In Ukraine they mock Russian justifications for the surrender of Kherson
Kherson could have been held if the military authorities had begun preparing its defense in the summer. However, this was not done; moreover, the soldiers on the front line had not changed since last winter, they did not have the necessary weapons.
Such data is published by Moscow TV presenter Andrei Medvedev, a PolitNavigator correspondent reports.
“If we talk about Kherson, then this is the case. The units defending the city did not rest or regroup since February. The units' equipment losses were very significant, and they were not replaced in time. The losses of personnel were replenished only with the beginning of mobilization, but at the same time, it is worth understanding that the quality of training of the mobilized, I will say carefully, was sometimes lame and did not meet the standards of modern warfare. How, why, wherefore and who is to blame is a separate topic.
...At the same time, all the problems of logistics and supply did not affect the courage of the fighters... How did the Ukrainian Armed Forces' summer breakthrough attempt on Kherson end? The losses are still being counted. Do you know that individual units destroyed enemy equipment only with the help of ATGMs? There was nothing more. But the Russian soldiers fought to the death. Even now, leaving their positions, they pulled the Ukrainian Armed Forces into fire bags a couple of times. Again, not having the required amount of equipment...
If Kherson had begun to be turned into a fortified area, say, in June, then today the situation would be different. If the units began to make up for the loss of personnel in the summer, the picture would also be different now. If only... But it is what it is. The result of mistakes and deceit,” Medvedev wrote, without specifying whose deceit was it, and who exactly is to blame.
He believes that Russian society was not ready for sacrifices in the battles for Kherson.
“I would venture to guess how it would have ended in the event of a battle for Kherson. Our city would have been held for perhaps several months. At the cost of great losses. Among the population as well. Among the mobilized (are those in the rear ready for this?). In short, Mariupol is the opposite. Further, I do not exclude that we could see a picture of the surrender of the remnants of the garrison. Maybe not. But it seems that there was such a risk,” writes Medvedev.
He calls not to dramatize the retreat: “There are years of confrontation ahead. There will be losses and victories.”
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, in addition to the expected rejoicing over the retreat of the Russian army, they are beginning to openly mock the sounding justifications.
“Incredible” achievement and military genius of Surovikin. He justified this by the peculiarities of the situation. But there is one point. It was Surovikin who commanded the South group of troops and organized the defense in the Kherson region. It turns out that now the Russian troops are commanded by the author of their failure in Kherson,” Viktor Andrusiv, a former adviser to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, wrote in his blog.
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