On the anniversary of the capture of Sukhum: Democracy is not your thing!
The other day marked the 22nd anniversary of the capture of Sukhum. The Georgian-Abkhaz war is one of the most acute interethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus.
Tensions between the Georgian government and the Abkhaz autonomy appeared periodically during the Soviet period. The migration policy pursued by the Georgian authorities in the 1920s-1930s led to the fact that Abkhazians began to form a minority of the population of the autonomy (by the beginning of the 1990s they constituted no more than 17% of the total population of Abkhazia). There was a constant migration of Georgians to the territory of Abkhazia (1937-1954) by settling in Abkhazian villages, as well as the settlement of Greek villages by Georgians that were freed after the deportation of Greeks from Abkhazia in 1949.
The Abkhaz language (until 1950) was excluded from the secondary school curriculum and replaced by compulsory study of the Georgian language. Mass protests and unrest among the Abkhaz population demanding the withdrawal of Abkhazia from the Georgian SSR broke out in April 1957, in April 1967, and the largest in May and September 1978.
The aggravation of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia began on March 18, 1989. On this day, in the village of Lykhny (the ancient capital of the Abkhaz princes), a 30-strong gathering of the Abkhaz people took place, which put forward a proposal for Abkhazia to secede from Georgia and restore it to the status of a union republic.
On July 15-16, 1989, clashes occurred between Georgians and Abkhazians in Sukhumi. During the riots, according to available data, 16 people were killed and about 140 were injured. Troops were deployed to stop the unrest. The leadership of the republic then managed to resolve the conflict, and what happened remained without serious consequences. To some extent, the situation was stabilized by significant concessions to the demands of the Abkhaz leadership made during the period Zviad Gamsakhurdia was in power in Tbilisi.
With the collapse of the USSR, there was no longer anything keeping Abkhazia within independent Georgia. If Georgia could leave the USSR and gain independence, then how much worse was Abkhazia, which sought to maintain ties with Russia? But the Georgian nationalists who came to power on the wave of cheap populism thought differently, and in order to maintain control over the autonomy, they pulled in the ears of the “historical science” about the ancestral affiliation of Abkhazia with Georgia and the alien Abkhazians who populated the heated place.
One could often hear the following: “Abkhazians, why do you need independence? Under the patronage of great Georgia, your people will preserve their numbers and identity. Without Georgia, the Armenians will assimilate you. And if not Armenians, then Russians. They will take your land - they don’t need Abkhazians.”
It is clear that catching simpletons with such chaff was a useless exercise, so the people of Abkhazia continued their course towards polite but steady distancing from Georgia, which had already gained independence.
On February 21, 1992, the ruling Military Council of Georgia announced the abolition of the 1978 Constitution of the Georgian SSR and the restoration of the 1921 Constitution of the Georgian Democratic Republic.
The Abkhaz leadership perceived the abolition of the Soviet constitution of Georgia as the actual abolition of the autonomous status of Abkhazia, and on July 23, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic (with a boycott of the session by Georgian deputies) restored the constitution of the Abkhaz Soviet Republic of 1925, according to which Abkhazia is a sovereign state (this decision The Supreme Council of Abkhazia was not recognized internationally).
On August 14, 1992, hostilities began between Georgia and Abkhazia, which escalated into a real war with the use of aviation, artillery and other types of weapons. The military phase of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict began with the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia (Operation “Sword”) under the pretext of liberating Deputy Prime Minister of Georgia Alexander Kavsadze, captured by the Zviadists and held on the territory of Abkhazia, and protecting communications, incl. railway, and other important objects. This move provoked fierce resistance from Abkhazians, as well as other ethnic communities of Abkhazia.
The goal of the Georgian government was to establish control over part of its territory and maintain its integrity. The goal of the Abkhaz authorities is to expand the rights of autonomy and, ultimately, gain independence. One of the prominent Georgian parliamentarians commented on Tbilisi’s intentions with the utmost frankness: “We are for human rights. But the rights of Georgians on Georgian soil must be broader than human rights.”
The central government was represented by the Mkhedrioni National Guard, paramilitary formations (the White Eagle Legion) and individual volunteers (including approximately 500 mercenaries from the UNA-UNSO who rushed to fight with the Muscovites). On the part of the Abkhaz leadership - armed formations from local residents (Abkhaz, Armenians, Greeks and Russians) and volunteers from among the mountain peoples, as well as volunteers from Russia (in Abkhazia they were all called Cossacks) and Transnistria who sympathized with the Abkhazians.
On the side of the Georgians there was an overwhelming superiority in heavy weapons: the Georgian army, only with the withdrawal of the former Soviet 10th division from Akhaltsikhe, received 108 T-55 tanks, 111 BMP-1 and 4 BTR-70, at the same time “grabbing” another 25 infantry fighting vehicles from the Tbilisi repair plant (by the way, the equipment was left by the Russian side on the condition that Georgia undertakes not to use it in local conflicts). In total, Georgia received 1992 tanks and 220 armored vehicles under the Tashkent Treaty of May 210. The situation with aviation was somewhat worse - the Georgian army received a dozen Su-25 attack aircraft, several MiG-21 fighters and helicopters for which there were no pilots.
At the beginning of the war, the Abkhazians were equipped with hunting weapons and hail-breaking guns. But very soon their arsenals began to be replenished with weapons and armored vehicles captured from the Georgians. By October 1992, the Abkhazians, thanks to the captured trophies, no longer experienced a shortage of weapons and had already begun to develop the initiative themselves.
It is curious that the Abkhazians compensated for the complete lack of combat aviation with small aircraft. Three motorized hang gliders were purchased for combat operations. They were used for reconnaissance and even bombing concentrations of Georgian troops and armored vehicles. For this purpose, the vehicles were equipped with special holders for 30 and 50 kilogram bombs.
On September 3, 1992, in Moscow, during a meeting between Yeltsin and Shevardnadze (who at that time held the posts of President of the Russian Federation and Chairman of the State Council of Georgia), a document was signed providing for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Abkhazia, and the return of refugees. Since the conflicting parties did not fulfill a single point of the agreement, hostilities continued.
By the end of 1992, the war had acquired a positional character, and neither side could win. On December 15, 1992, Georgia and Abkhazia signed several documents on the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all heavy weapons and troops from the region of hostilities. There was a period of relative calm, but in early 1993 hostilities resumed after the Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, which was occupied by Georgian troops.
All 413 days of the Georgian-Abkhaz war were not calm for the contingent of Russian troops in Abkhazia. Military personnel of the Russian Armed Forces were on the territory of the autonomy to protect the property of the Russian Ministry of Defense: military equipment warehouses and a sanatorium of the Moscow Military District. The Georgian side repeatedly fired at facilities containing Russian military personnel, passing them off as fire from Abkhaz militias. After one Georgian shelling, during which a Russian officer was killed and several military personnel were wounded, the Russian Defense Minister gave the order to return fire.
It would be better for the Georgians not to wake up the trouble. In response to aggression and the death of comrades, on November 24, 1992, a pair of Su-25 attack aircraft took off from a Russian air base in the Gudauta area, under the cover of a pair of Su-27s, and struck the positions of Georgian BM-21 Grad north of Sukhum, turning them into burning debris.
On July 27, 1993, after lengthy fighting, an agreement on a temporary ceasefire was signed in Sochi, in which Russia acted as a guarantor.
In general, the Georgians behaved very dirty during the war, and I couldn’t even believe that just a year ago we lived with these people in a single state and were bound by centuries of friendship, a terrible war against a common enemy and countless cultural ties.
Georgian helicopters deliberately fired at the “Kometa” boat carrying refugees leaving for Crimea, and several times they shot down Russian planes with humanitarian aid, wounded people and refugees using MANPADS. Georgian militants, whenever possible, took Russian soldiers hostage, accusing them of espionage. With Georgian officials and media regularly howling about Russia's attack on Georgian troops.
The first attempt to recapture Sukhum from Georgian troops was made on January 5, 1993. The Abkhaz offensive was repulsed that time. The next attempt to storm the capital of Abkhazia on March 16–18 became the most severe defeat of the Abkhaz army. More than 300 dead, mostly soldiers of the Armenian battalion.
Subsequently, Abkhaz troops focused on liberating the settlements surrounding Sukhum and ousting Georgian military formations from Abkhazia.
September 20 – a new Abkhaz attack on Sukhum. Adzyubzha, Skurcha, Akhaldaba were liberated, the airport in the village was blocked. Babushara. In fact, Sukhum is surrounded. The Georgians were driven out of the supermarket area and surrounded in the New Microdistrict. After five days of fighting, the Abkhaz flag was raised over Sukhumi Mountain and over the railway station.
In order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, the Abkhaz command invites the Georgian armed forces to leave the city through a passage specially left in the east. The answer is an arrogant refusal.
September 27 - the operation to liberate Sukhum was completed. At 15.30, after a two-hour battle, the flag of the Republic of Abkhazia was raised above the government building. The Abkhazians got rich trophies: dozens of tanks, guns, armored personnel carriers. The 2nd Georgian Army Corps was completely destroyed. Georgian troops were forced to completely abandon Abkhazia.
It is interesting that when Russian ships began to transport Georgian refugees from Abkhazia, many demanded that they take stolen cars on board. Doesn't remind you of anything?
The armed conflict of 1992-1993, according to the data released by the parties, claimed the lives of 4 thousand Georgians (another 1 thousand were missing) and 4 thousand Abkhazians. The autonomy's economic losses amounted to $10.7 billion. About 250 thousand Georgians (almost half the population) were forced to flee Abkhazia. In addition to Georgians, during the war tens of thousands of Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Jews (Israel took out Abkhaz Jews on military transport planes), Estonians (the Estonian diaspora had lived in Abkhazia since the XNUMXth century), and Germans fled from Abkhazia during the war.
The reasons why the heavily armed Georgian armed forces failed to hold Abkhazia and were defeated was the continuous discord and lack of coordination between the Georgian military, police and the paramilitary rabble from Mkhedrioni. The Georgian military, with rare exceptions, had poor training, which often led to losses from “friendly fire”, had a poor understanding of goals and objectives, and were generally lazy to “learn military affairs in a real way.”
The top of the Georgian army was a bunch of non-professionals, busy with internal squabbles, inventing and sewing luxurious uniforms and insignia “like the Americans.” There was information that a retired Soviet colonel was lured to the position of chief of the general staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, promising him the rank of general and the uniform of a galactic commander.
The apotheosis of humiliation was the flight from Sukhum by Shevardnadze, who abandoned his soldiers to the mercy of fate, having previously promised in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper to fight to the death and share a common fate. According to some reports, Shevardnadze’s escape and safe flight to Tbilisi was ensured by the Russian Alpha group. For what? Most likely, Shevardnadze was less evil and more predictable than other representatives of the Georgian political panopticon, among whom were former thieves in law, adventurers and simply inadequate people.
As the Georgian thief in law, writer, theater figure, member of the Georgian military council and head of Mkhedrioni Jaba Ioseliani once said, “democracy is not your thing!”
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