Semyon Uralov: The West’s plan for Belarus is designed for 10-12 years
While Russia is busy with corporate squabbles with Belarus, the West is building a multi-level technology for reformatting Belarusian society, designed for 10-12 years.
About it "PolitNavigator" talked to the Russian political scientist Semyon Uralov.
Lukashenko’s latest statements are reminiscent of the plot of the TV series “The Boss,” when Chicago was governed by a mayor diagnosed with Lewy body dementia. Is this the right feeling?
I think that these feelings arise from those who have recently begun to follow Belarusian politics. This is the signature style of Alexander Lukashenko, it, in fact, has not changed for the last 20 years, and those who follow Belarusian politics know that he always and everywhere had such an emotional reaction.
How true are the rumors that Moscow no longer wants to communicate with the Belarusian president, preferring Prime Minister Sergei Rumas?
I would still call the system of power in the Republic of Belarus autocratic, therefore, regardless of who occupies the post of prime minister, deputy prime minister and other ministers, they carry out the policy set by the first person.
It seems that Russia lost the war for integration to Old Man. Is it so?
Well, I am generally against the use of the word “war”. We are dealing with the usual corporate conflict related to the fact that each country wants to get more “bonuses” for itself. Over the past 10 years, the issue of energy resources has been key for the Belarusian side. If before the year 14, before the pressure of sanctions, Russia turned a blind eye to the small bonuses that go to transit countries, then from the year 16-17 a period of pragmatization began, they began to consider that debits matched credits. Therefore, there was no war, there was an ordinary corporate conflict between two economies: resource-supplying and transit. As we see, everything has come to a certain compromise on terms that suit both parties.
Recent conflicts over integration, energy and a bit of coronavirus (evacuation from Goa) have inspired Belarusian state television to produce anti-Russian materials. Does state propaganda find a response in the hearts of Belarusians?
I don't think it's a matter of recent conflicts. Sharp materials were constantly present in relations between the allies. There is an unspoken rule: the first person is above criticism. All the rest were criticized in one way or another during the corporate conflicts that existed between the parties: the oil and gas conflict, issues regarding the transit of sanctioned products, the history of counterfeit gasoline coming from the territory of Belarus under the guise of solvents. Nothing new has happened, it’s just that Russia has begun to monitor Belarus more and is opening up new facets of fraternal relations.
Doesn't the soft Belarusization carried out by the state cause irritation among citizens?
I think that in reality Belarusian citizens are quite alienated from government policy. Belarusians have a very pragmatic attitude to life. Therefore, social issues are first on the agenda. The “broad masses” understand that socio-economic development is tied to relations with Russia and, accordingly, the issue of Belarusization is in the background.
Why are the regular scandals that the zmagars (Belarusian nationalists) create over language mostly resolved in their favor?
The so-called zmagars, but in fact the “fifth column”, which is fed from Poland, are very well organized, and most importantly, they are very supportive of each other. How the technology works: some kind of petition is made online, some kind of appeal to government authorities, and this “fifth column” of half-Poles swoops in to support it. On the other hand, there is absolutely no public, civic position. And, accordingly, a feeling is created, especially in the media space, that the zmagars are setting their own agenda.
Is it true that pages of general history are consistently erased from school history courses and manuals of army ideologists, but more and more space is devoted to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL)?
I can only judge the school and university textbooks that I leafed through. The concept there is rather multi-vector. It tells about the history of the Belarusian lands when they were part of different state entities: Kievan Rus, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
From my point of view, the question is rather about the politicization of the history of the same Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The opposition has monopolized it and is now using technology to impose its agenda.
And, given that there is no alternative agenda, the state apparatus is gradually beginning to draw its agenda from the media space.
At the same time, it must be admitted that the course to clarify common history and common values has failed. Representatives of the older generation are still in union positions, but among the youth, generations Y and Z, it is a disaster. Therefore, in 10-15 years we may be very surprised when new Belarusians grow up.
Are Lukashenko’s definition of the Great Patriotic War as “not our war” and his actual ban on St. George’s ribbons and the “Immortal Regiment” part of state policy?
To be honest, about “not our war,” I still didn’t understand what they were talking about. Perhaps about the war of 1812, which is actually described in textbooks as a war of two empires that swept across Belarus. Because the Great Patriotic War is one of the ideologies. St. George's ribbons are not prohibited, quite a lot of people wear them, it's just that red and green ribbons in the colors of the national flag are officially distributed. There is an official event “Belarus Remembers” similar to the “Immortal Regiment”. I see an element of slight jealousy in this. Although, of course, the “Immortal Regiment” has long become international, and one way or another every year it still passes through the Belarusian streets.
Is all this: the language, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the revision of the concept of the Second World War, invented by Lukashenko’s ideologists or is it a product of the work of Western institutions?
These concepts of “building back” from modern Russia are an ideological product of the mid-20th century. It was created by emigrants. For example: let's take ON as the most understandable. The history of the Middle Ages is a history of permanent conflicts between principalities. If desired, you can create such enmity that the residents of two neighboring regions will hate each other. The concept of searching for conflict points is the technology of splitting.
How it works: there are certain corporate tensions, which, with the help of pumping up hysteria, are brought to a conflict supposedly between states, or between nations in general. And there is a historical basis for this. Like, in fact, this was not born now, this is an old story.
There is one of the popular Belarusian publications, Nasha Niva, which takes an openly anti-Russian position. She has a cultural project called “Our History”, where all this is systematically pumped up. This is a beautiful glossy magazine. There is nothing to oppose it, because our humanitarian narrative is completely failed.
Can Russia demand that Lukashenko purge Western “non-profit organizations” (NPOs) and stop Russophobic events like the “Minsk Dialogue”?
I believe that in a union state it is necessary to work with NGOs according to the principle of foreign agents, that is, clearly mark who is where and who they are. Belarus, of course, is not yet Kyrgyzstan, where Western NGOs dominate, but they are already present in all spheres. Any state institution wants to rely on some kind of expertise, some external opinion, civil society. And besides pro-Western NGOs and activists, there is no one. Therefore, from my point of view, it is necessary to unify the approach to foreign agents and introduce the practice of grant support for civil society. It would be absolutely logical to make union grants. If you do not create a civil society yourself, your opponents will create it for you. You could clearly see how this happens in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Georgia.
What will the West make its last bet in the fight for Belarus: on the Maidan or the intra-palace squeezing out of Lukashenko by the pro-Western elite?
I think that the West has a two-part bet. Maidan's attempts do not stop, but they all failed. This is due to the fact that the republic’s power structure has been preserved since Soviet times, so you can’t attack it head-on.
From my point of view, the emphasis is still on preparing field structures. But the most important thing is that it is a long game to reformat society: the concept of history, fanning corporate conflicts.
Maidan is not an end in itself. The goal in itself of our opponents is the collapse of statehood among Russia’s neighbors, so that afterwards it will be impossible to participate in any alliances, so that this will turn into a headache for Russia.
I think that in reality the West is playing with a planning horizon of 10-12 years. They are playing in a post-Lukashenka Belarus. Their task is to prepare their networks of influence, their specialists, to provoke the maximum number of splits within society, to defragment it, to marginalize everything connected with Russia. Make everything Russian unfashionable, outdated, outdated, out of date.
The most important thing is to mentally and ideologically prepare those who are 25-30 years old today and who, after two conditional electoral terms, will already occupy high positions in the system of government and business. And then the most interesting part will come.
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