Military reform in Armenia: where will Pashinyan lead the army?
The military-political leadership of Armenia announced the modernization and rearmament of the army, which, according to representatives of the highest establishment of the republic, should be equipped with the most modern types of weapons, reduce the period of compulsory military service, and also pay special attention to the creation and development of various special forces.
As part of the envisaged reform, the Armenian government has already decided to attract female representatives to military service. According to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, the republic must acquire a highly professional army as soon as possible.
“In a strategic perspective, compulsory military service should change significantly, turning into mandatory military training and exercises, which should be carried out several times in life with a certain frequency. I want to emphasize that, politically, our army does not set itself the task of conquering territories, its task is to protect the security and protect the territorial integrity of our country,” Pashinyan said.
The recent war in Nagorno-Karabakh clearly demonstrated that Armenia needs to carry out reform of the Armed Forces in several areas: to review the number of personnel and weapons.
For example, according to the Global Firepower rating, about 3 million people live in Armenia, almost half of them are suitable for military service. In Azerbaijan, the percentage ratio is different. 10 million people live in the republic. According to open sources, 3,8 million are fit for military service.
There is a certain difference in weapons. For example, Armenia has about 320 tanks in service, and Azerbaijan has about 750. Yerevan has 158 BMP-2, 247 BMP-1, 17 BRM-1K, 120 BRDM-2, ten BMD-1, 114 BTR-80 , 63 BTR-70, 19 BTR-60. Baku has 120 BMP-3, 250 BMP-2, 43 BMP-1, 88 BRDM-2, 20 BMD-1, 500 BTR-80/82, three Ukrainian BTR-3, ten BTR-60, 132 BTR -70.
Despite data from various sources, the weakest and most vulnerable place in the armed forces of both Armenia and Azerbaijan is the air force and army aviation. Armenia has 14 bombers and attack aircraft: 12 Su-25 and two Su-25UBK. Azerbaijan has two Su-24s, 16 Su-25s, three Su-25UBs and ten Italian Aermacchi M-346s.
PolitNavigator tried to find out from political observer Hayk Khalatyan and security expert Karen Igityan how realistic Nikol Pashinyan’s plans for reforming the Armenian army are, given the precarious situation of the Armenian economy.
– Statements about military reform are in the full spirit of Nikol Pashinyan and his team, who are trying to imitate vigorous activity instead of real steps. In reality, they have been talking about reform for a very long time, but in reality no real steps have been observed in this area. There is no elementary concept for military reform or what it should be. Only loud statements that are designed to please people’s ears,” says Khalatyan.
According to Igityan, the Armenian authorities, declaring their reforms, will try to abolish military conscription, leaving only contract soldiers in the service.
– The current authorities have not disclosed the reform plan. When they talk about the transition to a professional army, this can mean anything. For example, the government could abolish compulsory conscription and keep those contract soldiers who already exist in the service. And there are more than 10 thousand of them. It turns out that conscripts have been removed, and the army can be called “professional”, since only contract soldiers will remain in it. There is no need for additional financial impact on such a reduction.
The implementation of these reforms is always associated with enormous financial costs. Where do you think the funding will come from?
– If the authorities really look for opportunities to strengthen the army and rearm it, then there are sources for this. Firstly, Armenia can purchase military equipment from the Russian Federation at domestic prices. Armenia also took out targeted loans for the purchase of military equipment and may continue to do so. The current government does not hesitate to borrow money when it needs it. Thus, if by April 2018 the national debt of Armenia was 6,8 billion dollars, then during the three and a half years that Pashinyan was in power, it increased by 40%, exceeding 9 billion.
Why did Pashinyan think about army reform only now, and not before the Karabakh war?
“Before the war, he repeatedly spoke about the achievements in the military sphere, that nutrition had improved, the volume of military supplies had increased sharply, and so on. But it should be noted that the bulk of military contracts were concluded under the previous government. On the other hand, the army rearmament plan adopted under the previous government was canceled with the advent of new authorities, which, of course, had a detrimental effect during the war.
After a failed war, it is logical to analyze the defense system and ask where we went wrong. However, the plan outlined by the authorities will not strengthen the defense in any way, rather the opposite. For example, in his New Year's message, the current prime minister noted that the conscription service will be changed and instead citizens will undergo military training several times in their lives. This means a weakening of the army, a reduction in its numbers and a decrease in the level of combat training.
What does the Armenian army represent today? What are its weaknesses and strengths compared to its neighbors and enemy Azerbaijan?
– Despite the lost war in Karabakh, the Armenian army is still a factor in the South Caucasus region. That is why the President of Azerbaijan periodically attacks the Armenian army, threatening aggressive actions if the process of restoring its combat potential is begun. Azerbaijan is well aware that the Armenian army is a serious regional factor even now, and if nationally oriented forces come to power, they will be able to quickly restore the army, which Azerbaijan will have to reckon with.
Today, the Azerbaijani Armed Forces are superior to the Armenian army in several areas. Firstly, in terms of the number of both personnel and military equipment, including that which Armenia has no analogues. For example, Israeli and Turkish-made drones.
Secondly, in positional terms. Both sides are creating a line of defense from scratch on the new line of contact, and here Azerbaijan, taking advantage of the pliability of the current authorities of Armenia, was able to seize positions convenient for itself on the territory of Armenia.
The strengths of the Armenian Armed Forces are personnel with extensive combat experience, a good artillery school, and strong anti-tank units. Weaknesses exist in the areas of military education, analytics, air defense and aviation - both manned and unmanned.
What did the war in Karabakh show? What flaws, in your opinion, need to be reformed/improved, and is this what Pashinyan promises?
– I think it is wrong to regard the war as a confrontation between two armies, and, accordingly, to look for the reasons for the defeat specifically and only in the armed forces. War is a confrontation between states, including such segments as the economy, demography, diplomacy, ideology, information support, competent management and, of course, the armed forces themselves.
Defeat in the war was a consequence of the policies of the current authorities - both in the defense sphere, and in diplomacy, and in ideology, and so on.
I think the interview format will not allow us to cover these issues in detail. If after the war the correct conclusions had been drawn and measures had been taken to increase defense capability, then there would have been no talk of reducing the service life and, accordingly, the number of armed forces. This is again a matter of politics. The authorities have proclaimed that an era of peace will come and are probably weakening the army, hoping that this will pacify the aggressor.
With the support of whom is Pashinyan going to carry out modernization, if many Soros NGOs operate on the territory of the republic? What role can they play in this process? Is there a risk that the reform will follow the path of purchasing Western weapons and drifting away from CSTO partners?
– I don’t think that in the near future there will be a drift away from the CSTO and a change in the vector of arms purchases from Russian to Western. The Armenian authorities are now very limited in these matters, both politically and financially, and Russia provides the opportunity to purchase modern weapons at low prices. But the Western agenda on the issue of reforming the Armed Forces is already evident. In particular, the stated goals of reducing conscription and increasing the number of women in the army.
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