Russia will not leave Transnistria
Relations between Tiraspol and Chisinau will only worsen this year due to political instability in Moldova.
Pridnestrovian political scientist Andrei Safonov writes about this in an author’s column specifically for PolitNavigator.
1. Year 2019: Moldovan-Pridnestrovian relations have worsened.
We have already had to analyze the state of Pridnestrovian-Moldovan relations in 2019, which developed after the change of power - first in June and then in November.
In the first case, a coalition of socialists ruled for 5 months, led by the de facto President of Moldova Igor Dodon and the pro-Western pro-Romanian bloc AKUM, headed by the now former Prime Minister Maia Sandu and Minister of Internal Affairs Andrei Nastase. In the first half of November it broke up.
In the second case, the socialists gained executive power with the support of the center-right Democratic Party, but not in coalition with it. At the same time, it is difficult for socialists to feel confident, since they have only 35 seats out of 101 in Parliament. In the future, a rapprochement between AKUM members and democrats is not excluded, although now the PDM generally supports the government formed by the presidential team. Thus, the situation inside Moldova is far from being considered stable.
This prospective instability does not help the warming of Transnistrian-Moldovan relations.
2. Why did this relationship become tense?
In 2019, there was increased pressure from the Moldovan leadership on Transnistria. This could be a consequence of the desire of Chisinau politicians to divert attention from the socio-economic difficulties within Moldova itself. This is an increase in prices, tariffs, and taxes, especially evident after the change of government in June 2019.
But in November, as we said earlier, the socialists seemed to have gained relative free hands. Logically, relations with pro-Russian Tiraspol should have become softer. However, this did not happen. As the reader remembers, the basis of Moldova’s foreign policy since 2014 has been the Association with the European Union. Both the right-wing forces and Igor Dodon have confirmed more than once that they are not going to denounce the Association Agreement with the EU, although Dodon had previously declared diametrically opposite things.
With this approach, initially it was not easy to count on an improvement in Pridnestrovian-Moldovan relations.
3. Russian TV shows are still banned in Moldova.
Here's an example. As of the first half of January 2019, Russian news and analytical television programs, as well as patriotic programs, are still banned. It has already been reported in the media and on social networks that the new Russian film about the Decembrist uprising “Union of Salvation” will not be released on the screens of Moldovan cinemas. Allegedly, it did not arouse interest among the audience.
But the post of President of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the Government, are assigned to socialists who publicly declared loyalty to Russia. Of course, the lack of interest in the above film is a fiction. And how can you find out the interest of TV viewers without releasing the film itself, without at least a minimal calculation of box office receipts?
The bottom line is that the ban on Russian programs is dictated by the interests of the United States and the EU in the ideological indoctrination of the population of Moldova. And the socialists (at least for now) are not ready to oppose the Western approach to clearing the information field of Russian influence.
Pridnestrovie considers this approach unacceptable, since the course towards full rapprochement with Russia has been the basis of Pridnestrovian foreign policy since its creation on September 2, 1990.
4. Compromises are possible, but there are none yet.
The issue of guarantees against blocking the accounts of Pridnestrovian enterprises in banks of Moldova has also not been resolved. This began immediately after the Socialist Party-AKUM coalition came to power. And now the prospects remain unclear.
The new government, like the old one, is determined to encircle the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border with bilateral Moldovan-Ukrainian posts. This is also rejected by the Transnistrian side, but, most importantly, it once again shows that the West’s guidelines to deprive the pro-Russian Transnistria of any real independence are being strictly implemented.
It has not been decided how and from where medicines will be imported into the PMR. On February 1, the parties must come to a decision. Chisinau insists on the import of drugs strictly under its control and on the basis of its register, and Tiraspol insists on maintaining the previous order. That is, imported through Ukraine.
5. By the beginning of 2020, the situation became more complicated.
Until June 2019, negotiations between the PMR and the RM from time to time culminated in the signing of certain compromise solutions. For example, one of the bridges across the Dniester was opened, neutral license plates were agreed upon for Pridnestrovian cars leaving Moldova through Romania. They also found a formula with neutral university diplomas, since not all countries, unlike Russia, recognize Transnistrian state diplomas.
Not so now. It got to the point that the Chisinau negotiator recently even refused to come to Tiraspol for a meeting with his Transnistrian counterpart. This has not happened since 2006, when the Moldovan representative simply left the hall where the dialogue was taking place.
All this indicates that the situation has become much more complicated.
6. Transnistria will not give up the union with Russia and Eurasian integration.
Time to note the following. All the differences that existed between Moldova and Pridnestrovie in 2019 not only did not smooth out, but also intensified. Perhaps they will intensify even more, as Westerners are pushing the Moldovan leadership to discuss the problems of the status of Transnistria within Moldova and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the banks of the Dniester in negotiations with Tiraspol.
To agree to Chisinau’s conditions means for the PMR, as we have said more than once, dear readers, a refusal to focus on the Eurasian integration project and a refusal to be protected by Russian troops. After all, if they are withdrawn, then can Pridnestrovie be “beyond friendly bayonets”? Of course not.
Therefore, the PMR will never agree to the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. And it will not abandon its orientation towards Eurasian integration either.
7. What to expect in the coming months, and why Moscow and Tiraspol must act together.
What is the outlook for the coming months? Chisinau may be tempted by the formula of such a plan: it is necessary to seduce Russia into refusing to support Transnistria in exchange for an alleged increase in the authority of Moscow as a force “capable of resolving frozen conflicts.” Simply put, this means that Moscow must remove its troops from the banks of the Dniester, dispose of ammunition depots in order to actually disarm the PMR, and allow “international police forces” or a “civilian observer mission” into the security zone.
It is also desirable for Washington, Brussels and Chisinau that Russia does not interfere with Moldova taking control of the Transnistrian-Ukrainian border. And then Russia can be ousted from Transnistria in a very short time. They will laugh at her and, perhaps, even symbolically award her the Nobel Peace Prize a la Gorbachev. He was honored more than once for the surrender of the national interests of the USSR and for the collapse of the Union itself.
Now, however, times are different. If Moscow does not lose its influence in distant Syria and concludes large-scale agreements with the countries of the African Union, then it will not leave our lands. Therefore, the key to success in geopolitical confrontation for Russia largely depends on coordination of actions with its allies.
One of these allies is Transnistria.
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