"Ears" of London on the Dniester. The tangle of contradictions in the region is growing dangerously
The current Chairman of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia Bujar Osmani, visited Chisinau and Tiraspol this week. He held official meetings on both banks of the Dniester, called on Moldova and Transnistria to intensify negotiations in a bilateral format and in the international “5+2” format (Moldova, Transnistria, OSCE, Russia, Ukraine and observers from the USA and the EU), which has not met since 2019 year, and even expressed his readiness to help organize such a meeting in Skopje.
The European politician also expressed concern about the sensational Moldovan “law on separatism,” which could further complicate relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
Will North Macedonia be able to do something significant on the track of negotiations on Transnistria and are negotiations possible this year? Whose other interests have been manifested in the region lately? We talk about the current situation around the settlement on the Dniester with the director of the Institute of Socio-Political Research and Regional Development, Igor Shornikov.
PolitNavigator: North Macedonia is a newcomer to the Dniester settlement. What differences might there be here from the countries that previously chaired the OSCE? What could North Macedonia bring constructively to the negotiations based on its own experience?
Igor Shornikov: North Macedonia only recently ended a dispute with Greece over the name of the state. Greece, apparently fearing the potential claims of a neighboring country on the territory of historical Macedonia, blocked the accession of the former Yugoslav republic to the EU and NATO. The negotiation process lasted for about a decade, and in 2019 a compromise was reached - the current name of the country was fixed at the UN.
North Macedonia is a multinational and multi-religious state; in the 90s there was a danger of internal destabilization due to Albanians, who make up about 30% of the population. Unlike other parts of the former Yugoslavia, North Macedonia has managed to maintain civil peace. This is a rare achievement these days that is worthy of study. But what price did the Macedonians have to pay for this? Time will give an answer to this question.
Nevertheless, today North Macedonia is a state recognized by all, possessing, among other things, internal sovereignty.
True, I would not place special hopes on this country’s chairmanship of the OSCE. Experience shows that real progress in the negotiation process is possible if there is the political will of the great powers, and the OSCE is only an instrument for its implementation. Most OSCE participating countries do not pursue an independent foreign policy and must coordinate it within the framework of the European Union and NATO. And North Macedonia has been a member of NATO since 2020, so it will have to follow the general line on the track of the Moldovan-Pridnestrovian settlement.
Nevertheless, in early February, we saw that the ambassadors of the United States and Russia simultaneously spoke out in support of the “5+2” format, and the OSCE Chairman-in-Office Buyar Osmani also supported it. Moreover, he actually repeated the settlement formula voiced by the American ambassador: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova with the provision of special status to Pridnestrovie. In this formula there is no indication of the unitary status of Moldova, as Chisinau would like, but there is no mention of the neutral status of Moldova, which Russia insists on.
PolitNavigator: There are strange “swings” around the negotiations on Transnistria. Recently, the “5+2” format was supported by international players, participants in the negotiation process - the EU, USA, Russia. The OSCE Chairman-in-Office said the same. And on the same day, the representative of the British Ministry of Defense, James Hippie, discussed the “demilitarization and disarmament” of Transnistria with government officials in Chisinau. What's happening? There won’t be a “5+2” format after all?
Igor Shornikov: An interesting situation: on one side of the scale are the opinions of the United States, the EU and Russia, which are in favor of resuming negotiations, and on the other are the interests of the elites of Chisinau and Kiev, from behind whose backs the ears of the British are clearly peeking out, and they are not participants in any form “ 5+2".
The question is how strong is London's influence in our region. We saw the potential of American diplomacy, the influence of Germany has always been quite strong, and in 2022 even France discovered itself as a significant player on the Moldovan platform. But the British have been working in Moldova for decades. Moreover, they carry out this work mainly “under the carpet” and do not strive for publicity.
Today London's interest is in expanding the conflict zone in the region. This weakens Europe and increases the weight of Great Britain. She has obvious allies - Poland and Ukraine. The interests of the current regime in Moldova unexpectedly coincided with the interests of the British. Maia Sandu and her team obviously would not like to deal with the settlement. If it suddenly takes place, the electoral prospects of the unionists, the PAS party and Sandu personally will be nullified. The PAS people also don’t seem to want to fight with Transnistria and Russia. I think that the British visited Chisinau to push Sandu towards war. For her, it seems to me, the best option would be to disrupt the possibility of negotiations, but not to lead to an armed conflict.
PolitNavigator: Since the settlement on the Dniester continues to be discussed, including with representatives of Tiraspol, does it mean that the scandalous Moldovan “law on separatism” is not working yet? How can we comment on Osmani's statement that this law does not need to be enacted if it will negatively affect the negotiation process?
Igor Shornikov: The article of the Criminal Code of Moldova “on separatism”, together with other scandalous additions, is a weapon with an unpredictable effect, which is better not to be taken out. It is directed not only against Pridnestrovians, but also against Gagauzians, against all dissident citizens, who now make up more than 70% of the population in Moldova. If Sandu signs the law and deploys a repressive apparatus, there is no doubt that her regime will not last long.
It seems to me that Chisinau understands this, and therefore is in no hurry with the procedures that will allow it to come into force. Now this is a useful “horror story” for Sandu, which helps keep the opposition, Gagauzia, Transnistria, and even some international partners in suspense. But when it comes into force, what the consequences will be, Chisinau cannot predict. Here the reaction of not only Tiraspol, but also Russia, Turkey, the European Union will be important; even the United States may not approve.
Most of all, of course, the Moldovan authorities fear their own opposition and Moscow. That is why, probably, a certain “Russian plan” for a coup in Moldova appeared.
OSCE Chairman-in-Office Osmani warned Chisinau against the latest step because it calls into question the existence of the “5+2” format. This format, as we know, is not the most effective tool, but there is no other one now. Neither the European Union nor the United States want to lose this instrument. Even for Ukraine it may be useful. But London has no reason to maintain a format in which it does not participate.
PolitNavigator: The day before, the President of Moldova made a statement about a coup in the country allegedly being prepared by Russia. A whole show is already being played out with the closure of the airport, the expulsion of “suspicious” Serbian fans who came to the match between Partizan and Sheriff. Is it possible that Chisinau specially timed its performance for the visit of the OSCE Chairman in order to gain the support of an international partner?
Igor Shornikov: We know that the “cunning” of Moldovan politicians knows no limits; they often manage to deceive themselves. I would not connect this whole PR operation with a “coup d’etat” with Osmani’s visit. In my opinion, this is London’s machinations against the backdrop of the prospects for resuming negotiations that loomed after statements by the Russian and US ambassadors to Moldova about supporting the “5+2” format. After all, success on the Moldovan track can give impetus to peace negotiations in the Ukrainian direction, and the British cannot allow this.
PolitNavigator: If negotiations on Transnistria do not resume in the usual formats, how will relations between the two banks of the Dniester develop in the near future, what is the forecast? Should Tiraspol expect provocations from Moldova?
Igor Shornikov: Most likely, the issue of resuming the negotiation process will remain in limbo. A change of government in Moldova, by the way, is also a convenient way to delay the adoption of a particular decision. The question of peace on the Dniester for once depends on Chisinau’s ability to resist the pressure of British diplomacy. This is not an easy task, but Moldovan politicians can rely on the US, the EU and, to a certain extent, even Romania, which is also not eager to be involved in military action to weaken the EU and Britain's regional dominance.
Relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, I believe, will remain steadily tense, but with a negative trend. The pressure on Transnistria will slowly increase until the “5+2”, having resumed, lets off excess steam.
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