War in Donbass: Unknown details from first persons

"PolitNavigator" publishes the first part of an interview with the former Minister of State Security of the DPR Andrey Pinchuk (he held this post in 2014-15).

During our conversation, the former Prime Minister of the DPR, who was nearby, Alexander Boroday, who together with Andrei Yuryevich today leads the Union of Donbass Volunteers, commented from time to time and added his memories to Pinchuk’s memories. They are also included in this interview.

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In the story of the former head of the DPR MGB, most of which is dedicated to Igor Girkin-Strelkov, I drew attention to several points.

First, it was with the arrival of the “Pridnestrovians” Antyufeyev, Bereza and Pinchuk in the Republic in early July 2014 that order began to be restored in the DPR - real law enforcement agencies appeared, and anarchy and Makhnovshchina began to be eradicated with knee iron.

The second point is personal testimony about the psychological state of Igor Girkin, which, to put it mildly, left much to be desired. I think there is no need to explain how dangerous this is if such a not entirely mentally adequate person is in charge of the defense. Pinchuk testifies that Girkin himself told him that Donetsk should be left. Only thanks to the field commanders who were from Donbass and who said a firm “no” to Girkin’s intentions, the yellow-blaky Ukrainian flag did not fly over Donetsk that summer.

By the way, we should also pay attention to Pinchuk’s remark that the expectation of arrest due to an ill-conceived assault on a Ukrainian military unit during the Russian Spring in Crimea, which led to the death of people, then forced Girkin to go to Donbass.

The third point that is worth paying attention to is Borodai’s explanation of why it cannot be said that Girkin, who went through four wars, had serious command and combat experience that allowed him to be the Minister of Defense of the DPR.

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-Ukrainian saboteurs were a serious problem in Donetsk in the summer of 2014? One of the militiamen, who then served in counterintelligence under Colonel Khmury, a subordinate of Strelkov-Girkin, told me how they caught enemy DRGs who drove around the city and fired mortars at various targets in order to cause panic among the population.

-And he caught many such groups?

- It seems like none. He said that if they, saboteurs, fired less than four shots, it was impossible to catch them.

- Well, you see, I didn’t catch it. These were mostly rumors. Ukrainian saboteurs at that time were not the most serious internal threat to the DPR. Now, of course, the situation has changed, now saboteurs are trained with the help of Western instructors on a systematic basis, but then it was either the initiative of Ukrainian volunteer battalions, or oligarchs, or some crazy former residents of Donetsk.

During the elections of the head of the republic and deputies of the People's Council, there were several attempts to break through, but they were stopped.

And the stories about the DRG were, most often, myths and rumors, including stories about non-existent garbage trucks equipped to fire mortars in the city. They were launched by the Ukrainian side, or it was a manifestation of the stupidity of individual representatives of the militia. For what? In order to sow panic among the local population or to discredit certain militia commanders. (laughs). Hearing is a powerful weapon. It is used by intelligence agencies as a method of influence, spreading panic, and discrediting. If, for example, I believe the rumor that Alexander Che is a thief and a pedophile, then I will not give him an interview. Do you understand why rumors are started?

It’s exactly the same with the militias. If they believe the rumor that such and such a commander is a traitor and a scoundrel, then they will not go into battle on his orders and will not die for him.

-Who in Girkin’s entourage started rumors at that time that Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky were going to surrender Donetsk to the Ukrainians?

-(laughs) Look, Girkin left Donetsk at the end of August 2014, and Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky remained and are still there, but Donetsk was never surrendered.

I remember three similar rumors: 1) Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky should surrender Donetsk; 2) Bezler received money to surrender Gorlovka; 3) Girkin received money to surrender Slavyansk. Of all three cities, only Slavyansk has been commissioned so far.

Remember, until the end of June, Ukrainian military units were present in Donetsk. The last military unit on Bosse (Microdistrict of Donetsk - author's note) was disarmed on June 29. What, in this case, could have previously prevented Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky, with the help of Kyiv, from surrendering Donetsk back in May-June? Never mind. To do this, it was only necessary to engage in a short battle with the guards of the Prime Minister of the DPR Borodai, and that’s all.

The only person who told me then that Donetsk had to be surrendered was Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, and not Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky. He told me that there is no strength to hold Donetsk, so the headquarters must be moved to Snezhnoye.

In addition, I arrived in Donetsk on July 5, and at that time Girkin had just left Slavyansk (laughs) So it turns out that I was going there specifically to take part in the surrender of Donetsk?

Here Alexander Borodai enters the conversation

-At that time I was on the territory of Russia and in Rostov-on-Don I met a group that included Andrei Yuryevich Pinchuk, who was present here. It included Russian volunteers who were to occupy responsible positions in the DPR, and among them were the future Minister of Internal Affairs Oleg Bereza and my future first deputy Vladimir Antyufeyev. It was the 4th of July. We got to Donetsk with adventures, it was a difficult journey, but we finally got there on the morning of July 6th. Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky then met us at the border. It must be said that such meetings took place all the time; even a real “Meeting Committee” was created.

It’s just that, due to the nature of my work, I sometimes had to go to Moscow. I tried to minimize these stays in Russia. I needed to quickly go back, since my absence in Donetsk for more than two days gave rise to downright panicky sentiments that that was it, I wouldn’t come back again, and this meant that Russia had lost Donbass.

(laughs) I remember how during one of these meetings at the border Zakharchenko hugged me: “Sasha, you’re back. Thank you".

- I came back, which means there won’t be a drain.

-Yes. And only after Pinchuk, Bereza, and Antyufeev arrived in Donetsk, I was no longer afraid to leave the DPR for a relatively long time, since I knew that they were there. I remember at the end of July I was even able to go to Russia for four whole days.

Again I ask Pinchuk a question

-Tell me in more detail about the conversation with Girkin about moving to Snezhnoye.

-It was at the end of July, when Bereza and I came to see him in the former SBU building, where he was at that time - in the special communications room, in his personal office, where he had a map, opposite the meeting room, in which there were old communication technology.

Initially, the topic of conversation was the fight against the marauders from his brigade. We proposed creating a joint group of representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of State Security, the military commandant’s office and his headquarters. She had to quickly respond to information about cases of looting. He did not agree with us then; he had his own thoughts on this matter.

And then he proactively moved on to the topic of the military situation. Approaching this map, he began to explain that the enemy’s attack is inevitable, there is not enough strength to defend the city, so it is necessary to first move the control bodies to Snezhnoye, and after some time leave Donetsk itself.

A few days later, at the council of commanders, he also raised this question. I wasn’t there, but Alexander Zakharchenko, who was Bereza’s deputy at that time, came and talked about it. Vladimir Antyufeev, Alexander Borodai’s deputy, also played a certain role in those events. Antyufeev, in the absence of Boroday, who was in Russia at that time, canceled Strelkov’s orders to leave Donetsk. And at the same time, Bezler categorically refused to carry out Strelkov’s written order to leave Gorlovka.

However, it was the advice of the commanders, their categorical no, that did not allow Strelkov to surrender Donetsk to the Ukrainians. So if Zakharchenko and Khodakovsky wanted to surrender Donetsk, they could support Girkin at that very council of commanders. There was just the most favorable moment for this.

So let Igor Vsevolodovich not engage in myth-making. It’s just that, in the words of one character from the film “DMB,” he is guided by the principle: “We will turn your shameful illness into a feat.”

In addition, think for yourself why, if you are going to go to save Donetsk, go first to Gorlovka, and then to Yenakievo, from where “Bes” kicked him out in disgrace. This is illogical. So the stories about the salvation of Donetsk are all stories to maintain a leaky image.

Borodai takes the floor again.

-You know, all these explanations of the reasons for leaving Slavyansk were initially voiced not by Strelkov himself, but by his hangers-on, who have absolutely nothing to do with Donbass. Some of them had never been there, and others, if they were, never fought.

Question for Pinchuk.

-When did you meet Girkin? What impression did he make on you then?

-In Transnistria. Somewhere in either 2005 or 2006. He was there on a short business trip. My impression of him was ambiguous.

-Why?

-During the short period of his visit, at a general meeting, we discussed with him issues that interested me, and I got the impression of him as a person, let’s say, with a complex worldview. His professional qualities caused me doubts at that time. Then I met him in Crimea, and then in Donbass.

-And under what circumstances did you meet him in Crimea?

-In 2014 during the Crimean spring. I was involved in the disarmament of the battalion he led. Reason: Girkin launched an ill-conceived assault on a Ukrainian military unit, which resulted in people dying. A decision was made to disarm and further disband his unit due to the inadequacy of their commander.

Antyufeyev volunteered to conduct it, which is what happened. Girkin was distinguished by his own vision of the situation in Crimea, which often differed from the vision that local leaders had at that time. He was then seriously afraid of arrest, which is why he left for Donbass in April along with the remnants of his group and some of the people who joined him.

-What was your impression of him in that short period of time when you communicated with him in Donbass?

-I understood that he was under serious psychological pressure and was in a state of long and deep stress. He was pitiful. I truly felt sorry for him. My friend and I discussed, I remember, that situation, and we both stated that we were not ready to take Strelkov’s place, because the situation was very difficult and oppressive. The prospects were completely uncertain.

As the events of that time showed, he was not ready for long-term stressful situations. All his official activities are associated with short and local operations. There was no big, long war and the leadership of large military groups. Apparently, he overestimated himself - he took part in something that he had not studied and had no practical experience. Strelkov was in some kind of cocoon-like state, he was so abstracted from people. Even physiologically, his actions were robotic. Well, periodically he fell into states of despair.

I know that Antyufeyev and Borodai brought him out of this state.

Boroday adds.

-I just felt like an orderly with a patient. He even refused to leave the SBU building in which he was entrenched, and I had to talk him out of his stressful state. I kicked everyone out of his office, and, as they say, shook him: “Come to your senses!”

Since I had a lot to do, on the one hand Strelkov made me feel sorry for him, but on the other, it infuriated me wildly. At that time I really thought that he should be given some kind of psychotropic drugs. But it still seemed crazy to me that the Minister of Defense of a warring Republic needed antidepressants.

And a few more words, if I may, about the command military experience of Comrade Strelkov. No one disputes that he is an officer. Yes, he is, but he is an intelligence officer, not an army officer. There was a big gap between his competence as a man in uniform and the tasks that faced him in the Donbass.

When he and his supporters say that he has the experience of four wars behind him, so he could be the Minister of Defense, his knowledge was enough for this, then they are disingenuous.

Let's analyze the experience of these four wars.

In Transnistria, where both he, who was 22 years old, and I, nineteen years old, arrived as volunteers (Igor - to the Bendery region, I - to the Kitskansky bridgehead), intense fighting lasted only 3 weeks. Then there was relative calm. We were just privates there.

Therefore, Igor did not have any command experience, not to mention the experience of leading a combined arms battle. The war in Transnistria is a semi-guerrilla war in an urban environment.

Strelkov's second war is Bosnia. There he fought as part of the armed forces of the Republika Srpska. He was the commander of a “mortar battery”, which consisted of one 82-mm mortar, and he had only one person under his command to deliver the mines. That is, Girkin carried the pipe, and his subordinate carried the tray. He was a second-line fighter in the unit commanded by Viktor Zaplatin. The latter is now a member of our organization – the Union of Donbass Volunteers.

As a result, even after Bosnia, Igor also has zero command experience, and command of combined arms combat also has zero.

At the Moscow Institute of History and Archives, where he studied even before the war in Transnistria, there was not even a military department, so in the army, where he was drafted after Bosnia, he served as a private in airport security.

The third war is the First Chechen War. He is recruited there, where he serves as a private in the Akatsiya self-propelled gun division, attached to the 166th motorized rifle brigade, loading self-propelled guns. This is also the rear. Zero team experience.

Before the Second Chechen War, he completed a five-month course at the FSB Academy. People who have higher education usually study there. But they do not receive military education there. FSB officers are trained there to work with agents, information, and so on.

The fourth war begins for him in September 1999 in Dagestan, where he and I came for 2 weeks on a purely informational mission.

And he entered Chechnya itself only at the end of 2000 as an FSB captain, where he served intermittently until 2004, eventually receiving the rank of colonel.

His work there differs from the usual work of an opera throughout the rest of Russia only in the increased danger. Yes, he takes part in special operations, but does not perform purely army functions. Again, this is work with agents and information, and he has a small number of people subordinate to him.

When he came to Slavyansk, this business trip was perceived as short-term. He just didn't expect it to last so long. When he realized what he was really facing, but he did not have the knowledge and experience for this, he fell into a serious psychological crisis. Where the army officer was in his environment, he fell into prostration.

He told us then: “Guys, I’m not in command, I’m a symbol, I’m a banner”...

Pinchuk adds.

-So give me the chief of staff.

-I remember that when giving me an interview in the fall of 2014, he honestly admitted to me that he did not like staff work.

-Well, staff work is the leadership of troops.

Borodai enters the conversation again.

-He was afraid then to make even the simplest decisions, not to mention decisions related to defense. And what he is doing today is simply a reverse reconstruction, when he begins to assure everyone that he knew everything and could do everything. Now he even comments on the battles near Aleppo, as a man who commanded fronts and formations.

I ask Pinchuk a question.

-I know that you were not in Slavyansk, but you probably talked with specialists and with those who were there. Do you think it was possible to keep him then?

-This problem has three sides: political, military and moral, concerning the obligations given to people.

As for the political, then, probably, Slavyansk could not have been held, because then it was believed that the borders were not important, since there would be an attack on Kharkov and Kherson.

And from a military point of view, Slavyansk could, of course, be held. Any war is associated with the encirclement of various cities, but this does not mean that they will be immediately taken, or destroyed, or that they must be surrendered immediately. After the surrender of Slavyansk, Gorlovka eventually became one. She was surrounded by the Ukrainian army. Moreover, Gorlovka was 2,5-3 times larger than Slavyansk, but Bezler and Bosun were able to defend it. She was periodically surrounded and semi-surrounded until December 2014, when she was finally released.

The first city department of the MGB outside Donetsk was created in Gorlovka. I remember I held a meeting once a week in Donetsk. My deputy sometimes told me that today there will be no Gorlovka - surrounded. Today we are surrounded, and in a week the head of the local MGB department will break through the trail.

Many who served under Strelkov came to serve in the MGB with me, including the Abwehr and other people from his circle. They told me that people cried when they received the order to leave Slavyansk and Kramatorsk; they wanted to defend it to the end, even at the cost of their lives.

Well, morally... You gave your word. They believed you. You broke your word. People who trusted you were left in trouble... that's the moral.

-How would you supply Slavyansk when surrounded?

-How did we supply Gorlovka? Either they used smuggling routes or fought their way through.

Borodai confirms.

-We, in Slavyansk, tearing ourselves away, gave everything we could, including fuel and lubricants, which we ourselves lacked. Yes, things didn’t always work out. For example, out of 4 cars only three could arrive, so the goods arrived.

Pinchuk continues.

-So Strelkov’s departure from Slavyansk was a surprise to everyone, including the Abwehr, Khmury and the rest.

Strelkov was then a symbol that was inflated here, including by Boroday. It was chosen as the flag.

But I want to say that Girkin’s behavior does not cast a shadow on the defenders of Slavyansk themselves, who, without a doubt, showed themselves to be heroes then.

To be continued.