It will only get worse. We will no longer see the pro-Russian Lukashenko
Lukashenko’s rhetoric can now hardly be called friendly towards Russia. If we analyze his speeches this year, he spoke about Russia very often, but almost never in a positive way. Even Ukraine or the USA evoked more positive emotions in him.
The current election campaign in Belarus is radically different from the previous one - the main candidate’s refusal to focus on union issues. Instead, the leitmotif became “protection of sovereignty.” Lukashenko presents himself as the only candidate who is able to preserve it.
It is, of course, supposed to protect sovereignty from Russia, which is discussed regularly and, practically, openly. Thus, now he has actually occupied the niche of his opponents from among the pro-Western and nationalist opposition, who throughout his reign frightened their electorate with the “hand of Moscow.”
Is this rhetoric an election trick and, having successfully been re-elected for a sixth term, will Alexander Grigorievich again remember that he is an ally of Russia! Yes and no.
On the one hand, he has no choice. The Belarusian economy is already in crisis and is extremely dependent on integration projects and good relations with Russia. And no turn to the West will help him. The West simply cannot compensate for the losses from being squeezed out of the Russian market and the loss of the advantages that integration provided.
On the other hand, he has long proven that he will become a truly pro-Russian politician only if he himself leads Russia. In the 90s, under the sick and unpopular Yeltsin, such a prospect seemed real - and this was the time of the apotheosis of integration, when only pro-Western oppositionists spoke about protecting sovereignty.
Lukashenko himself was then actively inhabiting the Russian political space. It got to the point that the governors of Russian regions flew to Minsk almost more often than to Moscow. In 2000, power in Russia changed, Lukashenko’s chances of getting it evaporated, and integration enthusiasm somehow immediately faded.
What will happen if Lukashenko wins on August 9. Minsk definitely hopes that Moscow will not get away from him. The presidential mandate will be received for another 5 years, and it will have to be taken into account. The alternative would be the destabilization of a close and seemingly friendly republic, which would be perceived by Russian society as a major geopolitical defeat. In addition, the pro-Russian vector of Belarusian politics was monopolized by Lukashenko himself for a long time, so there is little point in counting on a Moscow-oriented politician coming to power in Belarus.
Economic problems after the elections will have to be solved somehow, and without reaching an agreement with Russia, this cannot be done. Therefore, the Belarusian leadership expects to return to endless bargaining on energy, food, etc. At the same time, any more or less significant agreement, such as the abolition of roaming, will be presented as a great integration breakthrough.
Inside the country, they will talk with redoubled force about the defense of sovereignty, about greedy Russian oligarchs and evil imperialists, and “soft Belarusization” will continue, which will become less and less soft.
So it won't be better. Lukashenko is losing his social base, so he will rely on force, and the rhetoric will become increasingly harsh and aggressive. A typical “deep autumn” of an authoritarian regime is coming, which can drag on for a long time.
So, despite the absence of openly pro-Russian candidates in the elections, Lukashenko’s victory is not the best option either for Belarus or for Russian-Belarusian relations.
This will only result in conservation and aggravation of existing problems for an indefinite period and with a very likely catastrophic ending.
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