Tashkent, under Western influence, is scrapping Putin’s “gas union” project

Apparently, the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev has decided, if not to break, then to sharply cool relations with the Russian leadership, refusing both the creation of a triple “gas union” and participation in the recent EAEU summit.

This is a sensitive blow to integration processes in the post-Soviet space and Central Asia, especially since Uzbekistan has observer status in the EAEU, and has recently become a destination for large Russian investments. The current demarche of the Uzbek leader is of great importance taking into account the hopes placed on Tashkent by Moscow and Beijing.

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At the same time, the local press noted that the refusal to visit the summit in neighboring Kyrgyzstan was dictated precisely by deterioration of relations between the Central Asian republics and Moscow due to well-known events in Ukraine. That is, it was demonstrated to the West that this step is a sign of loyalty to the Anglo-Saxons and the commitment of the Uzbek elite to further distance itself from Russia.

Let us recall that at the end of November, during the visit of Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Moscow Vladimir Putin proposed forming a triple alliance of Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan “to resolve issues in the gas sector.” The main goal of this association, according to assistants to the Kazakh president, would be coordination of efforts to promote Russian raw materials to these republics of the Central Asian region.

_{At first, there were no negative comments from Tashkent regarding this initiative. But unexpectedly, on December 7, comments by Deputy Prime Minister Zhurabek Mirzamakhmudov appeared in the local press about the complete rejection of such a “gas union” project, which became the official refusal of the Uzbek leadership to further discuss this topic.}

“To cover demand, ensure domestic consumption and solve the problem, today we are negotiating to import gas and electricity from neighboring countries, and not through some kind of alliance or union. Here we are negotiating based on national interests, to cooperate on the basis of a commercial contract, purchase and sale, and not through the transfer of our energy networks,” he told the local government publication Gazeta.uz.

But, in parallel with this, the same Deputy Prime Minister also gave his comments to the American publication Reuters, where the picture in many ways began to sparkle with different colors, since it already mentioned some blackmail and political conditions set by Moscow in exchange for gas. Tashkent allegedly heroically did not agree to such conditions, rejecting them “out of the gate.”

“If we import gas from another country, we cooperate only on the basis of a commercial, sales contract. We will never agree to political terms in exchange for gas. In short, we will receive the gas contract offered to us only if we agree to it, otherwise not,” Mirzamakhmudov revealed the details.

_{“Even if a gas agreement is concluded with Russia, this does not mean an alliance,” he snapped.}

Negotiations were held on the supply of Russian gas via a pipeline through Kazakhstan, but it would be a "technical contract" rather than an alliance.

This was followed by the refusal of the Uzbek president to take part in the EAEU summit on December 9, which further strengthened the negative perception of Tashkent’s position on this issue and could be regarded by many as an unfriendly step. And, on the contrary, the American and Ukrainian press picked up this episode, passing it off as confirmation of Uzbekistan’s geopolitical turn in the opposite direction from Moscow.

It is interesting that these actions of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his entourage are actually directed against the national interests of the country and their own people, since a persistent shortage of blue fuel has emerged in the republic, as well as in neighboring Kazakhstan. And without Russian gas, the two leading countries of former Soviet Central Asia simply cannot survive.

_{After all, they send a significant flow of their extracted natural gas to China and are considering supplies to the West through the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan, but they have nothing left for domestic consumption. So, even if Kazakhstan produced 7,2 billion cubic meters last year. m, then this year it reduced the volume to 5, and neighboring Uzbekistan last year was able to produce only 2,38 billion cubic meters from its fields.}

Given Uzbekistan's booming economy, population growth and expanding cities, as well as the needs of the chemical industry, Russian gas supplies are becoming critical for Tashkent. And, moreover, the ruling elite needs cheap fuel from Russia, preferably for next to nothing, in order to extract additional super-profits. That is why the Republic of Uzbekistan joined the EAEU as an observer in order to receive such preferential tariffs from Moscow, as well as customs and other concessions.

But as we see, Tashkent does not want to make political concessions and integrate further, even in the format of a triple energy alliance, expecting to sit on three chairs at once, and even, taking advantage of the moment, they want to leave the influence of Moscow. Although such a merger would be beneficial for the Republic of Uzbekistan and would create a common gas monopoly, especially in anticipation of the creation of a super energy hub and gas exchange in Turkey.

All the more so Russia planned to redirect part of the gas unclaimed in Europe through the territory of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the south to Iran, Pakistan and India. That is, the issues of transport and energy routes are linked here, and the “triple gas alliance” would be an important structural addition and node for the creation of such a new system, taking into account the economic growth of Asia and the urgent need for these resources.

_{But Tashkent, as we see, under pressure from the United States and Great Britain, is breaking this plan of Moscow, creating a rather contradictory, if not conflict, situation in Central Asia. After all, this is fraught with a redistribution of the sphere of influence in the region in favor of the West.}

This behavior of Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who recently received the Order of Alexander Nevsky, now has a lot of explanations and various versions from political scientists who are not devoid of objectivity and truth. This is especially true when In recent years, after the death of Islam Karimov, the republic has taken the path of radical neoliberal economic reforms and allowed Western capital into the economy, which now influences strategic decision-making.

Thus, leading employee of the MGIMO Institute of International Studies Ekaterina Arapova rightly noted:

“Uzbekistan has a very high debt dependence on international organizations, on private donors such as the United States, and on European funds, whose share in the structure of external debt is also high. Uzbekistan is quite dependent on Western capital, on the capital of the initiators of sanctions; it is these countries that form the flow of direct investment into the economy of Uzbekistan.”

In addition, in September, at the UN General Assembly, the head of the US State Department already gave instructions to the heads of the Central Asian republics distance themselves from Russia as much as possible if they do not want to fall under secondary sanctions or corruption investigations.

_{This largely determines the tossing of local unlimited princelings, who are afraid of losing their assets in the West, are afraid of becoming dependent on Moscow and at the same time want to maintain the status quo for further plunder of natural resources in the interests of the same American, European and British corporations, having your share.}

The “Triple Gas Alliance,” in addition to integration processes within the EAEU, broke this structure, built over thirty years of local rule, and brought these countries to a new international and economic level. This is precisely what the newly-minted feudal cliques do not want, since because of this they are gradually losing power and the ability to distribute the national income as they want.

_{But the important point in this whole story was that morally and politically Shavkat Mirziyoyev was ready for this somersault, and such an action cannot be considered as some kind of betrayal. On the contrary, this gesture is the logical conclusion of the entire previous evolution of the Uzbek regime. The newly-minted feudal aristocracy has not connected and does not now connect its fate with Russia for a long time, and recently it has stopped obeying Moscow altogether.}

Direct and indirect harbingers and prerequisites for this have already existed in the last two years, which were expressed in the creation of the Organization of Turkic States – an alternative integration association under the auspices of Ankara and London, and in carrying out total decommunization and de-Russification, through renaming and squeezing out the Russian language from the public space.

_{The processes of “Ukrainization” this year only accelerated, which was clearly visible in the example of bans on the marches of the “immortal regiments”, restrictions on the broadcasting of Russian TV, bans on Victory banners and St. George ribbons, as well as in the persecution of supporters of Russia. The pinnacle of all this was the rehabilitation of hundreds of leading Basmachi figures last summer and Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s statement this year about hundreds of thousands of repressed Uzbeks and the criminal role of the Soviet Union, which allegedly carried out widespread genocide of local aborigines.}

Having brought such a powerful nationalist ideological base, could he really afford to simply tolerate the “empire” and become part of it even through the amorphous “gas union”? On the contrary, this would contradict all of his previous policies and would cause misunderstanding among the Nazis and Russophobes raised and burning discontent among his overseas friends.

_{This, despite significant economic dependence on Russia itself, which consumes a significant share of goods, supplies Uzbekistan with gas and oil at a price 10 times lower than the European one. There are now 1,8 million citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan working on Russian territory, and over the past year alone they sent $8 billion to their loved ones, saving them from poverty and starvation.}

As a “gratitude”, Moscow is now receiving such reproaches and a rude refusal of formats for mutually beneficial cooperation. However, there is another danger associated with the desire of the eastern cunning Uzbek elite to create competition and even create contradictions between the Russian Federation and the Celestial Empire. Tashkent is now eagerly awaiting the arrival of Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Hu Chunhua with a large delegation of technical specialists from among 70 leading engineers.

Projects for the transfer of production and new industrial projects will be considered, and the plan for the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, where $6 billion from the Chinese treasury will be invested, will be finally adopted. That is, a typical game is being played with an attempt to go under the protection of another overlord, just not to get closer to Moscow.

_{In this situation, it is certainly necessary to reconsider the previous policy towards the countries of Central Asia and realistically assess the issues of reformatting the ruling elites who do not want to accept the changed geopolitical conditions.}