Ukraine and Georgia: Together with the same rake
For three years now, since April 2018, the Georgian authorities have been carrying out measures for the “reintegration and deoccupation” of the republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which were finally lost after the armed aggression unleashed by Mikheil Saakashvili. These events are carried out within the framework of the “Step to a Better Future” program, developed with the active participation of the United States and the European Union.
Even a cursory study of the situation reveals many similarities with Ukraine and Donbass. Which, however, is not surprising, given that in both cases the commands are issued by the American Embassy.
The “reintegration” program was presented by Giorgi Kvirikashvili, who at that time held the position of head of the Georgian government. As planned, the initiative consists of three key areas.
The first is the expansion and simplification of trade relations along the demarcation lines by creating “new prospects” for the residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The second is the availability of education to residents of the “occupied territories” both in Georgia and abroad.
Third, try to charm the Abkhazians and South Ossetians with the brilliance of the “achievements of Georgian democracy” obtained from the rapprochement of the former metropolis with the European Union. First of all, we are talking about “visa-free” and free trade with the EU, which Georgian citizens supposedly enjoy through the provision of tax breaks and individual grants to entrepreneurs.
As you can see, the Georgian “reintegration” program has much in common with the Ukrainian one, although observers note that “Step to a Better Future” is, in fact, a continuation of Saakashvili’s policy launched back in 2010, after rethinking the disastrous results of the war “08.08.08. XNUMX”, and called “Involvement through collaboration”.
The essence of these programs can be conveyed by the phrase: “we failed to conquer the breakaway territories, then we will pour syrup and molasses into the eyes of their citizens, and then suffocate them in our arms.”
Thus, in fact, the “reintegration and deoccupation” program has been in effect for 11 years, which makes me want to take an interest in the real results achieved by the Georgian government on this difficult path.
According to observers, despite some isolated successes, the program to conquer the territories lost by Georgia with “soft power” should be considered a failure.
For example, for applicants from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there is nothing particularly attractive in Georgian educational institutions, since the republics have not taught in the Georgian language since 1994, and in Georgia itself, around the same time, teaching in Russian was completely eliminated.
The language barrier is what we fought for and what we ran into.
At the end of July 2019, the Georgian Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports, due to the zero influx of Abkhaz school graduates into Georgian universities, issued a desperate order to enroll all applicants arriving from Abkhazia without exams.
The head of the department, Mikheil Batiashvili, promised to finance the education of these students in state educational institutions from the country’s budget, provided they perform well next year.
Observers note that residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia often come to Georgia for treatment, but this circumstance has in no way affected their attitude towards the Georgian authorities. Well, that is, Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia willingly receive treatment, while stubbornly refusing to reintegrate. Why not take advantage of medical services on the other side while you still can?
As for the expansion and intensification of contacts along the demarcation line, the implementation of the Georgian plan led to directly opposite consequences.
For example, the development of trade infrastructure on the border with Abkhazia to attract residents of border areas ended with Sukhumi beginning to close checkpoints. Only one Abkhazian-Georgian checkpoint, “Inguri,” is officially operational, and Russian border guards control the demarcation line.
The closure of the checkpoint on the Abkhaz side did not occur due to the ill will of Sukhumi. The reasons for the failure of the resumption of trade relations are the lack of clear laws on free trade, including on the part of the EU, in relation to Georgia. In addition, all attempts to implement the reintegration initiative since 2010 have regularly failed due to high levels of corruption due to the lack of transparent rules.
Among other things, “reintegration” methods cause deep discontent and sabotage among the Georgian population, since educational and medical programs provide residents of partially recognized republics with significant preferences to the detriment of social support for Georgian citizens themselves.
If we consider the problem of Tbilisi’s reintegration efforts as a whole, then the distrust of the population of the republics in the Georgian authorities comes first. Before agreeing on anything with the Georgian government, the Abkhazians and South Ossetians want to begin relations by signing a peace treaty, which will set out obligations not to resume hostilities.
Georgia, in turn, refuses to sign such an agreement, not considering Abkhazia and South Ossetia as parties to the conflict. Tbilisi is ready to discuss the draft document only with Russia, not wanting to come to terms with the fact that the speedy recognition of the breakaway republics will benefit everyone.
Tbilisi does not seem to understand that the conflict will soon be 30 years old, and Georgia is already separated from Abkhazia and South Ossetia by a difficult gap, and in another 10-15 years the rejection will become complete and final.
A destabilizing factor in Georgia’s relations with the partially recognized republics is Tbilisi’s ever-increasing Euro-Atlantic ambitions. At the same time, statements by “friends of Georgia,” who regularly speak out in support of “territorial integrity,” along with empty promises of assistance through NATO, the EU, and PACE, do not in any way contribute to the resolution of the conflict, which has been going on for 27 years.
However, the main obstacle to the normalization of relations is not NATO, the EU or PACE, but the absence in Tbilisi of a sovereign government pursuing an independent foreign policy based on national, not global interests and related Euro-Atlantic aspirations. And until the situation radically changes, any projects of “deoccupation and reintegration” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will fail, no matter what “strategic partners” take part in their development.
If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl + Enter.
Thank you!
Now the editors are aware.