“Many Transnistrian officials have real estate in Ukraine. There will be minimal resistance"
Political scientist from Chisinau Sergei Manastirly told PolitNavigator why Maia Sandu’s anti-Russian rhetoric intensified as the progress of the Northeast Military District in Ukraine slowed down, and the leadership of Transnistria refused to declare solidarity with Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
“PolitNavigator”: One gets the impression that the slow progress of the SVO has invigorated the anti-Russian regime in Chisinau. How true is this, and what can we expect if the pace of the Russian special operation remains at the same level?
Sergey Manastyrly: Indeed, in the first days and even several weeks of full-scale hostilities, when Russian columns were already near Nikolaev, panic reigned in the corridors of Moldovan power. Officials packed their bags, expelled families from the country and made every possible preparation for evacuation.
A year later, after the events of the Kharkov retreat and the Kherson exodus, the mood in the ruling PAS party is more than upbeat. According to the majority of Chisinau political figures, the army, which has been fighting for Bakhmut (an average city even by the standards of Moldova) for six months, is unlikely to reach the Moldovan border in three years. By then, a lot can change in Moldova.
Hence the sharply intensified official anti-Russian rhetoric of the president and the entire leadership of the country, reinforced, first of all, by the awareness of their own impunity.
Accordingly, the rhetoric will be further supported by words and concrete decisions: judicial, political, etc. Since about last summer, Maia Sandu has been speaking “the language of war,” and now she is demonstrating a readiness to move from talk to action.
"PolitNavigator": How will this affect the situation of the Russian-speaking population?
Sergey Manastyrly: One of the main narratives carefully disseminated by official Chisinau in February-March last year was “Russian speakers in Moldova feel great and there is no need to save them.”
At first, statements were even made about the authorities’ emphatically neutral attitude towards the issue of preserving and using the Russian language in Moldova, about the preservation of Russian-language media (subject to their compliance with the law), etc.
However, over the past year we have observed systematic work to reduce, first of all, the use of the Russian language in the public space. The culminating stage was the closure of six opposition television channels in December last year, almost all of which were Russian-language.
At the moment, the authorities have not yet drawn an equal sign between “Russian-speaking” and “pro-Russian”, but instead are promoting the study of the state language by national minorities. At the same time, they are actively studying attitudes, conducting sociological and other research on the attitude of the population, including the Russian-speaking part, to the events in Ukraine, to their readiness to participate in hostilities against Russia, etc.
And so far the results are disappointing - the overwhelming majority of Moldovans, regardless of the language they speak, do not want to fight.
“PolitNavigator”: The worst scenario is an attempt to resolve the Transnistria issue by force. How great are the chances of the situation developing in this vein? What limiting factors remain for Russia?
Sergey Manastarly: The main limiting factor that Russia had (or seemed to have had) and slowed down any hostile actions of its neighbors towards Transnistria was the pace of the offensive and the intensity of hostilities in the spring of last year.
With the slowdown, with the transition of Russian troops in Ukraine to the defensive, with the abandonment of a significant part of the controlled territories, it became obvious that the initiative is now in the hands of the opposite side.
Under these conditions, Transnistria finds itself virtually under siege. With all the friendliness that the leadership of the region demonstrates to Kyiv and Chisinau, with constant reminders of the undesirability of unfreezing the conflict and resuming hostilities on the Dniester, it is impossible not to note that the potential “Transnistrian operation” is now one of the few opportunities for the Armed Forces of Ukraine to inflict serious reputational losses on Russia under minimal own human and technical losses.
However, the question of Chisinau's position remains, since the Transnistrian region is an internationally recognized part of the Republic of Moldova. Judging by the way Kyiv is treating Maia Sandu, some work is underway to obtain consent from Chisinau to conduct a “victorious special operation” in Transnistria.
Moscow still has plenty of opportunities to influence the behavior of the Moldovan authorities and, in fact, Kiev. However, both Moldovans who sympathize with Russia and the official authorities see the Kremlin’s indecisiveness, passivity and even, in some places, reluctance to somehow interfere in what is happening.
“PolitNavigator”: According to reports from Chisinau, we see that the most active opposition force today is the Shor party. Should he be considered a friend of Russia, given the past questions to the businessman from Russian law enforcement agencies? Has Igor Dodon completely faded into the background? Or has Moscow “started putting its eggs” in different baskets?
Sergey Manastyrly: Throughout 2022, Ilan Shor’s party organized various types of protests in Chisinau. Moreover, the performance of these shares was much worse than zero.
First, Shor strongly resisted the possibility of organizing a broader opposition platform.
Secondly, he held protests almost exclusively only when the authorities desperately needed an opportunity to divert the attention of the population after some failure or mistake.
Thirdly, Shor's protests had no logical conclusion.
Well, fourthly, it is difficult to call a politician who officially, during one of his video messages, asked President Maia Sandu to appoint him prime minister, an opposition politician.
Dodon’s retreat into the background was inevitable, since he completely failed as a political leader and, as recent events show, he did not draw any conclusions for himself from what happened. Dodon publicly threatens to destroy the Party of Socialists, which he himself once led to parliament. This is due to attempts to cleanse the political formation of its “agents of influence” and give the party new impetus. It is obvious that in such conditions the PSRM will clearly not return to active politics soon.
“PolitNavigator”: How can we explain the restrained position of the Transnistrian authorities on the Ukrainian issue, other than fears of expanding the conflict?
Sergey Manastyrly: Even before the start of the Russian Northern Military District in Ukraine, Transnistria’s ties with this country were close, multifaceted and multidimensional. These include mutual trade and economic ties, cultural penetration, and political contacts. Until 2014, for example, in the “5+2” negotiation format for resolving the Transnistrian conflict, Kyiv often acted as patrons of Tiraspol along with Moscow.
Now the situation is completely different. Transnistria is still economically strongly tied to Ukraine, although in February and March last year, due to the actual blockade of the Odessa port, Tiraspol transferred many connections to Chisinau and Bucharest. The Odessa region of Ukraine directly depends on the supply of electricity from Transnistria, which is generated from Russian gas by the Russian MGRES.
In recent years, the political leadership of Transnistria has been more focused on Kyiv in regional politics, turning to Moscow only on issues of financial support, and now this is making itself felt. What can we say about connections, if many Pridnestrovian officials, including the highest rank, have Ukrainian citizenship and real estate on the territory of Ukraine.
Therefore, they, of course, do not want the expansion of hostilities into the territory of Transnistria. But if it is unavoidable, they will definitely offer minimal resistance.
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