Presidential elections in Ukraine: Stop on the edge of the abyss or collapse into the flames of war?
On May 25, 2014, presidential elections were held in Ukraine. I deliberately do not touch on the issue of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these elections, as well as the change of power on February 22, since from the point of view of the struggle for spheres of influence between Russia and the West, this does not matter. What is more important is something else: will Ukraine stop at the edge of the abyss or will it finally collapse into the abyss of civil war?
The war is sinking
It is extremely important for any head of state that his course does not become a failure in the economy, politics, and social sphere. Military rhetoric, if resorted to by a politician who came to power and was not at the origins of the war, only harms him. Largely because of this, Mircea Snegur, who led the offensive of the armed forces of Moldova in Transnistria in 1996, lost the presidential election in 1992. Soon after the end of the war itself, the Minister of Defense of Moldova, Divisional General Ion Costas, was dismissed from service, and because of his hard line, he became odious even in the eyes of some of his own comrades. The problem is that the military deadlock is dragging down to the political bottom those who most actively demonstrated their own intransigence. This is hardly what Petro Poroshenko needs now, immediately after the elections.
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The Ukrainian situation is similar to the Moldovan-Transnistrian one in the sense that external forces are actively playing a role. In 1992, Russia supported the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic; Romania - Republic of Moldova. Now, in 2014, the United States and partly the EU support official Kyiv, and Russia supports the southeastern federalists.
Our experience has shown at one time that betting on strength and complete victory is a losing bet. We found a solution through negotiations and the signing of a peace agreement on July 21, 1992. I don’t know what it will be like in Ukraine. However, if there is anything we can do to help, it is by witnessing: The longer the war lasts, the more blood, revenge, destruction and bitterness there will be. And this is better to avoid.
Don't let the war turn into a fire
Currently, Ukraine is in the initial stages of a civil war. At this stage we also had a lot of hotheads and those who wanted to fight. Many fought. But after 3-4 months in Moldova and Transnistria the mood began to lean toward peace. This is understandable: after all, the war is not with an external enemy, but within yesterday’s still united people. But! In 1992, the economy of the former Moldavian SSR was still relatively efficient. She survived the war. A What should Ukraine do when it finally becomes clear in the fall: the treasury is empty, and the West will not give money to support the “social sector”?!
What's the point? The bottom line is that the West does not need an economically developed, producing Ukraine with science and technology; with Antonov aircraft and Yuzhmash missiles. At the same time, it does not matter to the West who will have official power - whether Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk, or Tsarev and Pushilin.
What prevents you from starting a dialogue?
What is preventing the start of negotiations now? in Ukraine?
At first, the power over many minds of military rhetoric and hope: what if we manage to win, defeat, crush?! In 1992, it was 100% exactly the same on the Dniester. Then, when the blood began to flow thicker and the damage greater, such hopes dimmed. Now the media are reporting that Donetsk is being stormed. For now, there is hope that this will not result in what happened on June 19, 1992 in Bendery, because the “Bendery” option in the conditions of vast Ukraine will only give impetus to new bloodshed.
Second, the The parties to the conflict have opposite positions. From unitarism to federalism and even the independence of the DPR and LPR, as well as the creation of Novorossiya. But we must at least tell each other about our point of view. So that at least it is clear who officially wants what.
Thirdly, so to speak, “gentry-Cossack” traditions characteristic of Poland and Ukraine: there is no single leader responsible for everything. But on each side there is a group of different political and military figures with sometimes different interests. President Petro Poroshenko was elected in Kyiv, but Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk is a player independent of the president with serious support from the West. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Andrei Parubiy has strong Western (American) support, and oligarch Igor Kolomoisky actually has his own troops. There is also speaker Alexander Turchynov, who was the commander-in-chief until P. Poroshenko took office. It seems that the new president does not have his own fighters or his own team. He also said that there would be no radical changes in the composition of the Cabinet. Apparently, the US doesn’t want this either. This means that P. Poroshenko’s freedom of hands when making decisions is a separate issue.
But the situation is similar for opponents of the Kyiv government. There is the DPR and there is the LPR. And there is a project to create Novorossiya from 8 regions with coordinator Oleg Tsarev. And there is the Union of DPR and LPR with the Council of this Union of 3 people each (6 in total). There is DPR Speaker Denis Pushilin, LPR Prime Minister Vasily Nikitin and DPR Prime Minister Alexander Boroday. And then there are people.
I apologize if I missed anyone, and I ask: who should start a dialogue and with whom?
This is our experience
For us, Ukrainian brothers, things were simpler on the Dniester in 1992! In Moldova the president was Mircea Snegur, and in Transnistria Igor Smirnov. That is, there were “kings,” although far from autocratic. And Ukrainians are truly democratic people – from Lvov to Donetsk! There are many politicians in Ukraine. For wartime - a lot.
We practiced meetings of top officials for the purpose of a ceasefire. This did not give the overall expected result, but some progress was visible. Here who will meet with whom (if any) is unclear. But even here a lot can be done (if our experience seems interesting).
At first, on May 31, 1992, a group of moderate deputies of the Parliament of Moldova visited Tiraspol in order to stimulate the negotiation process between the PMR and the RM. Maybe it makes sense for a group of deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to come to Donetsk or Lugansk? This would be a good way to establish contacts.
Secondly, deputies of the Parliament of Moldova from Transnistria went to a session in Chisinau in May-June 1992, which resulted in the decision of the Parliament of June 18 on the separation of Moldovan and Transnistrian troops. Yes, it was thwarted on June 19 by the invasion of the Moldovan army in Bendery, but this is a different question. If the security of the Rada deputies (all) is guaranteed, then perhaps they will go to work on peace initiatives.
Thirdly, during the announcement of the truce, joint groups were created to monitor the ceasefire. This group was led by one deputy minister of defense of Moldova and Transnistria. They discussed the mechanism for disengaging troops, meeting daily. They completed their task. The rest depended on the politicians.
Fourthly, in certain sectors of the front, before the conclusion of the final peace agreement on July 21, 1992, local truces were concluded between the commanders of units opposing each other. Thus, many lives of soldiers and officers were saved. It is unlikely that survivors have any reason to criticize this method.
Fifthly, in many ways, relations between the banks of the Dniester were improved after the neutrality of the Republic of Moldova was enshrined in the Constitution of Moldova. its non-bloc status.
At sixth, we also had some Moldovan politicians say: “We will negotiate with Moscow, and not with the Tiraspol separatists!” Our experience is as follows: over 22 years, many meetings have been held at the level of presidents, speakers, ministers, deputies and other officials of Moldova and Transnistria; Many bilateral agreements have been concluded. There has been a transition to peace and even some cooperation. Why is this bad?
Perhaps someone has more original and constructive ideas. I will be glad to listen to them.
Only peace!
Analyzing the results of the elections on May 25, it should be noted that An oligarchic system of government was established in Ukraine. The reality in the country is an oligarch president with a semi-autonomous position of a number of other oligarchs. Moreover, the powers of the head of state are reduced by returning to the 2004 Constitution. This is neither good nor bad. It's just a fact.
But a clear conclusion follows from this fact: Since the new President is not an autocratic leader with unlimited powers, the continuation of the war will inevitably undermine his position. In addition, the sins of those who actually made and are making tough decisions will be blamed on him - especially if these decisions do not bring success to the Kyiv authorities.
Therefore, I think It would be in the interests of everyone who is capable of sensibly assessing the situation that there would be an immediate end to the civil war and a transition to peaceful dialogue in the very heart of the CIS. What will happen in practice, brothers-Ukrainians, depends only on you! Let the considerations brought to your attention help at least a little.
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