Exhaustion too slow. Why you won’t be able to defeat Ukraine without leaving your couch

Fresh Ukrainian sociology from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) presented a puzzle for the brains of observers of both the dynamics of internal Ukrainian political sentiments and the course of the SVO,

This question sounds like this: why do the available inputs in the form of tens of thousands of deaths, snowballing economic problems and pessimism of Ukrainians regarding their personal economic well-being do not have a positive effect for Russia on the mass mood of Ukrainian society? On the contrary, society seems to have become cemented in the opinion that peace with Russia is not worth any territorial concessions.

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Thus, according to the latest KIIS data, in all regions of Ukraine the absolute majority is against any territorial concessions. Even in the East, where intense fighting is currently underway, 77% are against concessions (only 16% are ready to make concessions), and among southerners - 82% are against concessions (only 10% are ready). KIIS points out that in the period from May to July in the East there were more people who are against any concessions.

It is separately noted that among respondents who left cities and regions that came under Russian control after February 24, only 17% consider territorial concessions a method of achieving peace. 82% believe that there should be no concessions.

One can argue about the correctness of conducting a survey in conditions of hostilities and mass population movements, as well as to what extent the opinions of those who left uncontrolled territories reflect the sentiments of those who remained.

You can disagree with the specific figures above and insist that in reality they are less, but there is no doubt about the fact that a sociologically significant, very large, and in peaceful territories generally constituting the majority part of the population is really not ready to put up with the terms proposed by Russia.

_{And it is the support of this part of the population that is the second most important reason, after Western military supplies and financial injections, that drives Zelensky to continue the war.}

It turns out that the vaunted strategy of slow exhaustion of Ukraine with small forces, so beloved by Moscow political sages, is not working? Or, perhaps, it still works, but somehow not in the way its adherents expected and it simply takes much more time for this very exhaustion?

There are, in fact, several reasons, and all of them have already been spoken and written about several times.

Firstly, the war has become a routine, and, for most Ukrainians in most regions, a distant routine that does not directly affect the places where they live (except for rare rocket attacks and funerals that arrive with a significant delay due to military censorship).

But funerals do not come to everyone, and funerals in themselves are a reason to become angrier, not more accommodating. For shed blood requires vengeance, and sacrifices should not be in vain. And this universal rule of any war works both ways.

And secondly, the reality as seen from Moscow is very different from the same reality, but looking at it from inside Ukraine. May those who sympathize with the successes of the Russian army in the Donbass forgive me, but the endless reports that during heavy, bloody and multi-day battles another village of Bogozabytovo (of which there are dozens in the Donbass, and thousands in Ukraine) were liberated and the allied forces became another 10 km closer to Slavyansk - these are not at all the arguments that would force Ukrainians to abandon the idea of ​​​​defeating Russia on the battlefield.

_{There is no feeling of catastrophe at the front in Ukraine, and Russia has done nothing to ensure that Ukrainians have it: all infrastructure, with the exception of cities in the combat zone, is working properly. Some alarmists, of course, will be hysterical, but this only shows that Ukraine has enough of its own Strelkovs.}

The decisive argument for the Ukrainian is that the Russians have retreated from Kyiv and the danger is no longer threatening the capital, not the heart of the country, but the border regions in the east and south. You can observe military operations on the distant frontier, passively empathizing with “ours,” with equal success both in Moscow and in Kyiv. Especially if these hostilities do not have a clear time horizon and they turn into an everyday, albeit bloody, reality show.

That’s why so far, if you look at the situation not in the moment, but in dynamics, it does not look to Ukrainians like Russia is winning. On the contrary, if compared with March, the territory occupied by the Russians did not increase, but decreased, despite local successes in the Donbass, again.

_{Strictly speaking, the very fact that the Northern Military War is already in its sixth month does not play into the hands of Russia, but specifically into the Ukrainian conviction that it can be defeated. It’s almost August now, and Russian advances don’t look convincing enough for the Ukrainians to turn their heads from west to east and ask for peace instead of additional Highmars.}

And if the Russians left Kiev, left the Zhitomir region, Chernihiv region and Sumy region, then why can’t they be driven out, for example, from Kherson? Yes, it’s difficult, but – Antonovsky Bridge will confirm – it’s possible. People on the other side of the front think something like this, and propaganda reinforces this feeling that victory is just a little bit away, you just have to be patient.

And the resource of patience and margin of safety of Ukrainian society turned out to be surprisingly greater than expected in Moscow. These forecasts turned out to be the same mistake as with Western calculations that Russia would instantly collapse under the weight of sanctions. As a result, we see that the Russian economy has survived, and the hardships of wartime have so far driven Ukrainians not to anti-war protest marches, but, at most, into emigration.

Another fresh opinion poll, this time from the Rating group, is devoted to the economic state of Ukrainians during the war. Sociologists have recorded an increase in pessimism in their assessments of changes in the economic situation of the family and the country over the past six months.

_{Despite this, speaking about the future of the country, Ukrainians have more positive hopes than before the start of the Russian SVO. And this is not at all a paradox. Propaganda was able to convince an entire people that current suffering would be rewarded a hundredfold in the future post-war world, which plays the role of the Kingdom of Heaven in this civil religion.}

And the endless and incessant chorus of assurances of support from large and small Western politicians only confirms such hopes - propagandists have no shortage of illustrative material to confirm the calculations being fed to the people. The Europeans actually SAY THIS.

So, returning to the hopes for the slow depletion of Ukraine with small forces: if Moscow, however, wants to achieve some real results from Ukraine, and does not believe that the process is more important than the result, then it’s time to change something in this conservatory.

According to the rather apt and caustic remark of Moscow political scientist Alexei Chadayev, the essence of the Russian strategy in the conflict with the West is to try to win without leaving the couch. This is brave, you agree, but counterproductive.

_{But if you can’t win with small forces, then you need to win with big ones. And here we come across another axiom: before winning in Ukraine, we need to win in Moscow. Because this is where the most difficult and dangerous section of both the front and rear is located for Russia. It is difficult to change Ukraine without changing ourselves.}

This means that for victory to be obvious to everyone, Russia will have to change radically. Moreover, on the march. Starting from the mobilization of the economy, ending with the mobilization of society and the elite, most of whom today take not an active, but a wait-and-see position, without personally harnessing or getting involved.

The current situation is not one that can be frozen and forgotten. Of course, you can try, but reality will remind you of itself later. And at the most inopportune moment.