Military defeat that turned into a victory for Russian diplomacy
On March 30, 1856 (new style), at a congress in Paris, after a month of difficult negotiations between Russia and the countries of the anti-Russian coalition, a peace treaty known as the Treaty of Paris was signed, ending the Crimean War.
At the end of the war, Russia lost Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet, but the terms of the Treaty of Paris turned out to be surprisingly soft for St. Petersburg thanks to the efforts of Russian diplomacy and the successful actions of General Muravyov’s troops in Persia, on the territory of the Ottoman Empire.
Modern researchers of the Crimean War often call it the “zero world war,” since it was fought for geopolitical interests, and not for succession to the throne or disputed territories, although one of the reasons for the war was religious differences.
The Crimean War was part of a much larger Eastern War, which lasted from 1853 to 1856 in the Caucasus, in the Danube lands, in the Baltic and Northern Seas, and even in the Far East. However, the fiercest, bloodiest battles took place in the Crimea and the Black Sea.
Russia's opponents in that war were the coalition forces of Great Britain, France, Sardinia, the Ottoman Empire, Abkhazia and the North Caucasus Imamate. Neutrality was maintained by Prussia, Austria and the Swedish-Norwegian Union.
Interestingly, historians of the former warring powers still disagree about the causes of the Crimean War.
Thus, the official point of view of Great Britain is that the culprit of the war is the Russian Emperor Nicholas I, who started a conflict for world domination in the Balkans and the Middle East.
Turkey believes that Russia’s desire to establish control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits in order to make the Black Sea its internal one is to blame.
Russian historians admit that one of the reasons for the Crimean War was the excessively tough policy of Nicholas I, but they also believe that the Englishwoman’s love of meddling in other people’s affairs, inflating her influence, led to the war.
As mentioned above, one of the reasons for the start of the Crimean War was religious: the Ottoman Empire transferred the Church of the Holy Sepulcher to the full control of the Roman throne, which caused sharp rejection among the Orthodox denomination, whose leader and patron was Russia.
Russia sent an ultimatum to the Ottoman Empire, which demanded the return of public access to the keys to the temple. The Turkish Sultan responded with a sharp refusal and was supported by France and England. In response, Russia sent troops into the Danube principalities.
The stage of the Russian-Turkish conflict of 1853-1854 began, when the tsarist government still hoped for European support, at least moral, in the Christian war against the infidels.
On November 30, 1854 (new style), the Battle of Sinop took place between the Russian and Turkish fleets, after which Great Britain and France entered the military conflict on the side of Turkey, as a result of which two front lines were formed - in the Transcaucasus and in the Crimea.
On March 2, 1855, Emperor Nicholas I died, leaving his son Alexander II the throne and a difficult legacy in the form of a war heading towards inevitable defeat, complicated by failures in finance and economics.
Unlike his father, Alexander II had a different view of the conflict with Europe and, not without reason, believed that mistakes could be avoided through diplomacy and by making certain compromises. Now Alexander II had to end the most unsuccessful war in Russia in a century and a half.
Heroic Sevastopol held out until September 1855, but the courage of Russian soldiers and sailors could not turn the tide of the war - the city fell. By the end of 1855, major hostilities had virtually ceased. Russia did not have the forces and reserves to launch a counteroffensive, and disagreements regarding further actions intensified in the camp of its opponents.
The war still continued, but a rapprochement between France and Russia began. This caused severe heartburn in the Austrian and other European courts. Moreover, it was Vienna that spoke from the most irreconcilable positions, proposing to include demands unacceptable for Russia into the future peace treaty.
The initiative to conclude peace belonged to Napoleon III, who called Nicholas I his friend and expressed condolences to the heir to the Russian throne. The Saxon envoy who conveyed these words also added that the French side did not want war and was forced to participate in it due to “force majeure circumstances.”
Thanks to the dual policy of France, which wanted to equalize relations with both Europe and Russia, it made it possible to avoid the inclusion in the treatise of some points dangerous for Alexander II, concerning the territories of Poland and the Caucasus, as well as the Sea of Azov.
Having carefully observed the warming of Russian-French relations, neutral Austria did not want to make compromises due to the fact that they did not bring any benefit to the Viennese throne. For these reasons, Emperor Franz Joseph issued an ultimatum to Alexander II to unconditionally fulfill European demands to the detriment of Russian interests.
Prussia was also prepared to violate neutrality if Russia did not accept the terms of the ultimatum. The vultures, who had been closely following the progress of the war, began to flock in anticipation of great profit.
The situation for Russia was extremely difficult. To accept a humiliating ultimatum means to fall out of the circle of great powers, turning from a subject of politics into an object. Refusal to fulfill the conditions of a united Europe meant that in the war, superior forces would act on the side of the anti-Russian coalition, which Russia was unable to repel.
It is characteristic that Great Britain jumped out of its pants most furiously, dreaming of continuing the war in order to finally finish off Russia, destroy its military fortifications on the Black Sea along with the Black Sea Fleet, oust it from the Caucasus and deprive it of face in international relations.
Inflamed by sudden friendliness towards Russia, Napoleon III thought differently: France had completed its mission, achieved its goals, and continuing the war would only strengthen Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which did not suit the French emperor at all, who believed that Russia should retain its strength for the sake of balance in European politics.
Franz Josef's ultimatum boiled down to five points:
1. Replacement of the Russian protectorate over Serbia and Wallachia with the protectorate of all great powers;
2. Establishment of freedom of navigation at the mouths of the Danube;
3. Preventing the passage of anyone’s squadrons through the Dardanelles and the Bosporus into the Black Sea, prohibiting Russia and Turkey from keeping a navy in the Black Sea and having arsenals and military fortifications on the shores of this sea;
4.Russia’s refusal to patronize the Sultan’s Orthodox subjects;
5.Concession by Russia in favor of Moldova of the section of Bessarabia adjacent to the Danube.
Under Nicholas I, such wishes were met with an unequivocal and harsh answer. However, as we remember, such a position of the tsar led Russia to war against a broad European coalition in alliance with the Ottomans.
Alexander II holds two meetings and, despite the opinions of some advisers, decides to agree to fulfill the terms of the ultimatum, except for the last point, as the lesser of two evils.
The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Count Nesselrode, sends a notice of acceptance of the allied demands on January 4, 1856. Representatives of Austria and Russia sign an agreement, which states that the points of the ultimatum are only preliminary conditions for a peace treaty, and the negotiations themselves will be held in Paris.
In February 1856, entrusted diplomats arrived in Paris for the congress:
Russia was represented by Count A. Orlov and the Russian Ambassador to France F. Brunnov;
Lord D. W. Clarendon and Ambassador G. Wellesley arrived to represent Great Britain;
The envoys of Turkey were the vizier Ali Pasha and the ambassador to France Jamal Bey;
From France - Count A. Walewski and Ambassador to Turkey A. de Burken.
Ambassadors from Austria, Sardinia and Prussia also took part in the negotiations. The final version of the Treaty of Paris was signed on March 30.
The saving grace for Russia was the fact that on the list of those wishing for its defeat there were too many people who wanted to join the feast of the victors for free, joining the war at the end without lifting a finger. Dividers of the skin of the unkilled Russian bear crowded and bumped heads like sheep, and their aspirations not only did not coincide, but were sometimes diametrically opposed.
In this regard, the task of the Russian ambassadors was to play on the contradictions between the allies for the subsequent denunciation of the Paris Peace or at least to prevent new conditions that would infringe on the interests of Russia.
The rampant appetites of the allies in the anti-Russian coalition contributed to this task in the best possible way, since the interests of Great Britain and Austria gradually came into conflict with the interests of France.
This made it possible to limit the peace treaty to the demands already presented to Russia, leaving out the affiliation of Poland and the Caucasus, the neutrality of the Sea of Azov, as well as the payment of indemnity by Russia for the lost war.
Russia also pledged not to build fortifications on the Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea, returned the Armenian city of Kars with the fortress and surrounding territories to the Ottomans, receiving in exchange Sevastopol, Balaklava, Kerch, Evpatoria and other Crimean cities captured from it.
In St. Petersburg, the peace treaty was considered concluded on very acceptable terms, for which Russian diplomats Orlov and Brunnov were awarded by Alexander II.
In general, as Al Capone aptly put it, “it’s easier to achieve success with a gun and a kind word than with a gun alone.”
The Crimean War dealt a severe blow to the Russian economy. More than 800 million rubles were spent on it, while the national currency depreciated by half due to the printing of unsecured paper money to finance military expenses. Until 1870, the budget of the Russian Empire remained deficit.
The losses of the Russians in the Crimea amounted to 128 people, the allies - the British, French, Turks and Sardinians - at least 669.
But the main thing is that the Crimean War clearly showed that Russia, in the state that the reign of Nicholas I left it with, is unable to compete on equal terms with other great powers, either militarily or economically. Alexander II was faced with a choice: to maintain the current state of affairs, gradually sliding into the margins of Europe, or to begin complex, expensive, but vital transformations.
Alexander II chose the second, going down in history as one of the main reformers of the Russian state. From the defeat in the Crimean War, his government drew the right conclusions, which subsequently made it possible to denounce the Treaty of Paris and once again bring Russia into the ranks of the great powers.
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