Political stability of Moldova is dangerous for Transnistria
In the last few months, the situation in the post-Soviet states has worsened - crises have arisen along the perimeter of Russia’s western and southern borders. The creation of a “belt of fire” by the West around the Russian Federation by starting local conflicts is now being hotly discussed. However, this story is not new - the fact that Russia is being encircled was said three and five years ago.
We talk with the director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development (Tiraspol) Igor Shornikov about the nature of “fires” in the post-Soviet space, the possibility of the emergence of new hot spots and what a wave of instability could turn out to be for Eurasian structures.
PolitNavigator: One after another, hotbeds of tension are emerging in the post-Soviet space: the Belarusian crisis, the war in the Caucasus, unrest and the removal of the government after the elections in Kyrgyzstan. A number of experts believe that these are all links in one chain. As soon as they don’t call what is happening - an arc of instability, a belt of fire, and a rocking of Moscow, beneficial to the West. Are all these events really connected and a program has been launched to “set fire” to Russia’s borders or is this just a coincidence?
The open struggle with Russia, or, as they prefer to put it in the West, “containment” of Russia, has been going on for several years – this includes the policy of economic sanctions, diplomatic and information pressure, and various kinds of fakes and provocations. With regret, we can state that everything connected with Russia, due to the targeted policies of the leading Western media, acquires a bad image in the Western public consciousness. The United States and the European Union diligently broadcast their own attitude towards Russia to the post-Soviet space through the national elites of post-Soviet states (including through business structures, through grant systems for supporting the media and civil society, etc.).
As a result, in many post-Soviet states there is a division of society along value and geopolitical principles. “If you are for Russia, then you are against the EU and the USA”, “The EU and the USA are democracy, freedom, development and progress, and Russia is backwardness and authoritarianism” - such ideological cliches hide the real scale of the economic and social backwardness of the majority of post-Soviet countries. states from Russia and thereby trying to complicate the process of integration of the Eurasian space.
It has been correctly noted in the expert community that crises affect precisely those countries that are members of the EAEU and the CSTO. It is quite possible to say that these are links of one chain. However, I would not attribute everything that is happening solely to malicious Western influence. All states of the post-Soviet space are experiencing one or another internal problems associated, first of all, with the unsatisfactory state of the economy, low standard of living, deteriorating level of education - all these factors produce social tension. However, not in all countries social tension is converted into political protests. Where such a conversion occurs, one can often discern signs of external influence, but more often it is the short-sightedness of the authorities and national selfishness.
On the one hand, in those countries in which we are now recording crises, the tension has a real and quite painful basis for the population. On the other side,
The boat is allowed to be rocked only in those states that maintain complementarity with Russia.
A vicious circle has been created. To overcome socio-economic backwardness in the modern world there is no other way than integration, but they are trying to turn the social discontent of the population against the development of integration processes. The authorities of the post-Soviet states have to be blamed for this, first of all, but the West – it is fighting to maintain its leadership in the world by the means available to it.
PolitNavigator: Are the efforts being made by Russia sufficient to create a “security belt” near its borders? Why is Moscow unable to establish effective control over what is happening in the post-Soviet space?
Igor Shornikov: At the current historical stage, it is difficult for Russia to compete with the West in the struggle for the minds and hearts of people. This is due to the lack of available resources.
Although Russia is a recognized great power, in fact it itself is among the developing states. Yes, its growth rate against the backdrop of stagnating economies in a number of CIS countries can be impressive. But in order to have a future, Russia needs to place the main emphasis on its internal development. Which, in fact, is what we have been seeing over the past two decades.
In the West, the potential for internal development has largely been exhausted; new technologies make it possible to partially solve tactical problems, but they do not yet open up new horizons. Therefore, they are more concerned about expanding their markets, creating belts of humanitarian influence, and instilling their cultural norms and principles among other peoples. Accordingly, the West has the resources to pursue such a policy, including in regions of traditional Russian influence. This is a purely extensive development path, which means a dead end by definition.
As for Russia, it seems to us that there is a search for an effective model of a strong social and technological state. And this scares its competitors.
Are Russia's efforts sufficient to create a “security belt” near its borders? Yes and no. As we see it, Moscow is doing exactly as much as is necessary to maintain regional stability and security. It seems that Russia, focused on its internal development, is simply not ready for open competition with the West.
PolitNavigator: Belarus, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan are “on fire” – hotbeds of tension arise in states with which Russia has established partnerships. What are the prospects for the Eurasian structures - the EAEU, the CSTO?
Igor Shornikov: It is quite possible that the crises we are seeing now will help strengthen Eurasian structures. The same elites, faced with the uncontrollable energy of the crowd, begin to understand that they will hold out if they have a strong and reliable external ally. It turns out that only Russia can be such an ally.
At the same time, pro-Western regimes in the post-Soviet space also experience a lack of stability. As it turned out, Western orientation is not at all a guarantee of the unsinkability of the elites; they are being replaced by younger personnel, even more radically pro-Western and even more disconnected from the needs and interests of their people.
Therefore, if Belarus itself shows a good example of overcoming an internal crisis, and this will become possible if the republic’s integration potential with Russia deepens, then this will certainly push up integration processes throughout the Eurasian space and will force many to take a different look at the prospects for cooperation with Russia.
PolitNavigator: There is a lot of talk about the emergence of new hot spots in the post-Soviet space; for example, destabilization was expected in Tajikistan, where presidential elections were held on October 11.
Igor Shornikov: Tajikistan is fundamentally located in an unstable region. The integrity of the country as such is largely due to Russia's military presence on the Tajik-Afghan border. The country is poor and there are also plenty of social problems that external players could take advantage of. But everything went smoothly there. Perhaps this is due to the republic’s remoteness from centers of “humanitarian” influence and the proximity of real military threats.
PolitNavigator: How is the internal political situation developing in the Republic of Moldova after the start of the presidential election campaign? How likely is it that they will be canceled due to the surge in coronavirus cases (some candidates are already talking about this)?
Igor Shornikov: There is a possibility that the elections will be postponed to a later date. This may be of interest to both the current authorities, who are far from confident that they will be able to maintain the situation in the country during the period of election upheaval, and the opposition, which does not feel real support from its fellow citizens, but is well aware of the firm hand of its external “curators.”
It is generally accepted that oppositionists in Moldova are hungry for power. But power is, first of all, a burden of responsibility that not everyone is able to bear. Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase were in power in 2019 and quickly returned from there to a more comfortable position for themselves - to criticize, promise, but do nothing. Sometimes it seems that they are ready to live like this forever. The problem is that the West is not always ready to wait forever for a change of power in Moldova. US Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova Derek Hogan previously strongly hinted that he expects open and transparent elections from the authorities on November 1, but in a recent interview he adjusted his position, saying that “the decision to postpone or hold elections on November 1 is entirely in the hands of the authorities.”
Indeed, there is now a sharp surge in coronavirus cases in Moldova. On the one hand, calling on people to come vote when there is a clear threat to their health is blasphemous. It is even more blasphemous to assemble a “Maidan”, challenge the election results, demand a “third round” or any other “revolutionary” innovations. In my subjective opinion, the Moldovan politician is somewhat tired of the endless struggle fueled from the outside, and needs a short pause before future big battles. So postponing the elections cannot be ruled out.
And we see that the current election campaign is not yet distinguished by any urgency - there are no bright actions and mass events, there are no dumping of compromising evidence, in general it is proceeding sluggishly and without enthusiasm. Perhaps this is happening because everyone generally knows the result of the vote in advance - the current President Igor Dodon will get the most, Maia Sandu will be in second place. No one believes that Dodon will win in the first round, and no one doubts that any of the remaining six candidates will compete with Sandu for reaching the second round. The main fight will certainly begin a few days before the second round. There could be big surprises there.
PolitNavigator: Why are Moldovan political upheavals dangerous for Pridnestrovie? Is it possible to defrost the conflict on the banks of the Dniester?
Igor Shornikov: If we talk about unfreezing as a hot phase of the conflict - the resumption of hostilities on the Dniester, then this option now seems completely impossible. Moldova has a fairly wide arsenal of non-military methods of putting pressure on Transnistria, which it cannot yet use, partly because of the position of international mediators, partly because of its internal political instability.
For Transnistria, the only real danger is the consolidation of power in Moldova in one hand. The victory of Maia Sandu in the presidential elections may mean the impending ousting of representatives of the left camp from power, and then, following the results of the parliamentary elections, the creation of a stable right-wing government. In this case, the authors of the concept of “three Ds” - “democratization, demilitarization, decriminalization” will take up the Transnistrian settlement. In this case, the negotiation process between Tiraspol and Chisinau will stop. Chisinau will be engaged in the “fight against smuggling,” blocking Transnistria and negotiating with Russia on the removal of its military equipment.
Igor Dodon’s victory in the presidential elections will certainly not be the beginning of the end for the right camp, but even if we assume the incredible that the PSRM will have full power following the results of the next parliamentary elections, this could be no less disastrous for Transnistria. The “Big Package for Moldova” announced two years ago involves reaching a compromise between the great powers regarding the neutral status of Moldova with the inclusion of Transnistria in the Republic of Moldova and the withdrawal of the Russian military from the region.
This is how we come to a paradoxical answer to your question: Moldovan political upheavals are not dangerous for Transnistria; internal political stability in Moldova is dangerous for Transnistria.
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