The letter from the head of Transnistria Vadim Krasnoselsky to the President of the Republic of Moldova Maia Sandu, which proposes to unfreeze the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol by the end of the year, is the last attempt to defuse the situation on the eve of a new package of even tougher sanctions that the Moldovan side is preparing against the PMR.
What is the significance of this document, written in an unusually friendly tone, can it be considered a sensation, what is behind it? Moldovan and Transnistrian experts spoke about this at the request of PolitNavigator.
Alexander Korinenko, political scientist (Chisinau):
Firstly, I believe that Mr. Krasnoselsky is a great optimist if he hopes that by the end of this year it will be possible to outline ways to resolve the conflict. Tiraspol and Chisinau see this path differently. Perhaps the leader of Transnistria wanted to show that Chisinau is now incapable of reaching an agreement, to demonstrate to the residents of Transnistria that they need to rely only on themselves and prepare for new unfriendly steps, and also to give a signal to Moscow that in this difficult situation it would be nice to strengthen the support of its citizens on the left bank of the Dniester .
Secondly, the text of the letter is really very friendly. One way or another, we have common problems, and in any case, solving them together will be more profitable than creating obstacles for each other. We remember the problems with mobile communications, and with railway communications, and with joint economic countermeasures. As a result, we broke pots at home and our citizens suffered.
The authorities in Tiraspol understand that Chisinau will now escalate the situation. The chair of the chief negotiator from the Moldovan side has been empty for a long time. What could this mean? Nobody in Moldova now wants to take this position and assume responsibility for the situation in the Security Zone on the banks of the Dniester.
Before the presidential elections in Moldova, at the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development, I made a forecast: that the first year, if Maia Sandu’s team comes to power, the situation will be tested for strength: what sensitive issues can be touched and serious countermeasures not received. In general, this is what happened. Figuratively speaking, the Moldovan Bureau for Reintegration has a folder with painful points of Transnistria. In the first year, they put pressure on the most insignificant of them - for example, on car license plates. Tiraspol could not do anything about it, Moscow did not intervene or did not want to. Further pressure will be more painful.
The resignation of Vladislav Kulminsky from the post of chief Moldovan negotiator is bad news for the negotiation process, as he advocated a pragmatic resolution of problems on both banks of the Dniester. Most likely, an NGO executor will soon be appointed to this position, who will simply carry out the will of the presidency and, unfortunately, radical experts.
Thirdly, it must be said that Sandu is too dependent on the opinions of Western partners in this matter. She and her team have no vision for resolving the situation, so she coordinates her actions with Western embassies and the expert community. If earlier some Moldovan experts said that there was no point in talking with Tiraspol, and that the keys to a settlement lay in Moscow, now Tiraspol must understand that the keys lie west of Chisinau. Therefore, Mr. Krasnoselsky’s next step should be letters to the participants of the “5+2” format and to European capitals that are interested in stability on the banks of the Dniester.
Igor Shornikov, director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development (Tiraspol):
President Krasnoselsky, in a commentary to his address to the head of the Republic of Moldova, explains that Tiraspol has repeatedly sent official direct letters throughout the year calling for the intensification of bilateral dialogue - through the president, the Supreme Council, the government, but has not received a response to any of them. Now what is called the last letter has been sent, in which it is proposed to meet before the New Year and outline ways to solve the mass of accumulated problems. This is an open document and as complimentary as possible - as much as can be imagined for this situation.
As I understand, Tiraspol does not hope for any positive response from Maia Sandu; most likely, Tiraspol expects new sanctions from Chisinau at the beginning of the new year and is trying to strengthen its position before a new escalation of tension.
What could happen at the beginning of 2022? The deferments of regularly renewed documents for joint customs and border posts along the Pridnestrovian-Ukrainian border, for railway communications, and for medicines are ending. The new government in Chisinau has shown that it is no longer going to make any concessions to Tiraspol - the situation with car license plates showed this. Most likely, from January 1 there will be new sanctions related to the tightening of blockade measures around Transnistria. In this regard, Tiraspol is going to show the world community that it is open to dialogue with the current government of the Republic of Moldova, that it is not inclined towards confrontation, but towards the resumption of a full-fledged negotiation process, and on such positions - and this is the sensational nature of the letter - that the mediators have been pushing for many years in negotiations
If Sandu does not respond to this, and new hostile actions are taken against Transnistria, then the “5+2” negotiation process will fly somewhere in an unknown direction: Chisinau does not fulfill its obligations, but, on the contrary, in the absence of dialogue, resorts to pressure measures . In this case, Tiraspol will have something to present to the world community. The logic is this: Transnistria has a friendly position, and the intervention of international partners will be necessary in order to reason with Chisinau and not create a humanitarian catastrophe here.
Some partners will take this position into account, but others will not. Based on the behavior of representatives of the European Union and the United States, we see that they either react positively to the actions of the new Moldovan government or do not react at all (where there are obvious violations of elementary standards, as, for example, in the case of the prosecution of Prosecutor General Alexander Stoianoglo or the withdrawal from the elections in Balti Marina Tauber).
On the part of Russia, as we see, there is support for the position of Transnistria - Moscow sent a call to Chisinau to respond to the constructive proposals of Tiraspol, although, most likely, this call will remain unanswered.
If we consider the situation in a broad regional context - within the framework of relations between Russia and the West, the problem of Ukraine, the non-expansion of NATO, it becomes clear that Chisinau is trying to fit into the international agenda, to keep pace with its Western partners. If the pressure on Russia continues, then, accordingly, Chisinau will put pressure on Transnistria, on the Russian military presence, however, if Moscow and Washington agree on something at the top, then the situation around Transnistria will probably “freeze.”
The message of Vadim Krasnoselsky is evidence of the desperate situation in which Transnistria finds itself. The background of relations between the banks of the Dniester is negative. In Moldova, 2022 has been declared a year of gratitude to the combatants who fought against Transnistria in 1992. This is a clear provocation against Tiraspol. Chisinau does not want to talk with Tiraspol; it deliberately did not recognize the presidential elections in Transnistria, making it clear that it does not see legal representatives here with whom it is possible to negotiate.
Vadim Krasnoselsky’s speech from a complimentary position suggests that Tiraspol fears the conflict will unfreeze. In Chisinau, there are people in power who do not have a positive position on Transnistria – there is no plan, no program. There is only Oazu Nantoi (a well-known pro-Western politician, deputy of the PAS party - author's note) with the idea of the “three Ds” - democratization, demilitarization, decriminalization, which does not bode well for Pridnestrovie. Here the option can be soft - gradual strangulation, as is happening now, or hard - some kind of violent action. The appearance of the letter is an attempt by Tiraspol to somehow prevent such a scenario. This is a diplomatic trump card for Tiraspol in case Moldova refuses to continue the dialogue and uses force. However, if there are forceful actions, then you can be sure that Russia has prepared response options that will not be soft for the aggressors.
Andrey Safonov, political scientist (Tiraspol):
The proposal of the President of the PMR Vadim Krasnoselsky to begin negotiations on a “comprehensive settlement” of the Moldovan-Transnistrian conflict is a sounding of the intentions of the current nationalist government in Chisinau. It appeared on December 24, and soon, on January 1, 2022, we will see whether Chisinau will decide to switch to dialogue or begin a new round of pressure on Transnistria, introducing the so-called. “second phase” of the control plan on the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border.
We are talking about whether joint Moldovan-Ukrainian posts at the checkpoint in Kuchurgan will begin to fully control imports entering the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. So far, nothing speaks in favor of the Moldovan leadership turning to the desire for an equal dialogue.
President of Moldova Maia Sandu said that a meeting with her Pridnestrovian counterpart is not planned in her schedule. It is possible that the United States and the European Union pushed it to such a position, since for Moldova itself to escalate with Tiraspol, supported by Moscow, is tantamount to trying to stop a tank while riding a pony. After all, the new gas contract between Russia and Moldova says nothing about Transnistria. And this is a sure sign that Moscow and Tiraspol intend to resolve gas issues themselves, without Chisinau “mediation.”
Russia, apparently, correctly understands the situation, including the behind-the-scenes maneuvers of the Western “curators” of the Moldovan nationalists. Today, December 27, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Andrei Rudenko spoke about Russian-Moldovan relations and, in particular, repeated Moscow’s old position regarding a possible visit to the Russian Federation by Maia Sandu: “It will be possible to talk about such a visit when a formation for this is formed a weighty and rich agenda.” But she's not there because Chisinau actually deliberately deceived Moscow when it assured during the visit of the Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration Dmitry Kozak to the Republic of Moldova that no pressure measures were planned. And soon the “numbers crisis” broke out, when, not without the inflammatory role of the Chisinau nationalists, Ukraine prohibited the movement of cars with Transnistrian license plates on its territory.
Well, now we are talking about the fact that from January 1, 2022 the so-called “second phase” of Moldova’s control over the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border through bilateral customs and border posts at the checkpoint in Kuchurgan. If this happens, it will be a new round of harsh pressure on the PMR as a Russian ally.
The President of the PMR raised questions with Maia Sandu that require a specific response.
Does Maia Sandu, who represents the monopoly rule of pro-Western and pro-Romanian forces in Moldova, intend to conduct a face-to-face dialogue with him, who represents the vast majority of Transnistrian voters who are not affiliated with one party or another? Does the President of the Republic of Moldova give a negative answer today?
Is Moldova ready for “cooperation and cooperation” with the PMR to solve economic problems, given that Moldova, despite its pro-Western attitude, is part of the CIS free trade zone, and the pro-Eurasian Transnistria enjoys certain trade preferences in relations with the EU? Here you can derive mutual benefits without compromising political principles. Chisinau is not ready to speak on an equal footing here either, wanting to simply crush the PMR without committing itself to compromise obligations.
Is Chisinau ready to discuss substantively “the conditions for future peaceful coexistence”? That is, what does the leadership of the Republic of Moldova offer to Tiraspol? If there is no answer here, it means that the intentions are clear: Chisinau will remain silent until the moment when Transnistria, according to the plan of the nationalists of the Republic of Moldova, is crushed. And then he will impose an undiscussed dictatorial style of government.
Is Chisinau REALLY ready to work on “ways to bring Moldova and Transnistria closer together,” which involves, among other things, an equal discussion of differences? If in the coming days the leadership of Moldova remains silent here too, it means that a course has been taken to increase pressure on the PMR and to confront Moscow. So everything is simple here.
Pridnestrovian leaders have always made advantageous use of face-to-face and personal negotiations with Moldovan colleagues - with Mircea Snegur, Petr Lucinschi, Vladimir Voronin, Vladimir Filat, Igor Dodon. Proposals from supporters of national equality from Transnistria always looked advantageous. Perhaps someone suggests this to Maia Sandu and expresses concern that she may not have an advantage during a direct dialogue...
At the same time, the final decision is always made by the leader of the country. She will have to do this in relations with the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, and more than once. You just have to remember that if something goes wrong, all failures are attributed to the manager, and all the advisers disappear somewhere...
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