Breakthrough of the border of the Ukrainian DRG: Could this happen again?

“There is treason, cowardice and deceit all around,” Nicholas II wrote on March 2, 1917 in his diary and abdicated the Throne. Written 106 years ago, but it feels like yesterday.

On March 9, 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced retaliatory missile strikes against Ukrainian infrastructure for a terrorist attack committed by pro-Ukrainian saboteurs in two settlements in the Bryansk region. This should probably warm the soul of the average person. I won’t comment on the blows, that’s not what we’re talking about. The question is, how could this happen? And could it happen again?

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Let's look at the events. According to media reports, on March 2, armed people entered the villages of Libuchany and Sushany in the Bryansk region and opened fire on civilians. There are people injured. Soon, the commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps, Denis Nikitin, took responsibility for this. This formation, after many attempts to join the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, became part of the International Legion of Ukraine, which was formed in August 2022 from Russian citizens who adhere to far-right views. Some of them fought on the side of Ukraine back in 2014.

Thus, it turns out that official Kyiv can easily disown this act of intimidation, which is exactly what it does.

But the same Nikitin, in a conversation with the Financial Times, leaked the customer:

“Yes, of course, this action was agreed upon [with the Ukrainian authorities], otherwise it could not have happened.”

With what authorities? I believe that the SBU or GUR is behind them. Because Nikitin goes on to say that he was provided with certain intelligence information:

“How do you imagine that I walked there through the darkness in the night? There are mined bridges, there are cameras, heat-seeking drones, hidden observation posts. If I hadn’t coordinated with anyone, I think we would have simply been destroyed.”

It was Nikitin who spoke about the equipment of the border on the Ukrainian side. The fact is that starting in 2014, Ukraine began implementing project "Wall". The project provides for “engineering and technical arrangement of the state border to ensure monitoring and deterrence of illegal border crossing by smugglers and sabotage groups.

The land section includes the following elements:

- Electro-optical surveillance systems

-Electronic alarm systems

-Control-trace strip

-Earth ditch 4 meters wide and 2 meters deep

-Concrete ditches

-Earth rampart, concrete in key places.

-Fortifications

-Towers

-Rocades

-Mobile and stationary combat modules

In 2020, Ukraine planned to complete the construction of the “Wall” by 2025, and the overall readiness was estimated at 40%.

This is what Nikitin was talking about. But what about Russia?

_{It must have been hard for the saboteurs? Not at all. After all, on the Russian side it’s not a border, but a complete hole! Why?}

After the collapse of the USSR, the administrative border between the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR received the status of a state border. That's all! In some places it was not even demarcated, that is, it was not marked on the ground with border markers until 2014.

If you remember, in Soviet times the border was guarded by the border troops of the KGB of the USSR.  There was barbed wire along the border and, where possible, the control and trace strip (CTB) was plowed. A corresponding outpost was responsible for each section of the border. The outposts were organized into detachments, etc. Observation towers were installed along the border to monitor the adjacent territory, where border guards served. There were also technical alarm systems, and so-called “secrets” were placed along the likely routes of movement of violators. At the same time, the border guards conducted reconnaissance of the adjacent territory. The staff structure of the border departments of the border regions had departments for operational activities. They were the ones who did the reconnaissance. The quality of the intelligence data they obtained was high.

The outpost also equipped defensive structures in its interests in case of war. Thanks to them, in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, some outposts held out for more than one day, showing true heroism. 

This is roughly the same thing that should have been done at the new border., since the old, equipped one remained with the neighbors who were part of the USSR. Ukraine is building the same thing, but even more complex and technically equipped. But these are considerable funds.

They were not found in Russia.

In 2003, the Federal Border Service was reorganized into the Border Service of the FSB of Russia. And in 2004, on the initiative of the new director of the service, Pronichev (information from border service veterans) and I am sure that with the help of our sworn “partners”, the principle of protecting the state border was changed from linear (described above) to regional-object based. Just like in Europe. That is, the Russian Federation has moved from a military-administrative to a territorial structure of state border protection.

What does this mean? And the fact is that now the task of border guards is not to prevent the illegal entry of foreign citizens into the territory of Russia, as such, but to prevent any citizens, vehicles and cargo from crossing the Russian border without properly executed documents.

Instead of wire and checkpoints at the border, there are now checkpoints on the roads.  According to the plan, the border line was to be equipped with technical means of tracking and signaling.

After all, without engineering arrangement and creation of acceptable and comfortable conditions for its protection the status of the state border turns into a fictitious declaration of intentions.

That for the technical equipment of the border “ground mobile radio systems and UAVs (drones), alarm devices, video and radar, infrared and thermal imaging surveillance devices, seismic sensors transmitting information in real time and other novelties of the domestic defense-industrial complex are being developed in an interview in March 2010 said Head of the Center for Military Forecasting, Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok.

However, it was smooth on paper.

Back in 2008, the Border Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation switched to a completely contract recruitment system. And contract workers need apartments and good salaries. The border, as a rule, is “wilderness”. And no one wants to serve there for pennies.

Eventually  There are very few funds left for technical equipment, namely borders. And what, in the current understanding, is technical equipment? First of all, equipped checkpoints.

That I'm not exaggerating Boris Skupov testifies:

“The most difficult and most urgent problem that must be solved before 2020 is creating the most comfortable conditions for citizens and vehicles to cross the border.”

As you can see, we are not talking about border protection. It should be understood that the real cost of 1 kilometer of the State Border is about 500 thousand dollars. The land border with Ukraine alone is 1500,2 kilometers long? and its equipment will cost the treasury 750,1 million US dollars.

_{Therefore, opposite the section of the border equipped by Ukraine, from the Russian side we can only see a lonely border pillar, passing by which in the direction of Russia will not be difficult.}

As veterans of the border service sadly said, now, practically, border protection in Russia is based on receiving information from agents, both in Russian and in neighboring territories. Perhaps this happens quickly?

As the author of the article happily reported on May 30, 2017, “Where does the Russian border end?":

“The State Border communications equipment is developing innovatively. There have always been big problems with it and now they have mostly been resolved. Now, unified information and telecommunication systems have appeared in border departments, which in official use have received the name “border Internet”.

That is, now the speed of communicating information about border violations to operational response units is the highest?

But what really?

But in fact, as the media reported about the attack on Lyubuchany and Sushany:

“...the first reports of the attack began to arrive at 8:35 local time. One of the first calls was related to the shelling of a Niva in which three children were being transported. At 9 a.m., a resident of Lyubechan called the police and said that he was driving with his wife in a car and was “stopped by people in white coats and ordered to sit still.”

At 10 a.m., according to the Baza telegram channel, operational services received a message that “a group of 17 armed people was walking around Sushany” (according to Kommersant, the main events took place in the village of Lyubechane). After 11 a.m., the police began receiving reports allegedly from residents of Lyubechan that shelling was underway in the village. The publication claims, that at 12:39 a resident of Lyubechan called the police and reported that “military members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” allegedly blew up the house.

Most interesting is that and after 4 hours no rapid response forces arrived at the scene. The “volunteer” terrorists unhinderedly completed the tasks assigned by their curators and also left unhindered. This is what the media reported, and towards the evening, the FSB Central Operations Center reported that the terrorists had been pushed out into the adjacent territory in order to avoid casualties among the civilian population, where they were destroyed by artillery fire.

_{But, alas, this all looks like an attempt to cover up the glaring problems of insecurity of our border with a country where the Russian Armed Forces have been conducting full-scale military operations for the second year now.}

But shortly before the DRG invasion from Ukraine, on February 9, the governor of the Bryansk region, Bogomaz, boasted:

“The work carried out on the construction of protective structures and strongholds was highly appreciated by the command Armed Forces of Russia».

At the same time, on October 19 last year, the country’s president Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin introduced a medium level of response in eight regions, including the Bryansk region. This involves, in particular, strengthening the protection of public order and an increased level of security at energy facilities.

In addition, in the Bryansk region the authorities indefinitely introduced terrorist threat level after decree Putin.

_{It’s curious, but if the terrorist threat level had not been introduced, then no one would have arrived at the scene of the incident?}

What As the situation of the Armed Forces at the front worsens, sabotage activities will increase, organized in Russia by the Ukrainian special services, is clear as day. A huge amount of material has been written about this, including by the author. So this was to be expected. This demonstration was organized by the SBU to test the possibility of carrying out a more serious action.

_{The described situation indicates that it is likely that we will face a terrorist attack worse than Beslan or Nord-Ost. Unless, of course, we are ALL! we will remain in a state of deep prostration.}

What to do?

First, officials must stop lying to themselves, the president and the people!

I wanted to write: “Stop stealing!“, but then I thought that we needed real recommendations, not slogans.

An investigation needs to be ordered and carried out. against the Governor of the Bryansk Region, Bogomaz, on the fact of reporting false information at a working meeting with the Commanders of the group about the completion of the strengthening of the state border and the high assessment given by the military of its condition, which ended up in the media.

Also check regarding the military that hosted these facilities and why were they praised?

Based on the results of the investigation, decide on the punishment of those responsible within the framework of administrative and criminal legal regulation, depending on the degree and content of guilt. This must be done, since impunity entails the disintegration of the entire organization. Read Russia.

Appoint a commission to check the actual state of technical equipment of the border and the availability of rapid response forces to its violation. If they are not there, urgently create them. Let it be the local militia as well. The forces must be sufficient to prevent the penetration of enemy forces up to and including a battalion deep into the country. Take comprehensive measures to protect and defend the regional center.

Conduct exercises to suppress the actions of violators and terrorist groups.

Develop a plan for the actual technical and engineering equipment of the state border. Allocate the necessary forces and means to complete this task.

Carry out similar activities along the entire length of the Russian-Ukrainian border with priority "A". 

_{Taking into account the actions of the United States to aggravate the situation on the borders of Russia with Georgia, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic republics, carry out events of similar content and focus.}

_{Particular attention should be paid to the security of the Kaliningrad enclave, the border with Crimea, as well as the security of the Russian Armed Forces group in Transnistria.}