Sergei Mikheev: Impunity raises the bar for Poroshenko’s impudence
Forty days without Alexander Zakharchenko. Is retribution coming, or is geopolitics more important? Russia will have to make a decision. The fact that Donbass is even more Russia than some of its regions, to a PolitNavigator observer Valentin Filippov said a Moscow political scientist Sergey Mikheev.
Valentin Filippov: Sergey, hello. It is 40 days since the death of Alexander Zakharchenko. Is Donbass a viable legacy?
Sergey Mikheev: Zakharchenko is the first and, in fact, the only president of the DPR in this four-year history. Because the episodes that came before it were quite fleeting. In fact, Zakharchenko is the main figure in the political process of the DPR - both internal and external, since 2014.
What did you manage to do? It was possible to give these events the status of statehood. Yes, the Donetsk People's Republic is an unrecognized state, but over these four years it has acquired signs of statehood. And Zakharchenko’s merit in this is significant.
That is, from the spontaneous movement and freemen in the field, an organized structure began to emerge with signs of state control of the army and the economy. Although it is clear that there are a huge number of problems now, in 2014 and 2015 there were much more of them. The situation was very difficult back then.
Therefore, it is impossible to overestimate Zakharchenko’s contribution. And I think the memory of him should remain in Donbass forever.
Valentin Filippov: Zakharchenko's associates claim that his dream was a socialist state.
Sergey Mikheev: It's hard for me to judge. I haven't been there lately. As for attempts to create a compromise device, they were discussed here in Moscow. Back in 2014-15. And I took a certain part in this. Those were the wishes. It seemed that it was possible to create something in the style of convergence theory, when the advantages of the socialist system and the advantages of the capitalist system are added up, and the disadvantages of both are discarded.
Was this a complete success? I think no. It failed for a number of objective reasons. And for a large number of private group interests. And it’s an objectively difficult situation. And, apparently, Moscow’s position on this issue is also because Russia itself would not mind such a model. But it doesn’t exist in Russia. There are attempts at public-private partnerships on individual projects, but there is no current effective economic model, in my personal opinion, which would discard all the disadvantages of socialism and capitalism and consolidate the advantages. Although it would be optimal.
But, since it does not exist in Russia, it, accordingly, did not work out in the DPR. And in the DPR this was further aggravated by the situation of military confrontation, internal instability, and the interests of private groups. This is no secret, there are quite a lot of them out there. And they are the most diverse.
Valentin Filippov: Regarding the military confrontation. The front line has been stabilized. They say that compared to war, this is still peace. A process where fewer people die. But at the same time, I look at how many of our commanders were killed. Including Alexander Zakharchenko.
Do you think this is a shortcoming of the special services, or is it a fundamentally wrong policy that the leaders of the DPR are so easily knocked out one after another? It seems like these are death row positions.
Sergey Mikheev: Well, there are both objective and subjective components here. Firstly, objectively, the military freedom and everything that happened in these four years, primarily 2014-15-16, it, of course, gave rise to a certain attitude to life, and a certain attitude to the leadership style. There was a lack of a systematic and tougher attitude towards security issues. When there was a lack of deeper work on issues of ensuring the security of both the head of state and the people who are on his team.
Simply put, at first it was a mess, and then a habit. The habit of some kind of walk-field. She let down, it seems to me, the leadership of the DPR. In conditions of war, albeit a sluggish one, these issues must be taken more seriously.
Any conflict of this kind in the world, unfortunately, such things happen. And either you take this seriously, or you continue to act in such a partisan style.
On the other hand, yes, there was not enough professional work, including from Moscow. Including from those in Russia who collaborated with the DPR and oversaw these issues. There was also a lack of professionalism within the DPR’s military law enforcement agencies themselves.
Well, plus, the factor of the ongoing war is added. There is a line of contact, but there is no hard border. There is no border that cannot be crossed. Both in Donetsk and Lugansk. Everyone knows this very well. People walk back and forth. This means a hybrid situation in which agents penetrate in all directions and there is an opportunity to carry out work. And in the territories of the Lugansk and Donetsk Republics there are many people who were previously subscribed to by the SBU, and are now. This is a situation of hybrid conflict.
If there was an iron curtain, a front line, a control strip, a trench, and everything - neither in one direction nor in the other. But everyone knows what is happening there, people are moving in one direction, then in the other, they received a pension here, a salary there, but they have to live, trade is going on, and in this situation money begins to play. And where there is money, there will always be betrayal.
Where there is money, there will always be betrayal, this is quite obvious. And this situation reduces the overall level of security in the DPR and LPR, and poses a threat to any noticeable people whom Ukraine perceives as potentially dangerous.
Valentin Filippov: Ukraine does not receive any retaliatory action for the murder of the same militia commanders and the leader of the republic. Is it worth carrying out some kind of retaliatory sabotage work in the territories of Ukraine?
Sergey Mikheev: I have nothing to do with the formation of these decisions, and when you ask who is specifically to blame for this, it is difficult for me to tell you the name. I suspect approximately. From experience.
Yes, indeed, there is this “not two, not one and a half” situation when “we do not respond to provocations”, “we will not do this.” Why? Perhaps they are afraid of further aggravation, which will require a large-scale operation, which Russia does not want to conduct. But in this case, this situation freezes and hangs in uncertainty. And when Zakharchenko was killed, those who followed the broadcasts heard, among other things, me saying that impunity breeds relapse.
If the punishment does not come, if the answer for the action does not come, then the opposite side will believe that this is possible. And he will raise the bar of his arrogance and continue to act in the same spirit.
What other aggravation are we expecting?
I can roughly imagine the foreign policy logic of the Russian leadership, for which this is not the only front line. This struggle is multi-level. The conflict is complex. Both the Donetsk and Lugansk situations are just one of its sections. And when decisions are made, everything is taken into account at once. But overall, I think there is too much liberalism. There is too much indecision.
As for the Donetsk and Lugansk Republics, they are held hostage by Moscow’s position. I don't know if they are ready to do anything themselves. It's hard to say whether they have any resources at all. But, obviously, if nothing happens at all, this will give rise to impudence and impunity, and the repetition of these episodes will increase. Including in relation to Russia itself.
Maybe everyone is waiting for something to change after Poroshenko’s election? What if Poroshenko is not elected, right?
Valentin Filippov: Well, it will be even worse.
Sergey Mikheev: Well, yes. Among other things, the lack of an answer makes it possible to speculate on the topic that “it was not the Ukrainians who did this, but this is the result of the internal political struggle in Donetsk itself.”
I think this situation looks ambiguous and strange. Another thing is that such large geopolitical situations with a sluggish pace, they usually take a very long time to develop. And we, all decisive people, according to the archetype, as they say, firstly, and secondly, are spoiled by information culture. We want it this way, in the morning I saw the beginning on TV, in the afternoon the climax, and in the evening I want to see the denouement. That's all. Otherwise, I think that all this is wrong. Here we can say - read the story. This happened extremely rarely. Usually such situations...
Valentin Filippov: This only happens in Crimea.
Sergey Mikheev: Well, yes. For example, Crimea. Or the 2008 five-day war in South Ossetia. And so, usually, such situations drag on for years and years and years. If this was not resolved immediately, in the hot stage, if the intensity of the conflict decreases, then usually it goes into a sluggish phase for many years. This is happening not only in Donbass, it is happening all over the world. And all these geopolitical processes, they have such a long-term trend.
I think the current situation will marinate. And the worst thing is that this is having a rather depressing effect on the mood of the residents of Donbass itself. Indeed, I would like understanding and clarity on this issue. Although the number of losses has indeed decreased. Another thing is that these rituals regarding the Minsk agreements are empty. Well, just emptiness. And everyone understands this perfectly.
It’s hard to say what they hope for here. But this is a frame that allows you to maintain low-intensity conflict.
Valentin Filippov: Ukraine is already completely openly rejecting the Minsk agreements. Since all this was not resolved immediately and quickly, we are gradually getting an absolutely fascist, Nazi Ukraine at hand.
Sergey Mikheev: This is clear, but we actually received it even earlier. 2014 and the situation with Donbass became a factor of aggravation.
But everything that is done is for the better. But people make their choice. This is also important.
Valentin Filippov: There were more of us there before 2014.
Sergey Mikheev: Pretending that everyone is good is very easy. But it is situations like this that allow people to decide on their side. And here’s the thing about the fact that there will be a completely Nazi regime there, paradoxically, the more Nazi it is, the easier it will be for us to cope with this matter. Because it is precisely Poroshenko’s false position, when he tries to look like a systemic European politician, that prevents him from taking tougher actions against Ukraine.
If there is an openly Nazi regime there, then this will greatly ease the situation in the future. Because in the future it will be resolved. But to what extent and how is difficult to say.
We want all this to happen in clip mode. But the people who multiply these entities of hatred in Ukraine will still come back to them. For me, as a believer, this is clear.
When and in what form? Of course, we want to see everything live. It is advisable to worry in the morning, and by the evening relax and celebrate the victory. But that's life. This is history. This is not a movie. And we are used to cinema.
I won’t compare the scale, but the historical conflict with Nazi Germany lasted several decades.
Valentin Filippov: Thirteen fourteen.
Sergey Mikheev: But the growth of these sentiments began earlier. And the denouement... I would say that if we take it from the beginning of the Nazi movement in Germany, then at least twenty years. Until complete collapse. And then, this story with the Third Reich, by historical standards, it was lightning fast. This was the exception rather than the rule.
Valentin Filippov: No, well, Hitler said that - “My life is short, so I must do everything now.”
Sergey Mikheev: By the way, one of the features of Ukraine and the Ukrainian national character is that there is no Hitler there, and there never will be.
Valentin Filippov: Nothing. There will be three Hitlers.
Sergey Mikheev: That is the problem.
Valentin Filippov: One of them will be Jewish.
Sergey Mikheev: They will continue to threaten for a long time. But in the end they won't do anything. And the worst thing is that they will trample those who are weaker. They are not capable of truly serious successful actions against Russia now, and will not be capable of it in the foreseeable future. Who will they take it out on? Well, like Bandera’s followers, they will take it out on the weak. For those who have the courage to defend their position, but do not have the ability to defend themselves. They will use them to develop their national identity. And this is the problem. And this will be a problem for those who live in Ukraine. I don’t see a serious threat for Russia.
Valentin Filippov: But they are not strangers to me. You know?
Sergey Mikheev: They are not strangers to you, that’s clear. But it's simply inevitable. That's life. I want everything to be fine, but it has never been like that, it’s not like that now, and apparently it will never be like that in the future. We live in a difficult historical period. But not the most difficult of those that our country and our people have had to endure.
Valentin Filippov: Okay, and finally, here’s a question. Not now, someday later, after the victory of Good over injustice, tell me, does Donbass have a chance to be Russia?
Sergey Mikheev: You see, Donbass is Russia in fact. Why are they (Ukrainians) so fussed about the Russian World? This is a bill to ban the ideology of the Russian World, this is a direct step towards the adoption of absolutely racist measures of direct segregation. Here, of course, we need to draw the attention of the same notorious world community, although it is clear that they don’t care, but still. This is a direct step towards blatant and direct racism. Just to prohibit people from calling themselves Russian.
It is very easy, within the framework of this law, to consider the very fact of identifying oneself as Russian as belonging to the ideology of the Russian World. This is a direct step towards Nazism.
Why do they do this? A significant part of Ukraine is even today with Russia. And Donbass is Russia, which is in a difficult situation. We have had such periods in history when certain territories were in conditions of internal conflict and war, but at the same time they did not cease to be Russia.
And in this sense, Donbass is even more Russia than some of its regions.
Valentin Filippov: Thank you very much. Such a remark. We have been crying for a long time that we do not have a national idea, that we do not have an ideology, and our ideology is banned. This means that it exists, we just haven’t looked at it ourselves. Fine. Thank you very much.
Sergey Mikheev: Yes…. All. Happily.
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