A re-release of the best-selling book about the 2014-15 battles in Donbass has been released
"Book World" - one of the largest Russian patriotic publishing houses, which has published many books about Donbass and events in Ukraine, has published new edition of the book “Donbass. Five years of battles and victories!”, which was written by the historian, participant in the war in Yugoslavia Mikhail Polikarpov.
This book is a detailed documentary chronicle of the fierce battles that took place in the Donbass in 2014-2015. The defense of Slavyansk, the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the rebellious people's republics, the bloody battles for Saur-Mogila and the defeat of Ukrainian troops in the steppe “cauldrons” near Donetsk, the “winter” campaign of 2015 and two fierce truces.
The book uses previously unpublished information, supplemented by photographs and maps of the theater of operations.
Here is one of the fragments from this book:
Yampil
Militia units under the overall command of Igor Strelkov held the front section from Konstantinovka on the left flank (then was Igor Bezler’s zone of responsibility) to Yampol on the right, where the Lisichansk “Ghost” battalion was a neighbor. In the rear there remained the besieged Kramatorsk airfield with a strong garrison of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and a blocked air defense station in Artemovsk.
Immediately after the fall of Krasny Liman, a small detachment commanded by “Prapor” (deputy - “Machete”) was transferred to a forest bridgehead on the northern (left) bank of the Seversky Donets near Yampol. They had to keep the Ukrainian Armed Forces in constant tension.
According to residents of Krasny Liman, the Ukrainian military had to rebuild its checkpoint on the outskirts of the city at least twice after it was attacked by the militia. To radically solve the problem, the security forces even tried to burn the forest, but a sudden downpour put out the fire.
The bridgehead itself resembled the flag of Novorossiya - as if the St. Andrew’s Cross was crossed by two roads. One went from Krasny Liman (there was a base of the Ukrainian Armed Forces) to the southeast to Seversk, crossing the Seversky Donets at Zakotny, there was a ford downstream. The second road went from Yampol to the southwest, crossing the river at Krivaya Luka.
These roads actually divided the forested bridgehead into four sectors. In the northern sector (closer to Yampol) there were positions of combat groups from Gorlovka under the command of “Ataman” and “Berkut”. In the western sector, in particular, there was a group of “Skif”; in the eastern sector, units under the command of “Machete” and “Leshego” occupied positions. In the southern sector there was a canteen, a weapons depot, doctors, and the Jeweler group occupied positions there. Remote checkpoints were located all the way to Seversk. In my opinion, Prapor made a mistake by covering all directions of a possible attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces - and at the same time not creating a reserve. There was nothing to plug the holes in case of a breakthrough.
In total, by the middle of the month there were about two hundred militia under the command of “Prapor”. The exact figure is unknown; there was no list of personnel. The bulk were made up of recently arrived, untrained and unfired fighters. The Prapor squad included Givi and Motorola, but their star will rise in the fall. And there weren't many heavy weapons. Two LNG-9s were installed near the route to Krasny Liman, and the bridge at Zakotny was covered by a ZSU-23-2. The militia also had anti-aircraft Utes based on UAZ and AGS. There was no artillery, only once a battery of Khudozhnik mortars came from Slavyansk “on tour” - then they covered the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ tent camp near Kirovsky.
“Prapor” only simulated mining the bridge near Zakotny, since it did not want to blow it up so as not to complicate the lives of local residents, who would then have to cross the river in boats.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces from Krasny Liman attacked the post several times with small forces, and Prapor did not even inform Igor Strelkov about some of the clashes. But among the militia there was a series of desertions and accidents. Thus, an attempt was made on the life of “Albanian”, whom the commander refused to let go - the car got into an accident after the shelling. “Prapor” decided that this indicated that an attack was being prepared, so he ordered to strengthen the position by burying himself in the ground. Soon, the militia captured a lieutenant and two ordinary soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the 3rd special forces regiment.
On June 16, a Ukrainian battery (six 100 mm guns) was destroyed in a field several kilometers east of Krasny Liman. The probable cause is the detonation of the ammunition, but in their reports the commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine could explain this by the actions of enemy saboteurs, which influenced the decision to liquidate the bridgehead.
Offensive. Since the morning of June 19, there have been reports of shelling of Kramatorsk and Yampol, as well as conflicting information about battles in the area of Yampol (southeast of Krasny Liman) and Seversk (a town between Slavyansk and Lisichansk).
The Ukrainian army, using its overwhelming superiority in forces and equipment, was able to achieve serious success. Early in the morning the shelling began and airstrikes were carried out. The effectiveness of aviation is in question, since the attack aircraft probably missed. The effectiveness of artillery shelling also turned out to be low. Previously, Prapor created false positions and maintained the appearance that they were occupied by militias. These positions were bombarded with shells. Between the first and second attacks, Igor Strelkov arrived at the intersection in the center of the bridgehead.
Although the main column that attacked the militia positions along the road from Krasny Liman suffered serious losses in the first attack (one tank, an infantry fighting vehicle and four infantry fighting vehicles were destroyed there), another Ukrainian Armed Forces detachment, bypassing the right flank of the militia, was able to capture the bridge near Zakotny.
The militias located in this locality fled (almost all). It was not possible to dislodge the security forces from there, and, finding themselves surrounded, militia groups left the left bank bridgehead across the bridge at Krivaya Luka. For some reason they called it a pontoon, although it was ordinary, on low steel supports. When this bridge was captured, the militia remaining on the left bank crossed the river in boats or by swimming.
The militia lost five or six people killed in this battle. Two cooks were killed during the shelling, and three more militiamen were killed in the battle itself (Prapor admits that there were four). About twenty soldiers were wounded. “Prapor” also received shrapnel wounds, and rumors spread among the militia about his death. Machete’s deputy, “Cat,” was literally riddled with bullets. Doctors subsequently removed from him two bullets from a PC and one from a Kalashnikov assault rifle (after long-term treatment in the hospital, “Kot” returned to duty). “Kastet” also received three bullet wounds that day. The fighters came out of the encirclement - more than fifty people were brought out by "Machete", another thirty - by "Maurice".[1] The BMP was knocked out by Denis, and the BMD was used by militias with the call signs “Gnome” and “Diesel”. The “Gnome” died at the very beginning of the battle, in the morning, when the first tank attack was repulsed. The crew of the LNG “Diesel” and “Geologist” distinguished themselves, who had previously chosen and camouflaged a position near the road. “Geologist” was wounded in the morning and sent to Lisichansk.
Having crossed the bridge near Zakotny, the Ukrainian military did not gain a foothold at the crossing. In the evening, the bridge was suddenly occupied by militia fighters from the Ghost. I am skeptical about the version according to which the attack on Seversk was thwarted due to an erroneous strike by the Ukrainian Air Force on its convoy. The next day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces withdrew from Zakotny, but the bridge at Krivoy Luka remained under their control. Subsequently, the Yampol bridgehead actually passed into the area of responsibility of Alexei Mozgovoy.
Chase VSU. The media, citing the Ukrainian authorities, reported that more than two dozen servicemen of the 24th brigade from Yavorivshchyna (Lviv region) were killed near Slavyansk, incl. battalion commander and reconnaissance company commander of the first battalion-tactical group of the 24th mechanized brigade. The soldiers say they were surrounded. And they promise to “sort things out” with their generals in the future.[2] Apparently, there was a “layer cake” there, and both sides believed that they were fighting surrounded.
From reports in the Ukrainian media it became known that on this day, during the fighting near Krasny Liman, 12 soldiers of the 25th Dnepropetrovsk Airborne Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were killed and XNUMX wounded.[3] These are the same damaged BMDs. Later, an interview with one of the paratroopers appeared, who said that in their company of 33 people there were seven left (that is, 28 people were killed, wounded or missing).
Information has appeared that in this battle the 1st battalion of the National Guard lost 7 people killed and 11 wounded.
In total, based on the above data, which is unofficial, the total losses of the Ukrainian “security forces” amounted to up to forty dead. However, the ATO press center did not confirm these figures, stating only seven killed. Later, the names of 12 Ukrainian Armed Forces fighters (that is, excluding the National Guard) who were killed that day near Yampol and Krasny Liman appeared on the list of dead security forces. Subsequently, the number of deaths in the official list of Ukrainian Armed Forces losses for that day increased.
After information about the losses, broken down by parts, appeared, the “fog of war” cleared a little. We can say that the core of the attacking forces was the battalion tactical group of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 1st battalion of this brigade, a reconnaissance company and at least one tank company. In addition, the 1st NSU battalion and at least two companies from the 25th airmobile brigade took part in the battle. Perhaps there were some other units.
Controversial conclusions. Assessments of both the battle and the operation itself vary greatly. According to the “Bad Soldier,” which he publicly voiced later, the Yampol operation itself was a mistake. According to him, Igor Strelkov was repeatedly asked to withdraw the militia across the river and blow up bridges, and use the Prapor battalion to destroy the checkpoint near Malinovka and (together with other forces) to strike the Artyomovsky warehouses.
Igor Strelkov assesses the Yampol operation as unsuccessful. At the same time, he did not consider it necessary to storm Malinovka, since there was a strong garrison of the Ukrainian Armed Forces there, and the supply of Slavyansk went along a different route, through Nikolaevka. Igor believes that control of the battalion during the battle on June 19 was actually lost due to a lack of communications equipment. But there were radio stations, they were just jammed.
“Prapor” believes that the defense of Nikolaevka in the future became possible thanks to the assault battalion, which was created “on wheels” and became a full-fledged combat unit precisely in the battles for the Yampol bridgehead, where it inflicted serious losses on the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Without the Yampolites, the right flank of Semyonovka would have been completely exposed later, in the July battles.
According to Eldar’s chief of staff, the bridgehead had to be held, but not by creating a stationary checkpoint, but by operating in mobile groups. True, this presupposes a certain qualification of the fighters.
One way or another, the section of the front between Slavyansk and Lisichansk still needs to be covered by someone. In my opinion, the river was not an insurmountable obstacle for the Ukrainian Armed Forces - if the bridges were destroyed, they could build pontoon bridges and cross to the right bank. I also doubt that a squad made up mostly of new recruits could be used successfully in the offensive operations called "Bad Soldier" above.
Military science knows a set of rules for unfired and poorly trained troops. It is expected, in particular, to abandon night attacks and the use of these troops in offensive operations, and to abandon complex flanking maneuvers... Troops must train in surprise attacks in small groups. The command staff, according to these rules, should be closer to the fighters, and orders should be more clear and detailed, control over the actual execution of actions should also be higher. In addition, these troops require more abundant supplies.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine had the opportunity to gradually improve the qualifications of their troops, transferring them to a qualitatively different level, while the militia acted under time pressure, and the possibilities of increasing firepower were very limited.
[1] He died at the end of August 2014 in a battle in Ilovaisk.
[2] http://takeinfo.net/news/view/dvadtsyat_soldat_iz_zahidno_ukrani_zaginulo_chimalo_poranenih_biy_triva
[3] http://nikopolnews.net/politika/voyna/1312-snova-pogibli-nashi-zemlyaki.html
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