Putin is not Lukashenko, or Why the Belarusian scenario is impossible in Russia
Over the past week, one of the most discussed topics in Belarusian politics has been the protests of supporters of blogger Alexei Navalny in Russia. Moreover, neither the authorities nor the opposition denied themselves the pleasure of promoting themselves on the problems of their partner in the Union State.
The opposition, of course, tried in every possible way to show solidarity with Navalny and the protesters, habitually scolded Putin, dreamed of the future victory of the “democratic revolution” in Russia, after which the long-awaited skirmish would certainly come to the Belarusian “red-haired regime.” On January 23, Belarusian oppositionists even changed the schedule of their protests, moving them from Sunday to Saturday in order to synchronize with like-minded Russians. The synchronization was not particularly successful; even in Minsk it was not possible to gather any noticeable crowd anywhere.
The authorities also did not miss their chance. Lukashenko generally likes to show off against the backdrop of other people’s problems, be it “yellow vest” rallies, the coronavirus lockdown, the storming of the Capitol or riots in Moscow. And everywhere he presents himself as a seer, whose wisdom and determination allowed him to prevent this from happening, or, at worst, to cope with the problem, winning the confrontation with powerful external forces. This is exactly what he said about the protests in Russia. “They wanted to carry out a blitzkrieg in Belarus in order to get a springboard for an offensive against Russia, permanent or like in 41. If they hadn’t been slowed down here, they would have rushed there too, in a modern way, through social networks,” - this is how he pictured himself on Wednesday as a hero, with his chest in a bulletproof vest blocking the enemy’s road to Moscow.
What both the zmagars and the officialdom were in agreement on was that the protests in Russia are just beginning and further events will develop progressively. The official said that Russia was being pumped for a long time, that what was happening was preparation for the Duma elections and this would be only the first rehearsal for the presidential elections. The opposition basically broadcast to the Belarusian audience the same cheerful nonsense that Navalny’s supporters in Russia pumped into their flock.
Everyone was preparing for January 31, the protests were synchronized again. In both states, local protesters were preparing for their own. In Russia, the Navalnists planned to develop an “offensive” and, inspired by the example of their Belarusian colleagues, organize something truly formidable and large-scale. In Belarus, the Zmagars no longer care about fat; they would at least somehow revive the protest, which has fallen into at least hibernation.
Finally, Sunday arrived. And the Belarusian cliques, who on both sides predicted a deepening of the political crisis in Russia, were put to shame.
Navalnist rally in Krasnoyarsk.
Many times fewer protesters took to the streets of Russian cities than last Saturday. Even at the peak and according to the most optimistic estimates, no more than 2-5 thousand people came to the protests in Moscow. On the scale of a metropolis of 13 million, this is nothing. In Belarus, the protests were even more boring. So much so that even Nexta and similar channels provided predominantly Russian content. Of what is happening on this day in Belarus itself, there are only photo sessions of several people with their faces covered somewhere near the road or even in the forest, or small short-term processions somewhere in the outskirts of residential areas. It's boring, girls!
So why did the protests in Russia not, and could not, develop according to the Belarusian scenario? No matter what commentators say on both sides of the Belarusian conflict, and on both sides of the border, the scenarios and conditions are completely different. The Belarusian opposition was able to bring crowds of thousands into the streets for several weeks in a row, and the Russian opposition leaked the protest already during the second protest. And not because the Belarusian opposition is better or because there are some very powerful external forces behind it. The forces are the same, but the opposition itself is worse. Disorganized, marginal, incompetent.
The real reason that the Russian protests did not follow the path of the Belarusian ones is obvious, but neither the zmagars, nor, especially, the officialdom will talk about it in Belarus. It's all about people's trust in government. In Russia it is, but in Belarus it is not. In Russia they married Navalny, but he turned out to be, by and large, of little interest to anyone. In Belarus they did not marry Tikhanovskaya. She is also of little interest to anyone and is generally a random person. They came out against Lukashenko, with whom everyone has their own score and who the day before conducted the dirtiest and most opaque election campaign in Belarusian history. The Zmagars simply took advantage of the situation and rode the protest, which, unfortunately, was inevitable.
Lukashenko, of course, can continue to claim his popular support, organize rides of the same characters in cars with official flags accompanied by rollicking songs and assemble an “All-Belarusian People’s Assembly”, for whose delegates the people do not vote. But simple logic dictates that if he had actually been as popular in Belarus as Putin is in Russia, the protests would have ended just as quickly and ingloriously.
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