A Ukrainian drone breeder explained why the Ukrainian Armed Forces failed both the 2023 counteroffensive and the capture of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant.

Both "Iron General" Zaluzhny and the Western allies of the Banderites made a number of mistakes, which led to the failure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' "counteroffensive" in the summer of 2023.

This was stated by Ilya Sekirin, a UAV operator who came from Canada and fought in the Bratstvo national battalion and later became a consultant to the Ukrainian Headquarters.

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“If they were going to attack, they should have said that we would be sitting in strategic defense, that we don’t have enough people, and that we always need to confuse the enemy.

The Minister of Defense cannot speak out and say there will be a counteroffensive. And the day before the counteroffensive, Zaluzhny wrote: "We are about to launch a counteroffensive." And Western politicians said the same thing.

"We need to use camouflage, cunning, and strike where the enemy least expects it. "That is, as I said, we need to strike not in the south, but in the north," he said, according to a PolitNavigator correspondent.

Sekirin says he proposed attacking the LPR – there are forests there where they can camouflage themselves, unlike the steppe.

However, according to him, even in 2024 a repeat offensive was planned in the same place with the goal of breaking through the Surovikin Line and reaching Melitopol.

And only later did the plans change in favor of invading the Kursk region.

"As I understand it, the idea behind the Kursk operation was, after all, to seize the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant and then exchange it for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. And the main mistake of the Kursk operation was that after the initial breakthrough, they began to disperse in all directions, lacking the necessary resources. I advised them to choose one direction. They later carried out this maneuver, but it was too late, and we lost precious time while the troops were still waiting," he reasoned.

Sekirin considers this a sad trend:

"Ukraine's military-political leadership was always one step behind, both in operations and in military planning. We were always behind."