Why does Poland “measure memory” with Ukraine and Israel?
The new Polish law, dubbed “anti-Bandera” in Ukraine, will in fact have much broader implications for Poland’s domestic and foreign policy.
Subscribe to PolitNavigator news at Telegram, Facebook, Classmates or In contact with
Let's start with the fact that only the authors of the corresponding amendment from the populist movement “Kukiz'15”, as well as Russian and Ukrainian commentators, call the law “anti-Bandera”. In fact, the law, which the Senate voted for on the night of February 1 without much discussion and which President Duda publicly promised to sign, deals with a whole set of changes to the law on the Institute of National Remembrance. They were initiated by the ruling Law and Justice party, and the formal author was Deputy Minister of Justice of Poland Patrick Jaki.
First of all, the law introduces liability for public allegations that the Polish state and the Polish people took part in the crimes of the Nazis, including the Holocaust, and for the use of the term "Polish death camps" to define Nazi concentration camps created during the Second World War Germans on the territory of German-occupied Poland, but also for denying the crimes of Ukrainian nationalists (and not only Bandera) and promoting their ideology (it was this amendment that was voted the other day when considering the bill).
But the main thing is that the law is not directed against the “Banderaites,” who are not among the Poles in Poland, nor among the millions of Ukrainians who came to this country to work. The main goal of the document is an attempt by the shadow ruler of Poland, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, to gain votes from the conservative and nationalist electorate, for which even Law and Justice seems too liberal. In the same category are the law banning trade on Sunday (“on this day you need to go to church”) and the impending complete ban on abortion (even for medical reasons), which has already come into force. And since all these innovations are opposed by Polish liberals, led by ex-Prime Minister of Poland Donald Tusk, and the left, personified by ex-President Aleksander Kwasniewski, Kaczynski and his colleagues in the right-wing conservative camp received another opportunity to call their political opponents “traitors to Poland.”
However, the law also has foreign policy goals - to strengthen Poland’s position in negotiations with Israel - on the return of property of Polish Jews, and with Ukraine - primarily on historical issues. Naturally, this does not exclude the punishment of specific individuals. And the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance, clearly trying the law on himself, correctly described the possible mechanisms for its use: “Responsibility extends not only to citizens of the Republic of Poland, but also to foreigners who are not even on the territory of Poland (Article 55 b). That is, if he wrote/said something incorrect from the point of view of the Polish authorities, not even on Polish territory, the Institute of National Remembrance initiates a criminal case, and then even through Interpol you can submit extradition requests.”
It is difficult to say how much the new law will affect the current relations between Poland and Ukraine, which can already be described as crisis. Warsaw stoically endured both the adopted law on the glorification of the OUN-UPA, and this glorification itself - the renaming of streets and avenues, the marches on October 14 and January 1. But the ban on the exhumation of the graves of victims of the Volyn massacre, introduced by Kiev last summer, was considered in Poland to go beyond all limits. Moreover, at first, official Warsaw tried to play with carrots: in August 2017, in a detailed interview with the Russian newspaper Kommersant, the head of Polish diplomacy, Witold Waszczykowski, actually disavowed his regular statements that “with Bandera and Shukhevych, Ukraine will not enter Europe.” Moreover, the head of Polish diplomacy said that “we have no information about growing nationalism in Ukraine,” and explained the glorification of the UPA by saying that “Ukraine is unconsciously trying to formulate, grope for its historical identity in order to lay the foundation for patriotism - although someone may call it nationalism, and this is a normal tendency.” But since the Ukrainian authorities did not understand the signal, since the beginning of November, Poland’s position on historical issues has been constantly tightening, and the law is clearly not the last step - we should expect the opening of cases against specific Ukrainian officials based on it.
The official reaction of Kyiv to the tightening of Polish legislation could initially be described as “stupor”. The only comment, without a signature, was published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it expressed a completely inadequate hope that the bill would be “buried” in the Polish Senate. Neither chief of diplomacy Klimkin, nor Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration Klympush-Tsintsadze, nor Prime Minister Groysman have yet commented on the problem. Only in the middle of the day on February 1, the President of Ukraine expressed deep concern, calling the assessments contained in the new law absolutely biased and categorically unacceptable. “The adopted bill does not comply with the proclaimed principles of the strategic partnership between Ukraine and Poland. I call on Poland to be objective and dialogue. Only together we will win,” Poroshenko noted on his Facebook page.
So far, Humanitarian Deputy Prime Minister Rozenko, who is due to meet in Warsaw with his Polish counterpart Glinsky in mid-February, is also silent to solve the problem of the exhumation of Polish graves in Volyn. By the way, one of the forms of reaction of both Ukraine and Poland may be the cancellation of this meeting.
At the same time, in general, the Ukrainian side is clearly inclined to escalate tensions in relations with Poland. For example, on January 30, the Lvov Regional Council made a decision that recommended (and in fact obligated) the red-and-black Bandera flag to be hung 10 times a year: January 1 - on the birthday of Stepan Bandera, February 3 - on the day of the creation of the OUN, March 5 - on the day of the death of the UPA Commander-in-Chief Roman Shukhevych, May 21 - on the day of remembrance of the victims of political repression, May 23 - on the Heroes' Day, June 14 - on the birthday of the first leader of the OUN Yevgeny Konovalets, June 30 - on the day of the proclamation of the Act on the Restoration of the Ukrainian State, July 30 is the day of the creation of the Ukrainian Military Organization, October 14 is the day of the creation of the UPA, the second Sunday of July is the day of the creation of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Council. It is obvious how such a decision will be perceived in the neighboring country.
And one of the president’s political strategists, Viktor Ukolov, even burst into accusations against Poland and the Poles. “As I understand it, now on the territory of the Panate it is impossible to say that Auschwitz was near Krakow, and the apartments from which Jews were taken to the gas chambers were most often taken by the Poles. The fact that in organizing the Holocaust, the Nazis had enough helpers among the local population and as a result, in Germany itself, half the Jewish population died (as a percentage of the entire Jewish population of the country) than in Poland. The fact that the Poles did not support the Jewish uprising in the Warsaw ghetto and thus allowed the Germans to drown the rebels in blood, and then the Polish uprising a year later in Warsaw repeated its fate. That on August 11, 1945, in Krakow, the Poles attacked Jews because of rumors that they were allegedly stealing Christian children... That on July 4, 1946, the Poles staged a pogrom in the city of Kielce against Jews who miraculously survived the war, because, they say they didn’t want to return their previous housing,” Ukolov wrote on his Facebook page.
At the same time, it should be noted that in Poland the impact of the new law on Polish-Jewish relations is mainly discussed, and Ukraine is rarely mentioned. Israel's reaction to the novelties of Polish legislation was very sharp: last Sunday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on Poland to refuse to adopt the law. Although formally Warsaw demonstrates its readiness for compromises (a joint working group with Jerusalem has been created), they will clearly relate specifically to the application of the law, and not to its text.
Moreover, it was at the insistence of the Israeli side that clarifications were made that historical research and works of art that contradict the norms of the new law should not be prosecuted. However, opposition politicians are already sneering at the last norm: whether a diploma in history or an Oscar is needed for a person to have the right to pronounce the phrase "Polish death camps." But representatives of the ruling majority very often in discussions slide into the formulations "no one, especially Jews, will tell Poland how to interpret its history."
After the vote in the Polish Senate, The Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli Knesset intends to consider a bill equating the Polish law on the Institute of National Remembrance with Holocaust denial. In addition, as early as February 1, Israel may decide to recall its ambassador Anna Azari from Poland (by the way, Israeli ambassador to Ukraine in 1999-2003). And according to Reuters, the adopted bill could also have consequences for Warsaw’s relations with the United States, as it “undermines freedom of speech and academic discourse, creating obstacles to discussions on the Holocaust.” US State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert stated bluntly that “we are also concerned about the implications that could arise for Poland’s strategic interests and relationships. We call on Poland to review its legislation."
Responding to critics of the law, official Warsaw focuses on the fact that the participation of individual Poles in the Holocaust in general and the extermination of Jews on Polish territory in particular was isolated, did not have support from government structures in exile and was not organized - unlike in other countries Europe occupied by Nazi Germany. However, propaganda in the style of “It’s not my fault!” sometimes takes on caricatured features: the current Minister of Education of Poland, in response to the question of who killed the Jews in Jedwabne, answered that they were “anti-Semites.”
It should be noted that very often discussions about the responsibility of the Poles to the Jewish people move into the plane of returning property previously owned by Jews or compensating for its value. In Poland, by the way, the idea that this could be done through reparations from Germany is being seriously discussed. So the “measurement of memory” in Warsaw will clearly not end with the law adopted today.
If you find an error, please select a piece of text and press Ctrl + Enter.
Thank you!
Now the editors are aware.