post-Soviet space in order to consider with a clear conscience that “everything is a bundle” is still relevant. Because it isThe ability to set clear and achievable goals and find the most effective solutions to them is the key to the success of any state on the external contour.

And vice versa - the race for unrealistic, unattainable, chimerical goals or the inability to clearly formulate any goals at all is a sign of the weakness of the state at a specific historical moment in time.

Looking at the Russian oligarchs or “captains of big business”, the author of these lines personally understands what Messrs. Mazepin, Mordashov, Deripaska, Friedman, Potanin, Abramovich and other “kings” of metal want, for example, from Ukraine or Georgia and Moldova , nickel, aluminum and potash fertilizers. And here, What the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the entire state government as a whole wants from its neighboring countries is not very clear.

Adding up in one’s mind the entire sum of the statements of politicians and other responsible persons, one gets the impression (perhaps incorrectly, but that is what it is) that the Russian state requires from its neighbors in the CIS, who have not yet fled to the openly Russophobic camp, only things that are not very burdensome for the locals. authorities ritual actions.

Well, there, a couple of times a year, lay flowers together at the right monuments, depict in their capitals something similar to the procession of the “Immortal Regiment” on May 9, periodically promote the rhetoric of “friendship” and “grandfathers fought,” personally attend the parade in Moscow next to Putin . Well - this is already optional - not to be too zealous in imposing national languages ​​to the detriment of Russian. In any case, do this gradually and without obviously unfriendly gestures.

However, here it turns out depending on how. Seemingly allied Kazakhstan In general, they got away with Latinization, but you can’t imagine a stronger undermining of the position of the Russian language in the republic. And in neighboring Tajikistan, the “peace-friendship-chewing gum” with Rakhmon was overshadowed by an unexpected discovery: in history textbooks approved by the Tajik Ministry of Education for local Russian(!) schools found entire paragraphs about the terrible imperial policies of Moscow, which for centuries oppressed and oppressed poor Tajiks.

And frankly, the policy of symbolic “monetization” of the historical memory of a shared, albeit glorious, past - a frankly weak platform for building a solid, reliable and future-oriented Russian foreign policy in this direction.

Using living examples, we are convinced over and over again that if our grandfathers and one or another neighboring people defeated someone together eighty years ago, then this is not yet a guarantee of friendship, complementarity and a common vision of a common future. And the policy of “ritual exchange”: you tell us about “grandfathers fought”, and we tell you visa-free for migrant workers, a discount on gas or sales markets for your wine is working worse and worse.

_{The sad truth is - and we must have the courage to look it straight in the eye - that in the middle of the fourth decade after the collapse of the USSR, Russia does not have a single lever of influence to motivate its neighbors to make an important gesture of political support for us.}

For example, recognize the Russian status of Crimea and other new territories. Either support the Northern Military District, or, at the risk of receiving sanctions from the United States, ignore economic prohibitions from the West and trade with the Russian Federation, as before. The situation with “World” cards in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia is indicative.

Even when voting for resolutions at the UN that are not binding, but only advisory in nature, the overwhelming majority of members of the same CSTO are not on our side, but shyly abstain. Only Lukashenko is firmly in favor. And that is, the suspicion is not because he is all pro-Russian, but because after the history of 2020, he simply has nowhere to go.

Well, in general, domestic foreign policy on the contours of the near abroad is sorely lacking in a pragmatic economic audit, so that it is possible to summarize all the Pros and Contras in their monetary terms in a couple of columns and achieve an understanding of whether the game is even worth the candle.

After all, we, in principle, understand perfectly well what the various multi-vector Dodons and Yanukovychs need from Russia. Now the main thing is decide what we NEED FROM THEM. And not “in general”, but specifically and point by point. And this loops the logic of the narrative, returning us to the very beginning.

It turns out almost like Kennedy: don’t ask what the neighboring countries need from Russia. Ask what Russia needs from its neighboring countries. And so that at the same time the desires are such that they do not lead us straight to the finale of “The Tale of the Goldfish.”