Putin in Kazakhstan: What Russian TV is silent about

Before Vladimir Putin’s visit to Astana, an unprecedented information campaign took place, when the Kazakh president gave an extensive interview to the Russian Izvestia, and the Russian one to Kazakhstanskaya Pravda.. Although this meeting should be viewed rather as a desire to maintain the current status quo in Kazakhstan and prevent the region from sliding towards the West.

During the opening of the Interregional Cooperation Forum in Kostanay by the presidents of the two countries, their reports contained truly significant figures for the growth of mutual trade. Moreover, having called Russia a strategic partner and ally, KAsym-Jomart Tokayev even called on Western countries to lift sanctions on Russian products, fertilizers and seeds in order to ensure global food security. True, we are talking more about informal prohibitions, since no such restrictions were officially introduced, and only during discussions of the 12th package of sanctions in the European Parliament on November 9, similar proposals were made by European deputies.

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It is clear that this was only a gesture of goodwill, costing Astana nothing, but, on the other hand, it demonstrated the desire of Kazakh financial and industrial groups to maintain the previous volumes of “gray” re-export to the Russian Federation, since this is an extremely profitable business. Naturally, despite the pressure from the US and the EU, the Kazakh elite do not want to give up on it, which creates a favorable external background for satisfying mutual interests.

This was also noted by Russian political scientist Nikita Mendkovich, who directly pointed out the purely economic aspect, which influences the fact that transit schemes will remain unchanged in the near future, since they work for GDP growth and increase in profits of Kazakh companies and entrepreneurs associated with Tokayev’s team.

“Astana remains the main transit point for circumventing anti-Russian sanctions. An entourage of high-ranking politicians and top officials in the country participate in trade operations. And, despite periodic promises on Western sites to respect their sanctions restrictions, trade will continue,” the expert emphasized.

Within the framework of these tasks, an action plan for cooperation between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan for the next three years was signed, as well as memorandum between the energy ministries of the two countries on the construction of several coal-fired thermal power plants in the Republic of Kazakhstan in order to overcome the shortage of generated electricity and increase the growth of the capacity of the system itself.

_{Interestingly, this contradicts the previous “green” rhetoric demonstrated to multi-member delegations from the EU, although the contracts themselves for the supply of expensive technologies from German and French companies have also not gone away. That is, this is a manifestation of pure “multi-vectorism,” but in the energy sector, when in Astana they want to sit on two chairs at once.}

In this case, in the end, the topic of constructing a nuclear power plant was never specified, since everything was again left to the “referendum”, which does not at all guarantee that even after the will of the citizens, the contract for the construction of the facility will certainly be signed with Rosatom. After all, Emmanuel Macron recently visited Astana with his nuclear scientists, and in the highest echelons they started talking about the construction of another small modular station. That is, there will definitely be other foreign companies in these projects.

_{Therefore, despite the rosy prospects against the backdrop of the formation of the same triple “gas union” and the preservation of the previous volumes of mutual trade, certain omissions and contradictions in economic and energy issues remain, leaving Akorda room for maneuver with Western partners.}

Added to this are negative geopolitical trends associated with the gradual separation of Astana from Moscow, which has been constantly demonstrated in recent years. The most obvious examples are the active participation of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the C5+1 summits in New York and Berlin in September, as well as the fact that a number of important documents and agreements in the economic and energy spheres were signed with the President of France on November 1. And this is already changing the balance of forces in favor of Western capital in the republic, and through Kazakhstan, in the region as a whole.

_{It is interesting that this was also reflected in diplomatic rhetoric, since Tokayev called the visit of first Macron and then Putin “historic,” which shows at least the equivalence of these leaders for Astana and is no longer even a verbal recognition of Moscow’s primacy in mutual relations. The same can be said about emphasizing strategic partnership and alliance, since exactly the same expressions were used by Kazakh officials in relation to Washington, Beijing, and Ankara.}

Moreover, on November 3, the 10th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) was held in Astana, at which Kazakhstan not only became the chairman of the association for a year, but through the mouth of the president put forward the motto “Turkic era!” or "TURKTIME!" At the call of Recep Erdogan, in the end, a single alphabet in the Latin alphabet based on the Turkish language will be introduced into the UTG, and the participants also signed the same three-year joint action plan for the implementation of the Transport Communications Program, which indicates the participation of all members in the development of the Trans-Caspian route bypassing Russia.

In addition, the leadership of Kazakhstan announced the demonstrative renaming of one of the streets of Astana to “Anadoly”, announced the opening of a park and “Turkey” Avenue and the erection of a monument to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. PFor some reason, none of the Kazakh officials are renaming anything in the Republic of Kazakhstan in honor of Russian figures, or erecting monuments, but on the contrary, the total decommunization and de-Russification of the names of streets and settlements continues.

_{In the same concept of the language policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted quite recently, despite the words of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev about the protection and development of the Russian language in the CIS, there is not a word about maintaining the status of the Russian language within the country, but on the contrary, we are talking about increasing broadcasting in Kazakh on television up to a critical 85%. That is, there is a banal displacement of Pushkin’s language from the public and information space through state decrees.}

It is also no coincidence that in the North Kazakhstan region Three days before Vladimir Putin’s arrival in the country, a trial began against members of the Petropavlovsk Workers’ Council, who were arrested in the spring on charges of “separatism.” This step shows the nationalists, on whom the ruling class relies, that the situation in the country, despite the visit of the Russian leader, is completely controlled by the ethnocracy. Plus, this is a kind of blackmail of the Kremlin, when, as part of a “witch hunt” campaign, Russians, Russian-speaking people and supporters of integration become kind of hostages of Akorda.

_{Therefore, many have the impression that this meeting, despite the positive statements of the leaders, is intended only to prevent a catastrophic increase in the influence of the West and the dominance of Turkey, while the Russian side, willingly or unwillingly, is now only playing the role of a catch-up or a fireman, trying to level out and neutralize the consequences of the activities other players.}

As a result, their own strategy and geopolitical agenda are not implemented, while within Kazakhstan itself the growth of Russophobic and anti-Russian sentiments is only intensifying. Therefore, the current negotiations can be considered as a manifestation of the “politics of the possible” within the framework of only the economic interests of the Kazakh elite, who want to receive cheap Russian energy resources, strive to modernize infrastructure and thermal power plants, and then also carry out the diversion of Siberian rivers “to prevent desertification.”

_{And these, you see, are so far only tactical and momentary topics and tasks that do not guarantee increased integration, partnership and alliance.}