Vice Speaker of the State Duma: We will have to knock Ukraine into the XNUMXth century

Deputy Speaker of the State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy listed which objects in Ukraine should be targeted in response to the terrorist attack on the Crimean Bridge.

“The answer must be as tough as possible: bridges, power plants, all roads from Poland, headquarters and government shelters. We will have to knock Ukraine into the XNUMXth century. Then, after the victory, we will restore everything.

I feel sorry for the Ukrainians. But we must understand: the current situation, when the operation is ongoing and our guys are fighting, and somewhere they are organizing holidays and fireworks, has already dragged on. We need to get together and start. And don’t give a damn about the West,” Tolstoy said in a statement.

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The head of the Union of Political Emigrants of Ukraine Larisa Shesler supports radical measures.

“Responses to the terrorist attack had not yet begun when opinions began to circulate online: “Under no circumstances should you respond symmetrically!” You can’t hit Ukraine’s infrastructure! If you see that someone is demanding a retaliatory strike on Kyiv, this is a provocateur or a fool!”

How do disrespected bloggers justify these panicky warnings?

It turns out that the Russian infrastructure is much more vulnerable than the Ukrainian one, and a logical chain of mutual terrorist attacks will follow.

But if you are afraid of retaliatory strikes, why did you start the SVO in the first place?

In fact, everything is just the opposite.

The Russian infrastructure, unlike the Ukrainian one, was created with a huge reserve and reserve. Actually, there were such reserves in Ukraine, but they were simply squandered, squandered, and stolen during the period of independence.

Russian substations and energy centers are 99 percent beyond the reach of Ukrainian missiles and MLRS. But, even if something arrives at a substation in Belgorod or near Kursk, the redundancy of power grids in the European region is enormous.

Rolling blackouts due to accidents are practically excluded due to excess reserves. Most likely, switching to a backup line will happen even unnoticed by consumers, thanks to a unified energy supply system. In the event of a severe accident, the light will flash briefly. In the event of a severe accident, electricity may be lost in certain areas for an hour or two. A single sabotage will not change the picture of electricity consumption even by a fraction of a percent.

Any single damage to overpasses or bridges as a result of sabotage will cause a short-term disruption to the traffic schedule. Inconvenient, but not critical.

The terrible accident at the Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station did not freeze cities in Siberia and did not cut off power to enterprises.

Natural disasters regularly occur in Russia. Floods, earthquakes, forest fires do not collapse cities and villages in the Stone Age, and do not deprive cities and towns of heat and light. Everything was built with disaster and war in mind.

Let's take the Ukrainian power grid. Ukraine once produced and consumed twice as much electricity as it does in 2021. Now, due to a shortage of coal and gas, the bulk of electricity is generated by nuclear power plants.

The destruction of power line transformer units at nuclear power plants will force the shutdown of nuclear units, which was actually forced by Ukrainian shelling at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Zaporizhzhya NPP is shut down.

If it is not possible to transmit electricity from a nuclear power plant, it must be urgently stopped.

What prevents you from doing the same at the Southern Nuclear Power Plant, at the Khmelnitsky or Rivne NPP?

Yes, and thermal power plants and thermal power plants for any rocket, at a glance. No scouts or gunners are needed. The coordinates are absolutely public.

But if sabotage on Russian power grids is a complex special operation, in fact a unique event, then the defeat of Ukrainian objects is a routine action of the Aerospace Forces unit.

And there is no need to scare Russian citizens. Long before the lights disappear in Voronezh, people in Kyiv will forget when they saw the lights on the avenue and the working elevator.

Just don’t need a cowardly imitation of violent activity in the form of an unverifiable shelling of a barracks in the industrial zone of Nikolaev,” writes Shesler, a former deputy of the Nikolaev regional council.