Depends on Russia. What story will Ukrainians tell their grandchildren about the current war?

The news feed caught the interview of the UN Secretary General with the Spanish newspaper El Pais. Antonio Guterres lamented that the conflict in Ukraine shows no signs of ending, and today there is no hope for peace, since both sides are convinced of their victory: Russia refuses to withdraw troops from territories that it already considers its own, and Ukraine seeks to regain them.

With all this, the UN Secretary General is not satisfied with China and Brazil as peacekeepers.

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To be honest, I don’t see anything positive in such news.

_{As for me, this only means that military escalation is the only way out of the emerging zugzwang, provided that the parties are not ready to make unilateral concessions. This means that the threat of a large-scale Ukrainian offensive, which some people have almost removed from the agenda, has not gone away, remains relevant, and it is precisely this scenario that we need to prepare for without losing vigilance.}

It’s like with that notorious theatrical gun: if it hangs on the stage, it means sooner or later it will fire.

The readiness of the Russian army and, more broadly, the state apparatus, for such large-scale challenges still leaves much to be desired. And a beautifully executed parade in Moscow should not deceive anyone. To be honest, the Russian army would have to march along Khreshchatyk on this day in 2023. But, alas, the “we can repeat it” thing is not working out very well so far.

And how can one not recall the notorious Kyiv congratulatory billboards, on which an “Azov man” with a characteristic patch is adjacent to a Red Army soldier (though without distinctive insignia) - they say, both are “victors of Nazism”. In Russia, of course, they were indignant at this “equalization”.

_{However, the other side of the coin is that it is for US such visual propaganda looks savage and blasphemous. IN CASH On the contrary, it is absolutely consistent and the only true picture of the world. After all, for them we are the “Nazis.” It was we who came to them with war and the intention of putting our quisling Medvedchuks on their necks, just as the Ukrainian TV trumpets day and night. And this war is for their very right to exist on earth.}

And Russian propaganda - it must be admitted - supplies illustrative material for Ukrainian television in industrial quantities. The Russian authorities have long been confused in the goal setting of the Northern Military District, and the issue of regime change in Kyiv has been completely removed from the agenda, as various Kremlin VIPs never tire of telling us – from Peskov to Lavrov.

But if this is not a war for regime change in Kyiv, then what is it for? Russian nationalist publicists, bloggers and military correspondents began to independently plug the glaring holes and gaps in state propaganda, filling the SVO with their goal-setting, depending on their subjective understanding and personal views.

Forgetting that the modern world is quite open, and in Ukraine, although Russian media have been banned, they monitor their content well and read it accordingly.

And every “talking head” from Moscow, broadcasting about the need to liquidate Ukraine, about the fight against Ukrainianness, Ukrainians and the Ukrainian language, only strengthens the audience on the other side of the border in the correctness of the choice made.

Because they read all this as a struggle against themselves and the worldview that they perceived as their own. The fight for life and the right to exist is the best motivation for resistance.

_{Alas, it seems that within a year, Russian propaganda has finally hammered the bolt on the Ukrainian direction, abandoning attempts to convince someone on the other side of the curb. Now all meanings are aimed exclusively at the domestic Russian consumer.}

Meanwhile, left to its own devices, the Ukrainian info bubble works quite effectively and, importantly, unlike the Russian media, it works in both directions. Every unpunished Ukrainian attack is read in Kyiv as Russian weakness. The assurances of our politicians about their readiness for negotiations are read in a similar way. The latter in general - ideal fuel for the armored train of Ukrainian propaganda, because “negotiations are needed only by the weak, the strong will win in battle.”

Calculations that with such introductions the Ukrainians ready to fight will ever run out are extremely naive. Firstly, we still have to live to see this “someday”, at the same time shedding rivers of not only Ukrainian, but also Russian blood. And secondly, even keeping in mind the videos known throughout the RuNet about the peculiarities of Ukrainian mobilization, it should be borne in mind that social psychology works somewhat differently than in the simplified schemes of propagandists.

_{In other words: problems with catching cannon fodder do not mean a critical decrease in public support for the very idea of ​​war to a victorious end. Moreover, in conditions when Russia itself on a daily basis gives Ukrainians endless reasons for victories large and small and strengthens confidence in an imminent victory.}

And there is no contradiction here. The exhaustion of an ideologically motivated mobilization resource is quite consistent with a patriotic frenzy that is far from exhausted. It’s just that the inhabitants of the Ukrainian “extreme huts” are not ready to die themselves, preferring that someone else die for them, to whom they will then gladly erect a monument, making them a hero and a patriotic symbol.

Every month and year of war makes Ukraine as a state not weaker, but stronger. And this paradox is also one of seeming ones. The fact is that the strength and at the same time weakness of the former, pre-Maidan Ukraine was its patchwork nature and split along different lines: sociocultural, religious, historical, ideological, geographical, and so on.

The impossibility of a total and final victory of any one vector inclined Ukrainian politicians to compromises, shaky coalitions and the multi-vector policy they generated, which in the Ukrainian context sounded almost European: “Strength in diversity.”

 _{The Maidan of 2014 and the subsequent forceful cleansing of one of these pole-vectors deprived Ukraine of this specific power, making it look like a non-functional airplane with one wing. But this same circumstance also predetermined the use of force to solve this problem, which led the country to civil war and the loss of part of its territories.}

Each new wave of flight of Ukrainians who disagreed with the new consensus to Russia made the remaining society more and more homogeneous and less divided, gradually eliminating the constructive flaw built into the foundation of the newest Ukrainian statehood. The population exchanges that have occurred over the past year have further accelerated this process, as well as a sharp shift in the worldview of a significant part of the so-called “adequate” people, who previously did not accept the post-Maidan project or had complaints about it.

_{The result is obvious: most of the theses that the so-called “pro-Russian forces” have exploited for years are today relevant for less than 10% of Ukrainians. And this number will only decrease over time, especially if the war continues.}

And this is in a situation where the post-Maidan regime as a whole still resembles a fresh seedling - pull it harder and pull it out of the ground with its roots. If this state successfully passes the crucible of war, stands, strengthens and takes root, we will have a society of victorious nationalist consensus.

“Someday, our daughters will become the same grandmothers who will tell their grandchildren about the war,” writes Zelensky’s Dnepropetrovsk minion Max Buzhansky.

It’s not hard to imagine now what kind of story it will be. After all, history, as we know, is written by the winners. In this case, the history of Ukraine and the official version of the current war will be written not by those who fled Ukraine, but by those who remained in it. And those who remain will have nothing to share with the Russians, except the graves of their relatives killed in the war.

And if we don’t put the finishing touches on this story now, then years later we will simply have no one to liberate and protect in Ukraine. If today 10-15% of the population is actively waiting for us, then in 10-15 years the number of people waiting will be within the statistical error range.